VZCZCXYZ0008
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #1983/01 1990415
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 170415Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5906
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0606
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1270
RHMFISS/USFJ
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 001983 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
NSC FOR WILDER/KATZ; DOD FOR OSD/APSA 
SHINN/SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA; USFJ FOR J00/J01/J3/J5 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2018 
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV AF JA
SUBJECT: DASD WILKES DELIVERS AFGHAN OPTIONS TO JAPAN 
 
Classified By: CDA James Zumwalt; Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) 
 
¶1. (C/NF) Summary: Japanese officials and politicians 
indicated a willingness to consider substantial new financial 
and personnel contributions to Afghanistan in response to an 
updated set of Afghan options presented on July 15-16 by DASD 
for Central Asia Bobby Wilkes.  DASD Wilkes' Japanese 
interlocutors said that Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda would 
make the final decision on the proposed package of Afghan 
contributions, which included aerial logistics, a medical 
network, and support for Afghan security forces, but 
cautioned that prospects for a new Self-Defense Force (SDF) 
mission appear increasingly dim given domestic political 
turmoil.  Ministry of Defense (MOD) Defense Policy Bureau 
Director General Nobushige Takamizawa urged the U.S. to take 
a longer view of possible Japanese military roles, suggesting 
that Japanese forces should begin preparations for a more 
robust operation in the 2010-2011 timeframe.  Off-line, MOFA 
officials expressed frustration over the political 
leadership's equivocations over dispatching SDF personnel and 
urged the President to call the Prime Minister to reinforce 
the importance of Japan making a ""substantial"" contribution 
to coalition efforts in Afghanistan.  Representatives from 
ISAF Embassies offered to support follow-on engagement with 
the Japanese government, noting that bilateral approaches on 
Afghanistan had thus far not been effective.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C/REL ISAF) DASD for Central Asia Bobby Wilkes met July 
15-16 with senior officials from Japan's Cabinet Secretariat, 
MOFA, MOD, and ruling and opposition parties to press Japan 
to implement a package of measures to support coalition 
stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. 
Wilkes noted that the package of initiatives was compiled in 
response to Prime Minister Fukuda's assertion to the 
President on July 6 that the dispatch of CH-47s or a full PRT 
would be impossible in the current political environment. 
While the U.S. judged that these two missions would qualify 
as ""substantive"" in terms of their benefits to ISAF and the 
Afghan people, the U.S. would also accept a package of 
smaller contributions that would, taken together, offer 
similar benefits. 
 
Option B 
-------- 
 
¶3. (C/NF) In each of his meetings, Wilkes outlined what the 
U.S. would expect in terms of a package of new Afghan 
contributions: 1) dedicated airlift by C-130s, and possibly 
1-2 CH-47s, for country-wide logistics or direct support to 
the Lithuanian PRT in RC-West; 2) dispatch of civilian or 
military experts to PRTs run by a third country 3) a medical 
a network consisting of a 40-45 bed hospital and set of 10-15 
bed satellite clinics; 4) USD 200 million contribution for 
Afghan elections in 2009 and 2010; and 5) USD 20 billion for 
the expansion of Afghan security forces and judicial 
structures.  In addition to these specific contributions, 
Wilkes noted the importance of Japan's leaders committing 
themselves and the Japanese people to the mission of aiding 
Afghanistan and its people. 
 
¶4. (C/NF) Deputy Vice Foreign Minister Chikao Kawai told DASD 
Wilkes that Japan clearly understood from the President's 
July 6 conversation with Prime Minister Fukuda that Japan 
needs to do more in Afghanistan.  He asserted that, in the 
near term, Japan faces significant operational, legal, and 
political hurdles to undertaking a military operation.  Kawai 
thanked the U.S. government for compiling a new package and 
offered Japan's ""best efforts"" to provide a positive 
response.  He noted, however, that time was short given the 
need to submit new legislation to authorize the dispatch of 
SDF personnel.  Since the government intends to submit 
legislation to extend Japan's maritime refueling mission by 
the end of August, Tokyo will need to decide within the 
coming week whether it will need to expand the current draft 
bill to include a ground mission in Afghanistan.  MOFA 
officials said that Japan will try to formally respond to the 
U.S. proposal in 1-3 weeks. 
 
SDF Role: Getting Cold Feet? 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C/NF) Off-line, MOFA Foreign Policy Bureau Deputy 
Director General Kazuyoshi Umemoto told the Embassy that the 
Prime Minister has been briefed on the C-130 operations 
proposed by DASD Wilkes but has not yet indicated the 
direction of his thinking on the matter.  Umemoto assessed, 
however, that short of a strong personal appeal from the 
President early in the week of July 21, it is likely that the 
Prime Minister will decide against taking the domestic 
political risk that the mission would entail.  Umemoto 
bemoaned that Japan's political leaders badly miscalculated 
by signaling to the United States that they would send SDF 
forces without adequately preparing themselves to sell the 
concept to coalition leaders focused almost exclusively on 
upcoming elections. 
 
¶6. (C/REL ISAF) Umemoto's negative assessment over a 
near-term SDF deployment was echoed in virtually all of DASD 
Wilkes' meetings.  MOD Defense Policy Bureau DG Takamizawa 
urged the U.S. to take a longer view of Japan's potential 
military contributions.  Takamizawa claimed that he was 
surprised by how unprepared for performing expeditionary the 
SDF is, citing a range of upgrades needed for Japan's C-130s 
and CH-47s to be fully capable of operating in Afghanistan. 
Rather than pressing for a near-term small-scale SDF dispatch 
in the current difficult political environment, Takamizawa 
said that it would be better to prepare the SDF for a more 
robust mission in the 2010-2011 timeframe.  Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) Acting Security Affairs Council 
Chairman Yasukazu Hamada told Wilkes that he ""hates giving 
excuses why Japan can not do what it should do in the world,"" 
but stated that it is more practical to prepare for a major 
mission in the medium term rather than expecting the ruling 
coalition to risk a showdown with the opposition over a new 
ground mission in the coming 12 months. 
 
Interest in Other Options 
------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C/REL ISAF) Most of DASD Wilkes' interlocutors suggested 
that the U.S. and Japan shift their focus to those elements 
of the package that do not require new legislative authority, 
such as sending civilian experts to PRTs or providing 
additional economic assistance.  MOFA Aid Policy Division 
Director Naoki Ito noted that Japan has long experience in 
assisting in the development of health care structures along 
the lines of what was proposed in the latest U.S. package. 
LDP Acting Foreign Affairs Council Chairman Seishiro Eto 
suggested that Japan go further than simply building one set 
of medical facilities and take complete responsibility for 
standing-up Afghanistan's health care system nation-wide. 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Vice President Seiji Maehara 
said that Japan should also consider sending irrigation 
experts to PRTs around Afghanistan to assist 
crop-substitution efforts in support of ISAF's 
counter-narcotics mission. 
 
¶8. (C/REL ISAF) During a July 16 inter-agency session to 
review the latest U.S. proposal, Japanese officials sought 
specific details on what role Japanese experts could play in 
various PRTs around Afghanistan beyond the work already being 
done by 70 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
personnel working in the Kabul region.  MOD's Takamizawa 
noted that the SDF may be able to send subject matter experts 
to PRTs without legislation, if they were seconded to MOFA 
and dispatched under diplomatic status.  MOFA National 
Security Division Deputy Director Shingo Miyamoto suggested 
the possibility of Japan chartering private airlift assets to 
support third-country PRT operations or nation-wide air 
support if Tokyo is unable to send its own C-130s for 
political reasons. 
 
¶9. (C/NF) Japanese officials also expressed interest in the 
details of the proposed five-year USD 20 billion Japanese 
contribution to support Afghan stability operations.  MOFA 
International Cooperation Bureau officials noted that Japan 
has self-imposed limits on its ability to provide financial 
assistance to foreign militaries, although they are able to 
provide non-lethal support to police activities.  MOFA North 
American Affairs DG Shunichi Nishimiya was more positive, 
noting that Japan has gradually expanded its interpretation 
of what can be providing to support security operations.  ""If 
there is anywhere in the world where we will be able to find 
creative ways to go even further,"" he added, ""it is 
Afghanistan.""  The LDP's Eto said he fully understood 
Washington's request for a major new funding commitment to 
Afghanistan.  He added that since Japan is unable to provide 
financial support to the Six-Party Process on North Korea due 
to the abduction issue, it is only natural for it to make 
significant additional contributions to Afghanistan. 
 
Coalition Support 
----------------- 
 
¶10. (C/NF) During a set of meetings with diplomats and 
attaches from ISAF member embassies, there was general 
agreement that a coordinated approach to Japan on Afghanistan 
will have a greater chance of success than previous bilateral 
interventions.  New Zealand Defense Attache Capt. John 
Campbell said that his country has offered Japan training for 
participating in PRT operations.  This could help Japan 
respond to the U.S. request for a Japanese presence on the 
ground.  Canadian Political Counselor Karen MacArthur 
commented that a U.S. briefing for Washington-based ISAF 
diplomats would help the Tokyo-based diplomatic corps raise 
the profile of Japan's potential as an Afghan partner back in 
their capitals.  DASD Wilkes suggested follow-on meetings 
with ISAF diplomats in both Washington and Tokyo to 
coordinate coalition messages to the Japanese government and 
public. 
 
Comment: Avoiding Risk has its Price 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (C/NF) Prime Minister Fukuda has yet to show his hand, 
but the clear message conveyed during DASD Wilkes visit was 
that the political will to risk a new military operation in 
Afghanistan is waning.  That said, Japanese officials and 
politicians seem fully aware that they cannot simply walk 
away from Afghanistan after raising U.S. expectations at such 
high levels without seriously damaging the Alliance.  This 
sense of obligation offers important leverage for gaining 
near-term commitments to major new financial and civilian 
contributions for Afghan development and security programs. 
In addition, the U.S. should keep up pressure on Japan to 
immediately enhance the expeditionary capabilities of the SDF 
so that there will be more options on the table when the 
domestic political environment improves.  Enlisting ISAF 
coalition partners will also be helpful in pushing the 
Japanese government towards more robust contributions and 
raising awareness of the situation in Afghanistan among the 
Japanese public and political leadership. 
ZUMWALT