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Viewing cable 08TALLINN241, THE DECLINE OF ESTONIA'S ETHNIC RUSSIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TALLINN241 2008-07-14 13:06 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tallinn
VZCZCXYZ0033
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTL #0241/01 1961306
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141306Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TALLINN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0704
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2602
UNCLAS TALLINN 000241 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SOCI RS EN
SUBJECT: THE DECLINE OF ESTONIA'S ETHNIC RUSSIAN 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
REF: A) 2007 TALLINN 280 
     B) 2007 Tallinn 288 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Although ethnic Russians make up about 
one-third of Estonia's population, they have failed to 
achieve any significant influence over Estonian politics. 
Support for Russian parties continues to decline, with most 
Russians supporting the mainstream Center Party.  The small 
Russian parties which do still exist in Estonia are 
fractured and focus too narrowly on ethnic issues rather 
than addressing concerns with broader appeal like the 
economy and social welfare.  END SUMMARY 
 
2. (U) Ethnic Russian political parties first developed in 
Estonia during the late 1980's, primarily in opposition to 
the Estonian independence movement.  During the mid to late 
1990s, several new Russian political parties emerged with 
platforms more focused on issues related to ethnicity. 
Russian parties were first represented in the Riigikogu 
(Estonian Parliament) in 1995.  During the 1999 
parliamentary elections two ethnically based parties, the 
United People's Party and the Russian Unity Party, ran on a 
joint ticket and received a combined 6.8 percent of the 
vote, earning them six seats in the 101-seat Estonian 
parliament. 
 
3. (U) Despite these early successes, Russian political 
parties have failed to achieve any significant influence in 
Estonian politics.  Currently, only two Russian political 
parties are politically engaged, the Constitution Party and 
the Russian Party. Both parties claim approximately 1,500 
registered members, of whom only about 500 are active. 
(Note: For comparison, the smallest party currently 
represented in Parliament, the Green Party, has 
approximately 1500 members. End Note.)  During the most 
recent parliamentary elections, held in March 2007, the 
Constitution Party received 1.7 percent and the Russian 
Party 0.2 percent of the vote.  As such, neither party 
achieved the 5 percent threshold necessary to gain a seat 
in Estonian Parliament. 
 
4. (U) A few members of the ethnic Russian political 
community suggest the downward trend in support for ethnic 
political parties demonstrates that the Russian speakers in 
Estonia have become marginalized and apolitical.  However, 
the unrest surrounding the relocation of a Russian World 
War II memorial in Tallinn in April 2007 (Reftel A) and the 
continuing debate concerning the Government of Estonia's 
(GOE) integration reforms (Reftel B) show that Russian 
speakers in Estonia do have a specific political and social 
agenda, i.e., countering what they perceive as biased or 
discriminatory practices against Estonia's ethnic Russian 
minority.  In addition, ethnic Russian support for one of 
Estonia's largest mainstream political parties has 
increased significantly over time.  During the 2007 
Parliamentary elections, the Center Party received an 
overwhelming 55 percent of the vote in the predominately 
Russian-speaking county of Ida-Viru, up from 41 percent in 
2003 and 56 percent of the vote in Lasnamae, a heavily 
ethnic Russian borough in Tallinn (up from 41 percent in 
2003). 
 
5. (SBU) Some of Estonia's ethnic Russian political leaders 
blame 'discriminatory practices' by the Estonian government 
for the decline of their parties.  Sergei Jurgens, leader 
of the Constitution Party, suggested that it has been the 
GOE's policy to negatively depict Russian political 
candidates in the press for fear they may attempt to 
restore the Soviet Union.  Rafik Grigorjan, chairman of the 
Estonian Chamber of National Minorities, an organization 
established by Russian speaking community leaders in 
response to the April 2007 riots, claims that many ethnic 
Russians are afraid to vote for non-Estonian parties 
because 'anyone can become jobless at any time.'  Stanislav 
Tserepanov, head of the Russia Party, suggested that ethnic 
support for the Center Party is linked to the relationship 
between Center Party leader Edgar Saavisar and high ranking 
officials within the Russian Government.  Tserepanov 
alleges that during the last election, the Russian FSB 
provided 'technical and financial assistance' to the Center 
Party in the heavily Russian northeast region of the 
country.  (Note: In 2004, Center Party leaders entered into 
a 'contract of cooperation' agreement with former Russian 
President Putin's United Russia Party. End Note.)  Even 
Russian speakers who belong to the more mainstream 
political parties see a government conspiracy behind the 
weakened state of Russia's political parties.  Sergei 
Ivanov, an ethnic Russian member of the coalition leading 
Reform Party, alleges that during the early 1990's, the 
Estonian security police, KAPO, purposefully 'destroyed' 
the Russian political elite for fear that Russia would use 
them as a means of influence. 
 
6. (U) Other members of the ethnic Russian community offer 
somewhat more pragmatic assessments as to why support for 
ethnic Russian political parties has steadily declined in 
the past 10 years.  On the one hand, there is the feeling 
that ethnic Russian parties have suffered from their late 
entry into independent Estonian politics.  According to 
Estonian law, only citizens have the right to join a 
political party.  As such, a substantial amount of time 
elapsed before there was a large enough naturalized 
Russian-speaking constituency to build upon.  Even today, 
there are still close to 115,000 ethnic Russians in Estonia 
who have not chosen to naturalize and as such cannot belong 
to a political party.  (Note:  There are also almost 
100,000 long'term residents living in Estonia who are 
citizens of the Russian Federation and not eligible to 
vote.)  Others have argued that this decline reflects that 
Russian speakers in Estonia do not vote on the basis of 
ethnicity, but are instead concerned about their economic 
future.  According to these sources, Russian political 
leaders consistently ignore economic and other quality of 
life issues and instead tend to focus solely on ethnic 
issues like the Estonian language transition program and 
citizenship. 
 
7. (U) Russian political leaders credit much of the success 
of the mainstream Center Party to its financial well-being 
and strategic courting of ethnic Russians.  Sergi Jurgens 
attributes ethnic Russian support for Center to the party's 
publication of a free Russian language newspaper, 
widespread television advertising before the last election, 
and operation of the highest circulating Russian language 
daily tabloid in Estonia. Stanislav Tserepanov commented 
that his Russia party is unable to recruit new voters 
because it failed to meet the 5 percent threshold in the 
past two elections, rendering Russia ineligible for state 
financing.  As a result, the Russia party has no money to 
campaign and potential voters are 'unaware' of their 
existence.  In comparison, Center, which currently holds 29 
seats received from the state the equivalent of USD 685,600 
during the 2007 elections. 
 
8.(U) While Center Party leadership claims not to promote 
an ethnic agenda, their success in attracting ethnic voters 
clearly stems from their support of policies which appeal 
to Russian voters.  Center Party strongly opposed the GOE 
decision to relocate the Bronze Soldier memorial in April 
2007 and Chairman Edgar Saavisar criticized the GOE for its 
handling of the riots.  Following the riots, polls showed a 
significant increase in ethnic Russian support for Center. 
The party has also actively supported liberalization of 
legislation to make it easier for older non-Estonians to 
naturalize and grant automatic citizenship to children born 
to non-citizens of the country.  Additionally, Center Party 
traditionally supports raising wages and expanding public 
sector jobs, issues important to ethnic Estonians and 
Russians alike. 
 
9. (U) An April 2008 opinion poll conducted by TNS EMOR, 
the largest marketing research and consulting company in 
Estonia, shows the 50 percent of the Russian speakers living 
in Tallinn favor Center over other mainstream political 
parties.  The next highest percentage of support goes to 
the Prime Minister's Reform Party with only 3 percent. 
While other mainstream parties also point to the fact that 
they have their own ethnic'Russian factions, support for 
these parties is very low within the Russian community. 
Sergi Jurgens, leader of the Constitution Party, estimates 
that about 75 percent of the overall ethnic Russian 
community in Estonia supports Center Party. 
 
10. (SBU) The future of Estonia's ethnic political parties 
remains unclear. Both parties lack energetic young 
leadership.  In addition, young, politically active ethnic 
Russians are often lured to the more mainstream political 
parties by the offer of a more promising career path. 
Also, despite recognizing the need to broaden their 
respective platforms and increase their appeal to ethnic 
voters, several attempts by ethnic Russian parties to agree 
on a common direction or leadership have failed.  In fact, 
a long rumored merger between the two ethnic Russian 
political parties, the Russia Party and the Constitution 
Party, was put to rest in June when the Constitution Party 
instead merged with another small party, the Estonian Left 
Party, which is represented in the European Parliament. 
 
DECKER