O 301159Z JUL 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 081808 
 
 
UNVIE FOR IAEA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IAEA TRGY ENRG KNNP ABUD AORC
 
SUBJECT: IAEA: INSTRUCTIONS FOR USDEL TO IAEA BOARD OF 
GOVERNORS (BOG) MEETING, 1 AUGUST 2008 
 
REF: A. UNVIE 392 
     ¶B. UNVIE 393 
     ¶C. UNVIE 395 
     ¶D. UNVIE 397 
     ¶E. U.S. POSITION PAPERS EMAILED TO UNVIE BY IO/T ON 
        29 JULY 2008 
     ¶F. STATE 72255 
     ¶G. STATE 77866 
     ¶H. STATE 81299 
 
¶1. Department appreciates the Mission,s reporting and 
analysis for the August IAEA BOG meeting (Refs A, B, C and 
D).  Instructions for the U.S. Delegation (USDel) follow in 
paragraphs 2 through 4. 
 
¶2. AGENDA ITEM 1 ) Nuclear Verification: Safeguards 
Agreement with India 
 
ISSUE: The BOG will be asked to approve the agreement with 
the Government of India for the application of safeguards to 
civilian nuclear facilities found in document GOV/2008/30. 
 
U.S. POSITION: 
 
BACKGROUND:  On 9 July 2008, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) circulated the draft India Safeguards Agreement 
for the Board of Governors' review.   The Agreement provides 
for appropriate, effective safeguards in perpetuity, based on 
accepted safeguards principles, while taking into account 
India's unique circumstances. The Agreement is based 
primarily on INFCIRC/66, the approved IAEA safeguards system 
appropriate for states not under NPT full-scope safeguards. 
INFCIRC/66 is not a model safeguards agreement, and there 
will be differences in the texts of INFCIRC/66-based 
agreements to accommodate the circumstances in which 
safeguards are applied, as well as the scope of facilities 
and materials being offered for safeguards.  Nonetheless, the 
technical safeguards methods that are applicable under 
INFCIRC/66 agreements are the same as those applicable to 
states with NPT full-scope safeguards, so that we expect that 
safeguards on reactors in India, for example, would resemble 
very closely those applied to reactors in NPT states. 
 
India has made public a plan to separate its civil and 
military facilities, in which 14 reactors and other 
facilities would be offered for safeguards under the 
agreement; the separation plan has been circulated to the 
Board as INFCIRC/731.  Placement of a large majority of 
India's civilian reactors under safeguards is a major gain 
for nonproliferation. Under this agreement, once India places 
a civilian facility into the list of facilities under 
safeguards in the Annex, it cannot be withdrawn from 
safeguards unless the IAEA and India jointly determine that 
the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity 
relevant from the point of view of safeguards. Some 
preambular language in the safeguards agreement (particularly 
that on &corrective measures8) has drawn criticism.  This 
language reflects the history and context of the application 
of safeguards in India.  It does not alter the substantive 
provisions governing the application of safeguards. 
 
Approval of the Indian safeguards agreement is a necessary 
step in the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. 
Following a positive Board decision, the United States will 
seek to gain consensus in the Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG) 
for an India-specific exception to the NSG's full-scope 
safeguards requirement; any linkages between the IAEA Board 
and NSG processes should be avoided.   Washington believes 
swift consideration and positive action on the India 
safeguards agreement will bring India into the 
nonproliferation mainstream and represents an important step 
toward realizing the economic and energy benefits foreseen by 
the Initiative. 
 
U.S. POSITION:  Delegation should welcome the conclusion of 
the Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and India and work 
to ensure its approval at this Board of Governors Meeting. 
In so doing, Delegation should focus on arguments that this 
is a credible safeguards agreement, based on accepted 
principles, recommended by the Secretariat, and deserving of 
broad international support. 
 
Delegation should attempt to ensure that the Board of 
Governors takes its decision on the IAEA-India Safeguards 
Agreement by consensus.  Delegation should ensure that 
Washington is kept informed fully of any efforts to defeat or 
delay adoption of the Agreement. 
 
Delegation should work to prevent any Board member from 
proposing any amendment to the Safeguards Agreement, keeping 
in mind that such amendments to the Agreement will be voted 
on before consideration of the Agreement itself (Rules 31 and 
44).  Delegation should work to defeat any proposal to vote 
paragraph by paragraph on the Agreement (Rule 43). 
 
Should any Board member oppose the Safeguards Agreement, 
Delegation should induce them not to block a consensus on 
approving the agreement and instead to formally state 
reservations about the consensus decision under Rule 42. 
Such reservations may be made before or after the vote is 
taken. 
 
If a vote is taken on the Safeguards Agreement, Delegation 
should work to ensure that Rule 37 requiring a two-thirds 
majority is not invoked.  Should a vote be called, Delegation 
should encourage Board Members opposed to the Agreement to 
abstain, vice voting against the Agreement, since abstentions 
and absences are counted as not voting (Rule 37). 
 
Delegation should bear in mind that on a procedural matters, 
points of order have the first preference, followed by 
motions to suspend the meeting, adjourn the meeting, adjourn 
the debate, postpone a decision until a fixed date, and for 
closure of the debate (Rule 29).  No debate is permitted on a 
motion to adjourn the meeting (Rule 28).  Delegation should 
work to defeat any motion to adjourn the meeting or to 
postpone a decision until a fixed date, provided that 
Delegation is confident that there are sufficient votes to 
approve the Safeguards Agreement should it come to a vote. 
In no case, should the measure be brought to a vote if it 
would fail, since, under Rule 33(b), the Agreement could not 
easily be brought back to the Board before December 2008. 
 
      The U.S. Delegation is instructed to deliver a brief 
statement, drawing on the language below. 
 
U.S. Statement: 
 
IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, August 1, 2008 
Agenda Item 1 
 
 
Nuclear Verification: Safeguards Agreement with India 
 
 
Mr. Chairman, 
 
      I will be brief, because in fact the issue before the 
Board is a simple one. 
 
      India came to the IAEA seeking a safeguards agreement 
to enable it to place nuclear facilities and materials under 
safeguards, for the purpose of engaging in peaceful nuclear 
activity and commerce. 
 
The agreement was carefully negotiated by the Secretariat, 
which has recommended it for approval by the Board. 
 
      The agreement is based solidly on INFCIRC/66, the 
document entitled &The Agency,s Safeguards System.8  The 
elements of this agreement are little different than those of 
other agreements based on INFCIRC/66 that have come before 
this body, agreements which have invariably been adopted by 
this body swiftly, and by consensus. Under this agreement, 
safeguards would be applied to nuclear facilities in India 
using the same methods as applied elsewhere in the world. 
 
      The Board has had ample opportunity to consider the 
agreement, and both India and the IAEA have provided 
occasions for questions to be answered regarding the 
agreement.   We commend both for their efforts, and for the 
openness and thoroughness with which questions were 
addressed.  Every substantive issue raised has been given a 
thorough hearing. 
 
      Due to the unique circumstances of this arrangement, 
the document was structured as an umbrella agreement, without 
identification of specific facilities that would be placed 
under safeguards upon entry into force.   In its separation 
plan, however, India has identified the facilities it intends 
to offer for safeguards, and the Secretariat has circulated 
this information to you as INFCIRC/731.  The document lists 
14 reactors along with other facilities.   Precisely because 
it is an umbrella agreement, India will also be able, in the 
future, to add other facilities engaged in peaceful nuclear 
activities to that list and place them under safeguards. 
Moreover, this agreement allows for replacing the current 
agreements with an updated, more uniform, set of safeguards 
arrangements for India. 
 
      Without this agreement, the safeguards activities, and 
the assurance of peaceful use provided by them, will not be 
possible. 
 
The only real issue before the Board is whether we allow the 
Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under its Statute to 
provide these safeguards and these assurances.  We urge the 
Board to do so, and to approve the Agreement before us. 
 
      Thank you Mr. Chairman. 
 
¶3. AGENDA ITEM 2 ) Technical Cooperation Fund Targets for 
2009-2011 triennium 
 
ISSUE:  The Co-Chairs of the open-ended Working Group on TCF 
targets for 2009-2011 and Indicative Planning figures for 
2012-2013 will present a report on the outcome of 
consultations they have held since the June BOG. 
 
U.S. POSITION:  Instructions for USDel are in Refs G and H. 
 
¶4. AGENDA ITEM 3 )     Funding of Agency-wide Information 
System for Programme Support (AIPS) 
 
ISSUE: The BOG will be asked to approve document 
GOV/2008/21/Rev.1. 
 
U.S. POSITION:  Instructions for USDel are in Ref F. 
RICE 
 
 
NNNN 
 



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