P 251121Z JUL 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5260
INFO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0005
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0520
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0230
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SOFIA 000502 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (SENSITIVE) 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCOR KCRM BU
SUBJECT: JUMP-STARTING MOI REFORM 
 
REF: SOFIA 00445 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary.  After a contentious debate, the 
Parliament passed new MOI legislation July 22, with major 
emphasis on increasing the investigative capacity of the 
ministry and improving accountability in the use of 
specialized investigative techniques (SIT).  The following 
day, July 23, the EU released a harshly-worded report on 
Bulgarian rule of law, which has added incentive to 
accelerate MOI reform.  Though the EU naturally did not 
comment on the new MOI legislation, it highlighted known MOI 
deficiencies such as the need to improve the pre-trial 
investigation and case development process.  Now, as all eyes 
are watching, the Bulgarians have turned to us to help turn 
this demoralized ministry around; and we seek U.S. expert 
advice to effectively respond.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  The Prime Minister remains absolutely committed to 
overhaul the MOI.  His -- and the MOI leadership's -- 
challenge for meaningful impact is formidable.  A recently 
released Eurobarometer poll reveals a striking lack of public 
confidence in Bulgarian institutions, especially the police, 
and the government on corruption and crime issues.  On July 
22, the Parliament passed legislation to overhaul the MOI. 
The law outlines the MOI's structure and designates the 
Secretary General, now renamed the Chief Commissioner,  as 
the ministry's top professional.  Under the new law, DOI and 
DOTI (the technical surveillance agencies) will remain in the 
Interior Ministry, which we supported, and be merged into a 
specialized directorate under the Interior Minister.  Despite 
opposition MPs insistence that all investigating officers 
have law degrees, the majority eventually decided to 
establish a separate directorate for investigations with four 
categories of officers: senior investigating officers, chief 
investigating officers, investigating officers, and junior 
investigating officers.  MPs required a law degree for the 
first two categories and mandatory training at the MOI 
Academy for the second two.  When we met the following day 
with MPs, including members of the Committee on Domestic 
Order and Security, they agreed with our analysis that 
passing legislation was not enough.  They welcomed any advice 
and technical assistance that the U.S. could provide to spur 
effective implementation of reform to build law enforcement 
capacity and, more tellingly, a culture that the ministry 
serves and protects the people. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  On July 23, the EU issued its harshly-worded 
report on Bulgarian performance in the area of rule of law. 
Though slightly softened in the political review process, the 
extremely negative EU Commission report on Bulgaria's rule of 
law performance and its use of EU funds, is a stinging, 
unparalleled rebuke for Bulgaria.  The EU refrained from 
assessing the much bruited proposed MOI reforms, but echoed 
many of our comments about known deficiencies.  The report 
stressed the need for MOI to clarify the roles of actors in 
the pre-trial investigation stage, invest and train in a more 
qualified police force, and amend the Criminal Procedures 
Code to remove obstacles to effective prosecutions. The 
report also recommended more coordination between DANS and 
MOI.  Given the report's harshness, our European Commission 
contacts believe that the Bulgarians will more readily accept 
needed advice to address deficiencies raised in the report 
from the United States than the EU. 
 
Overhauling the MOI 
-------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)   The GOB has asked us for advice on reforming MOI. 
 Responding to personal requests from the Prime Minister and 
Interior Minister, we have moved ahead with bringing U.S. 
experts to consult and offer recommendations to the MOI on 
its principles, purposes, procedures and personnel system, 
and how it can better work with prosecutors.  The dust first 
has to settle on the MOI legislative package -- and they need 
to have their senior personnel team in place -- before we can 
consider moving beyond pre-existing programmatic support 
already in train.  Rather than launching new assistance 
programs, we want to advise them on how best to re-build and 
to help them assess their needs. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Here's what we are doing. . . . 
 
-- Discussing with the Minister, Deputy Minister, Members of 
Parliament (MPs) and Prime Minister's advisors the 
legislative reform package and function/structure/mission of 
a revamped MOI. 
-- Focusing on DOI/DOTI, in which we have both a strong law 
enforcement and counter-intelligence/national security 
interest. 
-- Consulting (first with Gary Bennett and now with Don 
Lizotte, both from the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance 
Program (ICITAP) on practical police functions to build 
organizational, management, and crime-fighting capacity, 
especially in police-prosecutorial collaboration. 
-- Lining up existing training and assistance programs (and 
tracking Bulgarian participants) so that we get the most bang 
for buck. 
-- Sharing assessments with missions of EU member states 
here, to coordinate any potential training or other 
assistance programs.  The EU, as a collective, is not 
currently offering direct assistance on MOI reform, and EU 
member state experts have not been directly involved in the 
reform efforts, providing limited advice on discrete 
functions, such as personnel systems and border control. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) . . . and what we need from Washington: 
 
-- International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL): 
 We look to INL to serve as the conduit to help identify 
relevant experts in various governmental agencies.  Post will 
do most of the legwork, but we look to INL to point us to the 
appropriate U.S. experts. 
 
-- DOJ:  We ask the DOJ to build from its current work with 
the prosecutors to reinforce MOI reform with a team that 
consults on prosecutorial organized crime task forces 
(management, composition, interaction with police, customs 
officials, tax authorities). To reinforce Bulgarian 
enforcement capabilities, we look to ICITAP to consult with 
the Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and 
Training Program (OPDAT) and to advise the Bulgarians on how 
to build a competent and reliable police force to meet the 
needs of the regional and the central level. 
 
-- FBI:  We request that FBI send an expert to share U.S. 
experience in combating organized crime organizations in New 
York City, which included elements of organized crime and 
public corruption.  We turn to the FBI to outline the 
components that make a successful national strategy to fight 
organized crime and corruption, and for sample mechanisms for 
coordinating across agencies and jurisdictions.  We would 
like to provide concrete examples of how the U.S. 
investigates and prosecutes organized crime.  The role of 
this expert would be to share U.S. experience and provide an 
assessment to the Bulgarian MOI. 
 
-- Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA):  During her July 13-14 
visit here, Administrator Leonhart offered a team of 
financial experts to help MOI build financial investigative 
capacity and extended an invitation to Interior Minister 
Mikov to visit the DEA Special Operations Center, which 
coordinates across jurisdictions and agencies to fight drug 
trafficking cases.  We are following up with MOI to advocate 
an increased focus on following the money in narcotics cases 
as an especially fruitful area for Bulgarian improvement. 
 
 
Comment 
-------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  We emphasize that at this stage, Bulgaria is 
seeking expert advice, not training.  Based on their positive 
experience with U.S. consultation on DANS establishment, the 
Bulgarians would like that advice to come from the United 
States.  MOI leadership is eager for U.S. technical 
assistance, and in the organizing the upcoming Lizotte 
consultative visit, has taken an especially proactive role to 
make the arrangements and make key staff available.  They 
have not requested new programs but concentrated on having a 
healthy dialogue on how they can organize and reform 
themselves.  This consultative relationship between MOI and 
U.S. experts means that we can help define, shape, and guide 
MOI reform at the leadership and operational levels. 
 
Karagiannis