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O 031608Z JUL 08
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5211
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000453 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BU IZ
SUBJECT: SUPPORTING BULGARIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION 
THROUGH ACQUISITION OF U.S. FIGHTERS 
 
REF: A. SOFIA 305 
     ¶B. SOFIA 303 
     ¶C. SOFIA 87 
     ¶D. 07 SOFIA 1271 
     ¶E. 07 SOFIA 1219 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affairs, a.i., Alex Karagiannis for reasons 1.4 
 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C/NF)  Summary.  Based on an understanding reached at 
Prime Minister Stanishev's 17 June meeting with Secretary 
Gates, the Bulgarian Government is expecting a DOD team in 
July 2008 to consult on Bulgaria's military modernization 
plans.  Post welcomes and fully supports this visit, which 
represents an extremely valuable opportunity to shape the 
future Bulgarian Armed Forces.  The level at which this 
assistance was requested demonstrates the importance the 
Bulgarians place on our cooperation.  They are expecting 
guidance from us on how to proceed with a potential purchase 
of multi-role fighters as well as broader input on their 
modernization priorities.  We suggest the following themes to 
guide the discussions.  A) Our shared top priority is 
increasing the deployability and NATO interoperability of 
Bulgaria's forces.  The Bulgarian Land Forces and Navy have 
already made significant strides in this direction, but the 
Air Force lags far behind.  Bulgaria needs, and the U.S. 
government strongly supports the acquisition of a U.S. 
multi-role fighter.  But more important than the particular 
airframe is the political decision to enter into a long-term 
partnership between the Bulgarian Air Force (BuAF) and the 
USAF.  We will work with them to ensure that they can 
purchase the best aircraft they can afford without 
jeopardizing the long-term health of their modernization 
efforts.  B)  To ensure that the Bulgarians make best use of 
their scarce defense resources, we would like to share our 
suggestions on how to reduce waste and focus their spending 
on improving deployability and interoperability ) 
specifically, foregoing or delaying a commitment on French 
corvettes, further elimination of legacy systems and 
reduction of vehicle platforms to save on maintenance and 
logistics.  End Summary. 
 
TIMING AND COMPOSITION OF VISIT 
 
¶2.  (C/NF)  We recommend this visit take place within the 
last two weeks of July (7/21 ) 8/1).  This will allow the 
Bulgarians time to absorb the messages of USAFE Commander 
General Brady, visiting July 7, and Secretary Rice, visiting 
July 9, but would precede the month of August, during which 
many key Bulgarian decision makers will be unavailable.  We 
have an opportunity to drive the Bulgarian's decision 
process, but the right message must be delivered soon.  Delay 
will not serve our interests.  Since the request for this 
visit was made to Secretary Gates by the Prime Minister, it 
is important that the group meet Minister of Defense Tsonev. 
Ideally, the group should be led by at least a one-star 
officer.  "Big picture" discussions will help the Bulgarians 
prioritize their modernization projects, convince them of the 
merits of an older-model, more-affordable U.S. fighter and 
strengthen the position of like-minded thinkers in the MOD 
through our support.  A follow-up visit in the fall can then 
assist the Bulgarians in budget planning once political 
decisions have been made on their spending priorities. 
 
CONTEXT:  NEW MINISTER, OLD BUDGET BATTLES 
 
¶3.  (C/NF)  Earlier this year the MOD, then under the 
leadership of Minister Bliznakov, completed a re-evaluation 
of its four-year old "Plan 2015" transformation and 
modernization program.  (Reftel C)  While many steps taken 
under these reforms were positive, such as acceleration of a 
reduction in personnel and closure of unnecessary facilities, 
key future procurement decisions were deliberately not 
included in this review.  It has fallen to new Minister 
Tsonev to address these issues, which are particularly 
contentious since Plan 2015 originally recommended the 
purchase of 11 "priority projects", not all of which are 
affordable under Bulgaria's budget. 
 
¶4.  (C/NF)  Bulgaria's sense of procurement urgency is being 
driven by the intense pressure they are under to purchase 
very expensive corvette-class ships from the French company 
Armaris.  (Reftel E)  The general assumption has been that 
although corvettes and multi-role fighters were listed as 
"priority projects," Bulgaria cannot afford both.  For months 
 
speculation has been rife that one of the projects would go 
forward and the other would be delayed.  Post assessment is 
that an upgrade of Bulgaria's badly aging and 
Russian-dependent Air Force is a much greater priority than 
the corvettes, (especially given the recent purchases of 
three used Belgian frigates.)  Bulgaria intends to make a 
decision on funding these two programs before August.  A U.S. 
team must visit no later than the end of July to shape that 
process. 
 
¶5.  (C/NF)  The Bulgarian Prime Minister will travel to 
France on 4 July to meet President Sarkozy, and there is the 
real possibility that a deal on French Corvettes may be 
finalized.  (Though perhaps for only two ships, vice the 
original French offer of four.)  A expeditious U.S. visit is 
vital for establishing the acquisition of a U.S. fighter. 
Should Bulgaria attempt to fund both projects, we need to 
make the case that the fighter procurement must be given 
priority. 
 
ASSISTING BULGARIA IN BUILDING THE BEST, MOST DEPLOYABLE AND 
INTEROPERABLE FORCE IT CAN AFFORD 
 
¶6.  (C/NF)  FIGHTERS:  Rapidly losing capability, the 
Bulgarian Air Force is in dire need of modernization, but 
meaningful transformation is not possible due to its 
dependence on Russian airframes.  Transitioning Bulgaria to a 
U.S. multi-role fighter would drastically increase the 
capabilities of the BuAF and draw our two armed forces into 
ever closer cooperation.  Additionally, it would eliminate 
Russian influence over an entire section of the Bulgarian 
military and reduce its leverage over the Ministry of Defense 
as a whole.  (See Ref A for full analysis.) 
 
¶7.  (C/NF)  The Bulgarian Deputy CHOD told us the Bulgarians 
"urgently" need a "positive message" from us on fighters. 
They will look for a clear indication from the team that the 
United States supports Bulgaria's purchase of a U.S. fighter 
and will work with them to make sure they can conclude a deal 
as quickly as possible.  At the same time, we need to stress 
to them that our aim is to assist them in acquiring the best 
airframe they can afford.  Currently, the Bulgarians are 
overly focused on which particular aircraft (older vs. newer) 
they will acquire and are worried about the political optics 
of buying an airframe much older than what their regional 
neighbors (particularly Romania and Poland) have.  To counter 
this, we suggest that the team stress the paramount 
importance of partnership with the U.S. and the long-term 
goal of bridging the Bulgarians to the Joint Strike Fighter. 
The concept of a "bridge" to a fifth generation aircraft is 
not well understood by the Bulgarians.  Some key 
decisionmakers have even talked about staying with Russian 
MiGs and then jumping directly to a fifth generation 
aircraft.  It would be helpful to demonstrate clearly to the 
Bulgarian leadership why this is impossible. 
 
¶8.  (C/NF)  Moreover, we need to focus the Bulgarians away 
from the hardware itself and more on the need for 
transformation in doctrine and training.  We should stress to 
them that the BuAF not only needs new aircraft, but a 
fundamental transformation in the way it operates.  Strategic 
partnership with the USAF is essential to this, but will take 
time.  The type of U.S. aircraft Bulgaria acquires at this 
first stage (for example, Block 15 vs. Block 50) is less 
important than building a partnership with the USAF that 
increases interoperability and eventually leads to a fifth 
generation aircraft. 
 
¶9.  (C/NF)  The Bulgarians also have some misconceptions 
regarding the speed at which they could acquire and begin 
flying U.S. aircraft.  We will need to lay out for them a 
clear timeline of how long the acquisition and training 
process will take.  (Knowing that they will be comparing this 
to offers made for Gripens, which could be made available 
much sooner.)  It is important to be frank about the 
timelines involved, but also to note that lengthy training 
programs will have to take place before any new aircraft 
(U.S. or otherwise) could be flown by their pilots.  We 
should also reiterate the advantages of a U.S. partnership in 
terms of the comprehensive package of training and 
maintenance included in the acquisition of a U.S. aircraft. 
 
¶10.  (C/NF)  CUTTING COSTS/REDUCING WASTE:  It will not be 
possible in the context of this visit to attempt a full 
review of Bulgaria's defense budget.  But since the 
 
Bulgarians have asked us to take a comprehensive look at 
their budget priorities, there are several areas in each 
service where we could suggest targeted reductions, with 
fuller recommendations to follow from an expert-level team. 
Again the overarching theme is that Bulgaria should, in line 
with NATO recommendations, continue to eliminate non-NATO 
compatible legacy systems and to reduce units and equipment 
designed for territorial defense (versus expeditionary 
operations).  Specific recommendations in this vein: 
eliminate submarine program and outdated air-defense systems, 
delay or avoid commitment on French corvettes and reduce the 
number of vehicle platforms used by the Land Forces to reduce 
maintenance and logistics costs.  While reducing costs on 
specific vehicles and equipment, Bulgaria should make larger 
investments in training and development of its personnel, 
particularly its NCO Corps. 
 
¶11.  (C/NF)  Comment:  The new Defense Minister is looking to 
make bold moves on procurement and modernization decisions, 
but lacks sufficient background on the issues involved.  The 
Minister wants U.S. fighters, but there is a great deal of 
pressure elsewhere in the government for French corvettes and 
European fighters.  For political reasons, the Minister is 
inclined to want the newest fighter possible.  We can steer 
him off this by presenting a clear, justified way ahead on 
the procurement of an older, more-affordable airframe.  We 
want him to remain convinced that a U.S. fighter is the only 
valid course of action, while gaining a more realistic 
understanding of the costs and timelines involved.  To make 
procurement of an older fighter more politically palatable, 
it will be valuable to focus the Minister on the future goal 
of a fifth generation aircraft, with an older aircraft as a 
bridge.  The Bulgarians will almost certainly raise the Joint 
Strike Fighter.  We understand that the release of the JSF to 
Bulgaria has not been approved, but we do not have clarity on 
the criteria or decision-making process that led to that 
determination.  We urge this decision be revisited so that 
eventual release of the JSF could be paired with the 
near-term acquisition of an older airframe. 
Karagiannis