VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSN #0843 1962229
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 142229Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9786
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000843 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ES
SUBJECT: EMERGING PLAN B SHOULD THE FMLN WIN 2009 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
 
Classified By: The Ambassador, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Salvador Samayoa told us of a "Plan B" in the 
works to insulate El Salvador from (leftist) FMLN mischief 
should Mauricio Funes win the March 2009 election.  The draft 
plan is reportedly focused on preventing a catastrophic 
(conservative, pro-U.S.) ARENA loss in the Legislative 
Assembly, early selection of Supreme Court magistrates by the 
current Assembly, and legislative strengthening of existing 
Salvadoran institutions before the 2009 elections.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Salvador Samayoa, peace accords negotiator, former 
FMLN member, and now member of the National Development 
Commission and political commentator, told PolCouns July 11 
of consensus among the former ARENA presidents and others of 
the need for a "Plan B" should the FMLN's Mauricio Funes 
defeat ARENA candidate Rodrigo Avila in March 2009 elections. 
 Samayoa described an undisclosed meeting he attended in late 
June of the former ARENA presidents (Cristiani and Calderon 
Sol attended; Flores sent a personal representative) and 
Salvadoran business leaders including Roberto Murray Mesa, 
Ricardo Poma, and Arturo Sagrera.  Former President Cristiani 
reportedly told the group that while he had serious doubts 
about Avila's ability to win the election, they should all do 
everything in their power to secure his victory.  That said, 
he proposed, and the group concurred, that given the risk of 
a Funes victory, they needed to develop a "Plan B" in order 
to "save El Salvador" should Funes win the election. 
Cristiani proposed elaborating such a plan then having the 
former Presidents present it to Salvadoran President Saca, 
explain their support for Avila's candidacy and campaign, but 
alert him to their concerns of a Funes victory and inform him 
of their efforts. 
 
¶3. (C) As described by Samayoa, the plan has several 
components, two of which Samayoa believes are the most 
important.  He said the group is elaborating a plan to 
maintain near parity between the FMLN and ARENA in the 
Legislative Assembly in January 2009 elections.  Samayoa 
offered few details, but said the entire group believed a 
Funes government accompanied by a strong FMLN majority in the 
Assembly would spell disaster for El Salvador. 
 
¶4. (C) The other significant component of the plan would 
focus on control of key institutions, including the Supreme 
Court and Armed Forces.  Concerning the Court, Samayoa noted 
that five justices must be replaced by July 1, 2009, four of 
whom sit in the constitutional chamber of the Court.  The 
group believes it is essential their replacements be decided 
by the current Legislative Assembly (standard practice since 
the 1992 peace accords) not postponed until the Assembly to 
be elected in January 2009 is seated May 1 of that year. 
While the group expects complaints and opposition from the 
FMLN, they believe electing the new magistrates is 
achievable, but it will be difficult, since each must secure 
a 2/3 majority (56 of 84 deputies).  Samayoa said that in 
addition to support from its usual allies, ARENA would need 
the support of sometimes FMLN ally CD (Cambio Democratica or 
Democratic Change) and would still need to "buy" two more 
votes from the FMLN.  Regarding the Salvadoran Armed Forces, 
Samayoa only said the plan envisaged ensuring the Armed 
Forces were well cared for and in a position to maintain 
their independence. 
 
¶5. (C) Samayoa lamented the arbitrary way the Saca government 
had manipulated Salvadoran ministries and other institutions 
(including the Attorney General's Office) to pursue its own 
political ends and to satisfy the desires of political allies 
in and out of government.  A Funes government would be 
delighted to inherit a government structure that was so 
undisciplined and easily manipulated, therefore the group of 
former presidents plans to propose several key legislative 
reforms to impose order before the 2009 elections. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment: Samayoa makes no attempt to hide his 
disappointment in Avila and his candidacy.  He is equally 
disdainful of those in ARENA who are solely focused on the 
March 2009 presidential election and believes that by 
ignoring the January legislative vote, they put El Salvador's 
future at risk.  While the former Presidents' (and others') 
pessimism is bad news for Avila, the fact that they are 
taking a long view and attempting to fireproof El Salvador 
from feared FMLN mischief is reassuring.  We will report 
separately on Avila's successful Sunday, July 12 mega-rally 
in one of San Salvador's big soccer stadiums. 
 
GLAZER