VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSJ #0629/01 2121948
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301948Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9965
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1128
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0046

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000629 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, WHA/CEN AND WHA/CCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR CS CU
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA COZYING UP TO CUBA? 
 
REF: A. SAN JOSE 432 
     ¶B. 06 SAN JOSE 1841 
     ¶C. 07 SAN JOSE 1106 
     ¶D. SAN JOSE 129 
 
Classified By: DCM Peter M. Brennan for reason 1.4(d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) The Arias administration may be contemplating 
re-establishing diplomatic ties with Cuba.  A vocal embargo 
opponent in the legislature (a member of President Arias' own 
party) seems to have Arias' ear on the issue, arguing that 
normalized relations would help open Cuba to democracy. 
FonMin Stagno has signaled to local diplomats that a change 
is being considered.  The GOCR Consul in Havana emailed a 
local Cuba-watcher a month ago that ties were "getting 
closer."  A leading editorial writer told us July 24 that he 
is convinced a change is in the wind (and overdue, in his 
view). 
 
¶2. (C) The chatter here has been sporadic but persistent:  an 
opening with Cuba, explained as a move to force the Castro 
regime to democratize faster, might be just the sort of 
sweeping international gesture Arias is looking for in the 
last half of his administration.  Such a move would burnish 
his credentials with the international (and Costa Rican) 
intellectual left; allow him to respond to critics who say he 
has been too close to the U.S. during the bruising two-year 
fight to ratify and implement CAFTA; and place him back on 
the global stage.  On the other hand, a drastic reversal in 
Cuba policy might be a tough sell domestically, given Arias' 
record of vocal criticism of the regime in Havana.  Talk of a 
Cuba gambit has quieted over the last two weeks, perhaps 
because of our recent and widespread soundings on the issue, 
but there is still a hum in the background.  Given the Arias' 
administration's penchant for dramatic, no-notice foreign 
policy moves (moving the GOCR Embassy from Jerusalem to Tel 
Aviv, recognizing China, establishing relations with the 
Palestinian "state," etc.), if a change towards Cuba comes, 
it may be sudden. 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------- 
WHAT'S THE BUZZ? 
---------------- 
 
¶3. (C) There has been some political and media buzz about 
possible GOCR overtures to Cuba over the last 2-3 months, 
coinciding with Fidel's failing health and fade from power. 
During a luncheon with Poloffs in early June, legislator 
Federico Tinoco (PLN), strongly pro-US and one of the May 21 
Cuban Solidarity Day speakers (Ref A), (but also strongly 
anti-embargo), floated the idea of a Costa Rican opening to 
Cuba.  Tinoco intimated that he was shopping the idea 
informally around San Jose and in the GOCR.  His rationale: 
1) All other countries in Latin America had relations with 
Cuba and Costa Rica was a lone holdout; 2) Now that Costa 
Rica had opened relations with China (to very little domestic 
or international hue and cry), why not open up to Cuba?; 3) 
Costa Rica already had fairly extensive informal relations 
with Cuba, including some 10,000 Cubans in the country (news 
to us); and 4) Costa Rica's re-establishing relations would 
help further democracy in Cuba.  Tinoco maintained that the 
idea was more to help the Cuban people than to challenge U.S. 
policy. 
 
¶4. (C) Tinoco's musing reminded us of an earlier conversation 
in May with Elaine White, former advisor to the Minister and 
then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Pacheco 
administration (1998-2002).  She told us that during her 
tenure at the MFA, GOCR foreign policy rested on three sacred 
pillars:  1) recognition of Taiwan, 2) maintaining an embassy 
in Jerusalem, and 3) not having ties with Cuba.  White noted 
that Arias and Stagno had already reversed the first two 
(Refs B-C).  She added that the GOCR could not use "human 
rights" as the reason for distancing itself from Cuba, having 
recognized the PRC despite the latter's abysmal human rights 
record, and she pondered whether that would pave the way for 
a return to full GOCR-Cuban diplomatic relations. 
 
¶5. (SBU) On June 24, during an MFA overview briefing to 
senior members of the diplomatic corps, Stagno answered a 
point-blank question about relations with Cuba from the 
Russian Ambassador by saying that the GOCR was open to talk 
to the Cubans and did so from time to time, but that nothing 
"formal" was in the works. 
 
------------------------------ 
THE CUBA WATCHERS ARE WATCHING 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) With Tinoco's and White's reasoning on our minds, and 
the Cuba buzz continuing in the background, we canvassed some 
contacts in and outside of government.  Adriana Nunez, 
Cuban-born and -exiled PLN faction press chief in the 
legislature, who has had her finger on the pulse of Cuban 
issues here, told us on July 15 that the GOCR Consul in 
Havana, Jose Maria Penebad, visited San Jose about a month 
before for medical reasons but stayed on for consultations 
with the MFA.  After his return to Havana, Penebad wrote 
Nunez from his personal email account to tell her that ties 
were "getting closer."  Nunez believes the GOCR would make 
such a move sooner rather than later, with the uneventful 
opening to China the likely turning point in the Arias Team's 
thinking.  She said that President Arias had never had much 
of an internal "discourse" on Cuba, except to say that he 
would not re-engage with Cuba while Fidel was in power.  With 
Raul now in control, Arias may have an out, according to 
Nunez. 
 
¶7. (C) Nunez said that several of Arias' advisors have been 
encouraging him to re-establish full ties and that the MFA 
may have been deliberating doing so since late 2007.  She 
based this on a couple of indicators.  First, after the Cuban 
consul in San Jose vocally criticized Arias during last 
year's CAFTA debate and October referendum, Havana replaced 
the consul.  Second, toward the end of last year, a group of 
legislators took an official complaint they prepared 
regarding a Cuban political prisoner to the MFA to forward to 
Geneva.  When the "denuncia" made its way 
"upstairs" to the FonMin's desk, it was stopped and the MFA 
said it could not get involved.  Nunez took this as a sign 
that the MFA did not want to be seen by Havana as 
participating in the complaint.  She also noted that earlier 
this year the GOCR announced it was going to "shortly" 
establish diplomatic relations with a Caribbean country and a 
country in the Middle East.  (NOTE:  Aside from the quirky 
recognition of the "state" of Palestine, Ref D, there have 
been no new diplomatic ties established by the GOCR thus far 
in 2008.) 
 
¶8. (C) According to Nunez, Arias would most likely couch a 
re-establishment of ties in terms of contributing to the 
opening of Cuban democracy; showing solidarity with the other 
Latin American countries; and expanding the benefits of 
cultural/educational/professional exchanges.  Costa Rica 
already benefits from large numbers of Cuban doctors, many of 
whom work in the Costa Rican national health system.  Though 
Arias is known for his large ego and his role as a 
peace-broker, both Nunez and think-tank member Constantino 
Urcuyo doubted that Arias would try to insert himself as a 
mediator between the U.S. and Havana, in regards to the 
embargo, for example.  Urcuyo said Arias' motivation would be 
something "more simple," possibly -- as Nunez and Urcuyo both 
indicated -- another attempt to re-burnish his credentials 
with Costa Rican leftists. (COMMENT: Urcuyo also mused on the 
possible impact of the GOCR's Petrocaribe membership (septel) 
on ties with Cuba.  Would Chavez push San Jose closer to 
Havana?  END COMMENT.)  Nunez believes that the GOCR will 
strike quickly whenever it changes policy towards Cuba.  She 
bases this (with justification) on the Arias administration's 
surprise announcements about the embassy in Israel and 
recognition of China. 
 
----------------------------- 
BACKING OFF THE BUZZ, FOR NOW 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The Cuba buzz has quieted recently, but has not died 
altogether.  In mid-July, French Ambassador Jean-Paul Monchau 
told the DCM that he had asked Stagno directly about the GOCR 
normalizing relations with Cuba.  Stagno admitted they had 
been working on it, telling Monchau that the GOCR had cooled 
to the idea after the Cubans "insulted" the Europeans and 
started going after dissidents again.  On July 21, we asked 
legislator Evita Arguedas (Independent, married to a Cuban 
exile) whether she had heard anything definite about a 
normalization of relations.  She told us she had also heard 
chatter, but nothing definitive.  She did not discount the 
idea, however, and stated that "where there is talk, there is 
a reason." 
¶10. (C) Other leading legislators including PLN faction Chief 
Oscar Nunez and PUSC faction chief Lorena Vasquez told us 
they have heard nothing from the Executive on changes 
vis-a-vis Cuba, but both acknowledged the Arias 
administration would not necessarily inform or consult the 
legislature in advance, based on the China example.  Both 
also opined that it might be a tough sell for Arias 
domestically, given the Costa Rican people's strong support 
of human rights and (as Vasquez put it) general dislike for 
Cubans.  Ever the PLN loyalist, Oscar Nunez was confident the 
Costa Rican people would follow Arias' lead in the end.  "If 
they trust him on anything, it is on foreign policy," he 
said. 
 
¶11. (C) On July 22, we followed up with Adriana Nunez who had 
asked Rodrigo Arias, Minister of the Presidency, by email if 
the GOCR was planning to re-establish ties.  According to 
Nunez, Arias responded that it was "within the realm of 
possibilities" but he indicated that the matter had been 
"paralyzed" for now due to "other problems."  (COMMENT:  We 
assume this refers to the local scandal involving possible 
unethical government use of BCIE funds, which has been 
occupying a great deal of space in the local press, and 
perhaps the new membership in Petrocaribe.  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
¶12. (C) At the MFA, both Antonio Alarcon, Stagno's Chief of 
Staff, and Alejandro Solano, Deputy Director of Foreign 
Policy, had heard nothing about a prospective change in Cuba 
policy.  Neither could foresee relations being normalized in 
the next two years, and Alarcon also noted the possible 
political difficulties in selling a change in policy to the 
Costa Rican public.  However, recalling the way the China 
decision was handled, Alarcon promised there would be "no 
surprises" to the USG should the GOCR open to Cuba; the MFA 
would let us know in advance. 
 
¶13. (C) In a long, private conversation with us on July 18, 
Tinoco himself seemed to have backed off.  At first he did 
not want to talk about the issue (convincing us that he had 
indeed been pushing for relations with Cuba).  He then 
reprised his early arguments about Latin American solidarity, 
the moderate reaction to establishing ties to China, and the 
hoped-for positive Costa Rican influence on the regime. 
Pushing back firmly, we noted that Cuba is not China, and 
that Costa Rica is not like all other Latin American 
countries: Havana would turn full Costa Rican relations into 
an endorsement and a reward, long before appropriate and 
sufficient democratic changes had been made.  We added that 
even the EU had established benchmarks for improved behavior 
by the regime.  We concluded that an opening to Cuba by Arias 
now, with Petrocaribe in the works and following the 
president's critical comments about the U.S. in Iraq and the 
lack of USG assistance and attention to the region, might be 
hard to explain to Washington.  We also cautioned Tinoco not 
to expect wholesale, immediate changes in USG Cuba policy 
should a Democratic administration be elected in November. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶14. (C) We have not heard the last word on this. 
Paraphrasing legislator Evita Arguedas, where there is this 
much smoke, there is probably a little fire.  On July 24, 
Armando Gonzalez, editorial page chief of leading daily "La 
Nacion" told us that he is convinced a change remains in the 
wind (and is long overdue).  At an appropriate moment, 
establishing full diplomatic ties with Cuba might be just the 
sort of sweeping international gesture Arias seeks in the 
last half of his administration, to place him back on the 
world stage, burnish his leftist credentials and allow him to 
show some distance from Washington.  It would make more sense 
for him to postpone such a significant policy 
shift until after CAFTA implementation in October and the 
U.S. elections in November, but he may be tempted to move 
sooner. 
BRENNAN