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Viewing cable 08PHNOMPENH601, CAMBODIA ELECTION: SAM RAINSY PARTY STANDS TO GAIN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08PHNOMPENH601 2008-07-25 04:10 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Phnom Penh
VZCZCXRO5804
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0601/01 2070410
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 250410Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 PHNOM PENH 000601 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM CB
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA ELECTION: SAM RAINSY PARTY STANDS TO GAIN 
BUT BY HOW MUCH? 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  HANDLE ACCORDINGLY. 
 
1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  One day before the official cooling-off 
period ahead of the July 27 election, the Sam Rainsy Party 
(SRP) is assessing its chances as good in many of Cambodia's 
24 provinces.  In more sober moments - when not rhetorically 
claiming imminent victory - party regulars will say they can 
obtain anywhere between 27 to 35 seats in the 123-seat 
National Assembly, a gain over the 24 seats they won in 2003. 
 Based solely on Commune Council elections results in 2007, 
Sam Rainsy could net a gain of seven seats.  But there was 
less on the line in those 1621 local Commune Council 
elections.  The Sam Rainsy party has a new grass-roots 
orientation and a "softly, softly, quietly, quietly" strategy 
designed not to draw attention to its gains.  At the same 
time that SRP covets many of the 20 or so seats FUNCINPEC 
(FCP) stands to lose, the ruling Cambodian Peoples Party 
(CPP) has been working overtime to win over FCP supporters. 
CPP Senior Minister Mem Sam An has been aggressive in trying 
for a full sweep of Svay Rieng's five seats, for example, and 
is likely to snatch away a FCP seat that was within SRP's 
grasp just six months ago.  The Human Rights Party often 
positions itself as an alternative to SRP and may drain past 
supporters.  SRP strong-suit policies on issues that might 
have swayed voters just a week ago -- economic uncertainty, 
joblessness, high inflation -- are perceived as less 
important, as the election takes place in the shadow of the 
Preah Vihear border dispute and the electorate focuses on 
national security.  Post offers a snapshot analysis of SRP's 
position and chances in the election, province by province. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU)  Sam Rainsy Party perceptions and strategies going 
into Sunday's National Election constitute one indicator of 
the party's political acumen and represent a measure of its 
credibility as the main opposition party.  With seats being 
contested province by province under a party's name, the 
National Assembly election is also a test of the party 
democratization efforts begun by the SRP in 2006 with support 
from the International Republican Institute (IRI).  If SRP 
has indeed secured loyal support for provincial leadership 
from members at the local level, then this new effort should 
translate into more votes for the party.   Some of the more 
realistic SRP candidates know their position is weak in a 
number of provinces where CPP has been and remains strong - 
Sihanoukville, Kep, and Ratanakiri to name three.  They are 
out on the hustings holding high the SRP party banner 
nonetheless, hopeful to score gains in long-term supporters 
for future elections.  Others are in the thick of a battle 
for the hundreds of thousands of voters who once supported 
the Royalists.  Prey Veng and Kandal may offer up at least 
two former FCP seats and Battambang and Kampong Speu are two 
more battleground provinces where an FCP seat is almost sure 
to fall. 
 
No-Contest, One-Seat Provinces; and Then There's Pailin 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
3.  (SBU)  Among one-seat provinces, Sihanoukville, Kep and 
Ratanakiri have voted for CPP over SRP by a margin of at 
least five to one in past elections.  Other sure-fire CPP 
seats are Odar Meanchey, Stung Treng, Preah Vihear, Koh Kong, 
and Mondolkiri.  A unique case is exotic Pailin Municipality, 
the former Khmer Rouge stronghold that went to Sam Rainsy 
Party in the second mandate in 1998, but was won by CPP in 
2002 Commune Council elections and has eluded re-capture ever 
since.  In the 2007 Commune Council elections, SRP won half 
as many votes as CPP in Pailin and appears to be gaining 
strength.  Given that SRP candidate Long Bunny has not 
previously served in parliament, it appears the SRP is not 
willing to put itself on the line with a high-profile 
candidate for the seat.  While SRP is more visible in Pailin 
(which is prosperous through small-hold farming in corn sold 
to Thailand), isolated allegations persist of undue influence 
by village chiefs in Pailin.  One village chief was reported 
to warn a family earlier this year that if they didn't join 
CPP, they would be "banned" from the village, an idle threat 
that many local officials found laughable, but a needless 
strong-arm tactic against poor and uneducated farmers that 
the CPP center does not favor. 
 
More Depth Among SRP Candidates in Kampong Cham, Phnom Penh 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
4.  (SBU)  By the looks of its candidate lists for Kampong 
Cham and Phnom Penh, SRP is hoping to gain at least one more 
seat among these traditional strongholds for a net gain from 
11 to 12 seats.  (COMMENT:  It is notable that SRP has placed 
well-connected Cambodian-Americans who bring in substantial 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000601  002 OF 004 
 
 
financial support just below the traditional threshold of 
winning seats.  END COMMENT.)  Phnom Penh's workers and 
educated middle class are two of SRP's strongest voter bases. 
 With the CPP taking credit for a recent $6 monthly bonus 
among all garment workers, and with the rise of a new 
generation of uneducated but wealthy businesspersons in 
Cambodia's recent economic boom, CPP may be increasing its 
base and holding back any further SRP gains. 
 
5.  (SBU)  The youth vote is a major uncertainty in the two 
seat-rich provinces of Kampong Cham and Phnom Penh. 
Nationwide, 260,000 new young voters have joined the rolls 
for the first time, and more than half of all of Cambodia's 
voters are aged 18-30.  On the one hand, many youth are 
better educated and more attuned to concepts of personal 
freedom and democratic values (SRP strong points).  On the 
other hand, CPP has produced an unprecedented number of youth 
events this past year.  One defection may be the key to 
understanding the youth vote split between CPP and SRP.  The 
CPP wooed away SRP's National Youth Movement leader 
(reportedly with cash, a big car and a bevy of motorbikes 
among other inducements), who is active and vocal, skills he 
has been deploying with some effect against SRP over the 
months since he defected.  In radio talk shows, he emphasizes 
the nepotism and cronyism among the inner circles at the SRP. 
 True or not, his stories resonate and he appears to attract 
many more callers than the typical call-in show. 
 
The Middle Provinces: Prey Veng and Kandal 
------------------------------------------ 
 
6.  (SBU)  Though they each have 11 seats in the National 
Assembly, these two eastern neighbors to Phnom Penh have 
never been strong suits for SRP, which won three seats in 
Kandal and two seats in Prey Veng in 2003.  FUNCINPEC carried 
three seats in each province in 2003 -- the Royalist base had 
been strong.  However, with Ranariddh's departure from FCP 
and the creation of his own party, the Norodom Ranariddh 
Party (NRP) did surprisingly well in these provinces in the 
CC elections.  Given that CPP is fielding a lesser minister 
in the sixth position on its candidate list for Kandal (which 
includes Hun Sen at the top), it would appear that CPP 
expects to easily gain one seat.  SRP strength in the Commune 
Council elections, taken at face value, would indicate that 
SRP could pick up two more seats here, one in each province, 
but SRP can take nothing for granted.  Nonetheless, Tioulong 
Saumura told Pol/Ec Chief July 20 that people will be 
surprised by Sam Rainsy's showing in Prey Veng. 
 
Battambang: Premier Battleground Province 
----------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU)  If the large number of SRP campaign complaints to 
the Provincial Election Committee says nothing else, it 
indicates how seriously SRP takes Battambang province with 
one FCP seat up for grabs.  Battambang is SRP Secretary 
General Eng Chhay Eang's home province, and the base from 
which he mounted a successful grass-roots campaign to secure 
supporters to back his run for the top internal SRP position. 
 Knowing that CPP did not do well enough in the CC elections 
to be assured of adding to its current five seats in 
Battambang, Eng Chhay Eang is using every means at his 
disposal to increase SRP's voice in parliament and gain the 
one FCP seat at stake.  SRP boycotted a youth debate held in 
the only local hall large enough to accommodate the audience 
because it was government controlled.  SRP held campaign 
parades a full week before the official campaign period. 
Local CPP officials acknowledge SRP's aggressive campaign 
tactics but state they have chosen not to confront SRP. 
Judging by the massive rallies and parades held in 
Battambang, CPP is devoting vast resources to increase its 
parliamentary standing. 
 
New and Difficult Frontiers: Svay Rieng and Pursat 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
8.  (SBU)  With no seat in either province previously, but 
having won about one fifth of the vote in each of these 
provinces in the 2007 CC elections, SRP earlier was feeling 
confident about picking up a seat in each during this year's 
election.  On the opening day of the election campaign 
season, the 10,000-person party parade that CPP Senior 
Minister Mem Sam An orchestrated with hundreds of vehicles 
going down route 1 to the Vietnamese border (including 
helicopter eye-in-the-sky television coverage) was just one 
more indication that CPP is committed to its Svay Rieng 
strategy motto: "five-out-of-five."  SRP MP Ngor Sovann, who 
had previously served in Kandal but was assigned to lead the 
SRP campaign in Svay Rieng, defected to CPP earlier in the 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000601  003 OF 004 
 
 
year.  It might have been possible for SRP to pick up an FCP 
seat in Pursat, since FUNCINPEC is not putting up one of its 
leading lights on that province's candidate list.  However, 
the number one CPP candidate is Minister of Industry, Mines 
and Energy Suy Sem and an incumbent MP and a Pursat native is 
CPP's fourth-listed candidate in an unspoken four-out-of-four 
strategy. 
 
SRP's One-Seater Wonders 
------------------------ 
 
9.  (SBU)  In six provinces where SRP won a single seat in 
2003, three showed real growth in voter support during the 
2007 CC elections, indicating that SRP might be able to take 
a second seat in each: Takeo, Siem Reap, and Kampong Speu. 
Both Takeo (Sok An's home province) and Siem Reap (Tea Banh's 
base) have received massive infusions of CPP support.  SRP 
has not put up strong candidates beyond incumbents in the 
number one slots.  SRP looks to maintain it current six seats 
in these areas. 
 
Kampot and Kampong Thom: Complicated 
------------------------------------ 
 
10.  (SBU)  In Kampot, Mu Sochua early on engineered the 
removal of Kampot native Kieng Vang from the provincial 
candidate list -- his consolation was that he could have a 
safe SRP seat in Phnom Penh -- but he was so furious that he 
quit the party, returned to FUNCINPEC, and is their number 
one candidate in Kampot.  Were it not for these internal 
party maneuverings and other headline-grabbing stunts, Mu 
Sochua might have helped secure for SRP two of Kampot's six 
seats.  As it stands, SRP may be facing an uphill battle to 
hold on to one seat.  In Kampong Thom, where SRP has a number 
of Commune Council Chief positions, SRP has put up only one 
strong MP incumbent.  The number two candidate is a grandson 
of an historic figure from the early anti-Sihanouk days who 
was an ally of Sam Rainsy's anti-Sihanouk father, Sam Sary. 
 
11.  (SBU)  Banteay Meanchey is the source of another SRP 
safe seat based largely on the thousands of casino workers 
who also reside there.  FUNCINPEC and NRP have effectively 
split the Royalist vote, but it appears that SRP support is 
not strong enough to win more than one of the province's six 
seats. 
 
"Softly, Softly, Quietly, Quietly" a Success... 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
12.  (SBU)  The long-term strategy SRP instituted last year 
is to work at the grass-roots on constituent issues but 
without fanfare or calling attention to themselves.  In this 
work -- which should be considered separate from the 
high-visibility national campaign run by Rainsy and his inner 
circle -- SRP has no interest in confronting CPP, or using 
aggressive tactics, or even initiating a competition, 
according to a senior SRP cabinet member, who labeled it the 
"softly, softly, quietly, quietly" strategy that has already 
won over many supporters.  SRP will work on one problem at a 
time to help people improve their lives and remember that SRP 
was the source of assistance, he noted.  In Kampong Speu, EU 
Long Term Election Observer Ruth Meyer noted to Pol/Ec chief 
on July 17 how effective Sam Rainsy had been in coming to 
different rural villages and attracting substantial crowds at 
each - about 1,000 on three separate occasions.  This 
experienced observer, a veteran Cambodia election-watcher, 
remarked on the success of this grass-roots effort. 
 
... But Issues Campaign Stalled 
------------------------------- 
 
13.  (SBU)  The focused issues campaign that Sam Rainsy had 
initiated last year so that every candidate could repeat it 
ad nauseum has now died a quiet death and lays like another 
ruin at Preah Vihear.  It was a simple and effective 
platform: promising more jobs; lower prices for gas, 
fertilizer and electricity; and free health care.  During 
Phnom Penh's shock inflationary period earlier this year, the 
message was resonating widely.  Now that every Cambodian of 
voting age is preoccupied with the defense of the motherland 
against Thai invaders at Preah Vihear, it is almost as if 
these issues had never existed.  SRP efforts to insert key 
parliamentarians into the foreign and defense policy debate 
(key SRP parliamentarians such as Son Chhay rushed to Preah 
Vihear) have not gained much traction.  The party in power 
has a clear incumbent advantage in this time of perceived 
national emergency.  In the meantime, HRP serves as SRP's 
mirror image and attracts some of the same voter base, 
despite Khem Sokha's protestations that he is seeking former 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000601  004 OF 004 
 
 
FUNCINPEC supporters. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
14.  (SBU)  SRP is expecting to do better than in 2003 and 
has certainly enjoyed a more open political space with far 
less violence, threats or intimidation than in past election 
campaigns.  While it has shown more maturity at the grass 
roots than in such headline-grabbing antics as Sam Rainsy 
embroiling himself in a Khmer Rouge Tribunal controversy, and 
while SRP in this election is likely to gain seats at the 
polls, whether SRP can realize the substantial gains it had 
set its sights on last year is questionable. 
MUSSOMELI