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Viewing cable 08PHNOMPENH581, PREAH VIHEAR: TENSION UNLIKELY TO DISSIPATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08PHNOMPENH581 2008-07-18 13:55 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Phnom Penh
VZCZCXRO0937
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0581/01 2001355
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181355Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEKDIA/DIA WASH DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0086
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUHUTRA/CDR 19AS TRAVIS AFB CA IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HI IMMEDIATE
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0619
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PHNOM PENH 000581 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS PLEASE PASS US MISSION TO UNESCO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2010 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNESCO SCUL MOPS PBTS TH CB
SUBJECT: PREAH VIHEAR: TENSION UNLIKELY TO DISSIPATE 
WITHOUT CHANGE IN BILATERAL DYNAMIC 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 2207 
     B. PHNOM PENH 578 
     C. BANGKOK 2167 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Joseph A. Mussomeli, for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d) 
 
See para two for action request. 
 
1. (C) Summary: Reftel A provides a solid update on the 
evolving situation along the Thai-Cambodian border near Preah 
Vihear temple.  Embassies Phnom Penh and Bangkok had a number 
of good exchanges during the course of the day to 
double-track information coming from Thai and Cambodian 
sources.  Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Sok An called 
Ambassador late this afternoon to convey continued Cambodian 
concerns that tensions in the area are high, with what the 
Cambodians describe as a significant number of Thai troops 
having moved into Cambodian-built structures in an area 
awarded to Cambodia by a 1962 International Court of Justice 
decision.  During Sok An's conversation with the Ambassador, 
the DPM took a call conveying information apparently passed 
to Prime Minister Hun Sen from Prime Minister Samak.  Sok An 
said that Samak had been counseled by Thai military described 
as being closer to the government that other Thai military 
would follow orders if instructed to withdraw from the newly 
occupied areas -- but would then use this as a pretext to 
topple the government.  Sok An said that the Cambodian 
government (RGC) would continue its policy of patience and 
peaceful, bilateral efforts to resolve the situation. 
However, he expressed two concerns: (1) that the number of 
Thai and Cambodian soldiers crowded into a small area 
presented a volatile situation which could not continue 
indefinitely without sparking, and (2) that the Thai 
government's hands may be tied in dealing with its strong and 
relatively independent military.  Sok An was dubious that the 
planned extraordinary meeting of the General Border Committee 
July 21 would yield results.  He noted that if these quiet, 
bilateral efforts did not work, Cambodia contemplated taking 
the issue to ASEAN, UNESCO and the UN Security Council -- to 
pressure Thailand to withdraw its troops from Cambodian 
territory and arrange some sort of international observation 
in the border area. End Summary 
 
2. (C) Comment and Action Request: Embassy Phnom Penh agrees 
with Embassy Bangkok's assessment of the extraordinary 
politicization of issues surrounding Cambodia's decision to 
inscribe Preah Vihear temple as a World Heritage site and the 
linked question of what the Thai describe as a nearby 
overlapping claim.  This assertion of an overlapping claim, 
however, is irrelevant legally or morally.  Cambodia has had 
control of the territory in question for 46 years. 
Historically, most border disputes that result in armed 
conflict begin with an assertion of overlapping claims.  We 
believe that the U.S.'s overarching interest in maintaining 
regional stability does not allow us the luxury of 
indefinitely standing on the sidelines of this dispute.  We 
see the options as follows: (a) pursue balanced, quiet 
diplomacy now to encourage both parties to defuse tensions 
and work in a spirit of goodwill using solid existing 
mechanisms including the upcoming GBC, (b) react when, almost 
inevitably, tensions spark a incident, (c) accept that both 
the Cambodians, who see international law as solidly on their 
side, and the Thai military will perceive U.S. silence as 
tacit approval, or (d) develop a position when the Cambodians 
bring this into regional and multilateral fora.  We believe 
the two sides are paralyzed at the moment and need help.  We 
should continue to frame this as a mil-mil issue and believe 
that a call from a senior U.S. military official to his Thai 
and Cambodian counterparts would help to get both sides to 
prepare seriously for the July 21 Border Committee meeting. 
We would advocate the following points, building on Embassy 
Bangkok's suggestions but shifting from "if asked" to a more 
proactive approach: 
 
-- URGING THAT ALL PARTIES WORK IN A SPIRIT OF GOOD WILL AND 
COOPERATION TO RESOLVE THEIR CONCERNS PEACEFULLY AND 
DIPLOMATICALLY, 
 
-- ENCOURAGING THEM TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH EXISTING 
MECHANISMS (SUCH AS THE UPCOMING MEETING OF THE GENERAL 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000581  002 OF 003 
 
 
BORDER COMMITTEE) TO RESOLVE BORDER ISSUES CAN FUNCTION, 
 
-- REDUCING THE NUMBER OF SOLDIERS DEPLOYED INTO THE AREA AND 
PULLING BACK TO POSITIONS HELD BEFORE JULY 14 
 
End comment and action request. 
 
3. (C)  Deputy Prime Minister Sok An met the Ambassador late 
in the day July 18 to provide an update on Cambodian-Thai 
discussions about Preah Vihear.  Sok An reviewed developments 
since July 15, shared with the Ambassador photographs of Thai 
military in and around the Cambodian-built Keo Sikha Kiri 
Svara pagoda and a Cambodian police outpost, reviewed the 
maps and import of the 1962 ICJ decision which awarded the 
Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia and instructed Thai troops to 
withdraw from the area (which they did), and shared Cambodian 
thoughts on next steps to defuse this issue.  During the 
course of the conversation, Sok An stressed the RGC's 
sympathy for the difficult position of the Samak government 
and recognition that Preah Vihear had become excessively 
politicized in Thailand.  He said PM Hun Sen had counseled 
patience repeatedly when approached by senior Cambodian 
military and police insulted by what he described as Thai 
rangers' occupation of a Cambodian-built pagoda approximately 
1/2 kilometer within Cambodian territory. 
 
4. (SBU)  Earlier in the day, Foreign Minister Hor Namhong 
convened Phnom Penh-based Ambassadors for a briefing on Preah 
Vihear.  He opened by noting the July 7 inscription of the 
sacred site of Preah Vihear temple by the World Heritage 
Committee; the Thai government (RTG) had first supported and 
then later, because of domestic opposition, withdrawn their 
support for inscription.  There had then been "a political 
storm" in Thailand, stirred up by known figures.  Cambodia 
had never thought, however, that Thai soldiers would decide 
to take possession of a pagoda within 300 meters of the 
temple.  Hor Namhong displayed copies of the French-Siam map 
from the early 1900s, noting this map had been used in the 
1962 International Court of Justice decision awarding Preah 
Vihear temple to Cambodia.  He asserted the pagoda in 
question is clearly in Cambodian territory as per that map. 
Hor Namhong also referred to Thailand's "unilateral" 
development of a competing map and assertion that there is a 
4.6 km square overlapping claim area. 
 
5. (SBU) Hor Namhong said Cambodia did not know who was 
behind the military decision to move troops into this area. 
He did not/not think the Thai government was behind the 
decision.  However, the situation was tense with more than 
1,000 Thai and Cambodian troops in the area.  Cambodia 
further understood that some 40-60 trucks had brought in Thai 
protesters who were gathered in Thai territory with the 
intent of protesting at the temple.  In the face of this 
provocative situation, Cambodia had maintained its self 
restrain.  PM Hun Sen,s phone call and letter to PM Samak 
were efforts to solve the problem peacefully.  Cambodia 
wanted to solve the problem peacefully and bilaterally, 
without foreign or international intervention.  If they 
cannot solve the problem peacefully and the Thai choose to 
use force, Cambodia reserved the right to use force.  First, 
however, Cambodia envisions solving this politically and 
diplomatically  possibly be referring the matter to the UN 
Security Council. 
 
6. (SBU) On July 21, there will be a meeting of the General 
Border Commission (GBC).  Cambodian Defense Minister Tea Banh 
will attend.  Answering a question, Hor Namhong noted that PM 
Samak is dual-hatted as Defense Minister, but was unlikely to 
attend, probably instead sending Supreme Commander Boonsrang 
Niumpradit.  Responding to a German question about whether 
ASEAN could play a mediating role, the FM noted that he would 
be unable to attend the ASEAN FM's meeting, because of the 
upcoming elections, and is sending MFA Secretary of State Kao 
Kim Horn.  Kao Kim Horn is instructed to inform ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers about the situation.  the FM concluded the meeting 
saying that if the situation worsens, Cambodia may ask the 
assembled Ambassadors if their countries could contribute to 
helping solve the problem. 
 
7. (SBU) Comment: Although well-spoken, intelligent and known 
in ASEAN circles, we do not see Kao Kim Horn as somebody who 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000581  003 OF 003 
 
 
will be able to engage with ASEAN Foreign Ministers or use 
the Singapore meeting to problem-solve.  While the FM did 
not/not seem eager to seek ASEAN mediation, it was clear 
there were Ambassadors (in addition to Germany, Singapore, 
Brunei and Malaysia were talking about this question) who 
believe this issue is bound to come up during the ARF.  We 
learned earlier that the Cambodians have been in contact with 
Vietnam, seeking what was described as "Vietnamese support" 
-- we now suspect that may have been in the context of the 
Vietnamese' position on the Security Council.  Local papers 
-- which are portraying tensions as having abated somewhat -- 
also describe Thai and Cambodian military units as 
"face-to-face and side-by-side" in the small area.  One 
English language report describes one narrow alleyway of the 
100 meter stretch leading up to the pagoda as "young and old 
Thai and Cambodian troops standing and sitting cheek by jowl 
and with a horrifying range of weaponry."  From this 
Embassy's perspective, this face-off generates a level of 
tension which is likely to lead to an incident or accident 
and should not be left to fester. 
 
8. (SBU) Although tourists could in theory access Preah 
Vihear temple in Cambodian territoy without passing through 
the area of tension or nearing the Thai border checkpoint, 
Post's EAC decided this morning also to issue a warden 
message counseling American citizens to avoid the area until 
tensions subside. 
MUSSOMELI