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Viewing cable 08PANAMA605, PANAMA: 2009 NATIONAL ELECTION YOUTH DEMOGRAPHIC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08PANAMA605 2008-07-25 14:58 2011-05-31 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Panama
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHZP #0605/01 2071458
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 251458Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2314
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000605 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA: 2009 NATIONAL ELECTION YOUTH DEMOGRAPHIC 
 
REF: PANAMA 00580 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS BRIAN R. NARANJO REASON: 
1.4 (d) 
 
------- 
 SUMMARY 
 ------- 
1. (SBU) Of the 2.2 million Panamanians eligible to vote in 
the May 3, 2009 general elections, 53% will be voters between 
the ages of 18 and 40. The youth account for one third to one 
half of political parties memberships. Efforts to reach out 
to these new voters included multi-tiered organizations 
designed to mobilize this important voting bloc on election 
day. POL met with national youth secretaries of the 
contending political parties: Cambio Democratic, 
Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD), and the Panamenista 
Party to discuss youth presence in the upcoming presidential 
elections. In addition to informal meetings, POL also 
attended youth-related campaign events and engaged in 
dialogue with youth activists to understand: who represented 
the youth demographic; what they wanted from the presidential 
candidates; why they have engaged in the elections, and how 
they intended to impact Panama's political landscape. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Growing Presence Among the Parties 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) According to Panama's Tribunal Electoral (TE), 2.2 
million citizens will be eligible to vote in the May 3, 2009 
general elections. Of that figure, 53% of Panamanian voters 
are between the ages of 18 and 40. As the youth vote would 
comprise over half of the electorate in 2009, youth 
membership has also been a significant component within 
Panama's political parties. Democratic Change's (CD) youth 
secretary Christina Maria Gonzalez noted that youth 
supporters represented 35% of the party's membership. 
Likewise, 30% of governing Revolutionary Democratic Party 
(PRD) membership was between the ages of 18 and 30. The 
opposition's largest political party, Panamenista Party, 
doubled the number of registered voters in the youth 
demographic from 50,000 to 110,000 between June 2007 to June 
2008, accounting for 50% of party membership asserted 
Panamenista Youth Secretary and legislative candidate Aldofo 
"Beby" Valderrama. 
 
3. (SBU) Presidential candidates have reached out 
aggressively to this important youth demographic. The parties 
have established multi-level systems to organize youth 
outreach at the national, provincial, and local level. For 
example, Valderrama described the Panamenista youth network 
as a four-tiered pyramid of youth secretaries, delegates, 
leaders, and volunteers. The national youth secretary and the 
youth executive board (comprised of 15 members) streamlined 
the party's political platform and outreach initiatives to 
youth delegates that were assigned to manage outreach in 
Panama's nine provinces. The youth delegates administered 
campaign activities at the provincial level and supervised a 
team of youth leaders (3 to 4 persons) in each voting 
district. These leaders managed close to 150 volunteers that 
were spread out in neighborhoods located in each district. 
Heavily populated voting districts that historically 
determined election results, noted Valderrama, such as 8-8, 
8-9,and 8-10 would have a larger number of volunteers to 
mobilize the youth vote. The April 2008 Tribunal Electoral's 
report stated that within the 8-8, 8-9, and 8-10 precincts, 1 
in 3 Panamanian voters are between the ages of 18 and 35. 
Valderrama noted that because of this significant statistic, 
the Panamenista party directed approximately 700 youth 
volunteers across these three districts. 
 
------------------------------ 
Social Background of the Youth 
------------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) The youth demographic among the competing political 
parties represented a diverse mix of social classes. PRD 
youth supporters were primarily working class Panamanians 
that attended the University of Panama, affirmed PRD youth 
secretary Samuel Buitrago. Conversely, the CD was comprised 
of young professionals from the middle and upper class. The 
Panamenista party held the most diverse mix of young 
supporters and extended across social, economic, and 
educational status. Buitrago noted that PRD's university 
outreach focused on establishing a relationship with the 
youth attending the University of Panama. In contrast, 
Valderrama highlighted that the Panamenista youth campaign 
connected with student organizations in both public and 
private universities. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Platform Identical Among Social Class 
------------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Despite the various backgrounds of youth activists 
within the contending parties, the issues important to the 
Panamanian youth were identical. Education reform and job 
security were mentioned consistently as their top concerns, 
during POL's discussion with youth leaders and supporters 
from all parties. University students and young professionals 
were dissatisfied with Panama's poor quality of education. 
Most felt inadequately prepared for job opportunities 
presented by foreign investors. Poor education heightened 
Panama's economic challenges such as the growing income gap 
and stagnant social mobility among the poor and working 
class, asserted PRD youth supporter Fernando Paniagua. To 
combat this problem, youth leaders constructed their own 
political platform and urged presidential candidates to 
address these issues. Youth activists in the PRD and 
Panamenista party requested a "Congress of the Youth" that 
would operate as a separate entity within each party and 
ensure a voice for young voters. 

--------------------------------- 
Internet is Key to Youth Outreach 
--------------------------------- 
 
6. (U) "The use of on-line technology is tied to the fact 
that 65,000 new young voters will participate in the 2009 
presidential elections," La Prensa journalist Manuel Vega Loo 
wrote on June 1, 2008. Candidates have used social networking 
sites Facebook, MySpace, Flickr, and Youtube to: mobilize 
youth supporters, publicize their platforms, recruit campaign 
volunteers, and increase party membership. From June to July, 
competing political parties have increased registration to 
their respective Facebook webpage from 5,000 to 7,000 
subscribers. 
 
7. (C) "Internet marketing is a science. You have to pay for 
it to win," PRD youth secretary Buitrago told POL on July 16. 
Presidential candidate Balbina Herrera's campaign hired a 
team of computer experts to manage and operate her online 
campaign, Buitrago stated. These contractors were focused 
solely on promoting Herrera's campaign events, political 
platform, and recruiting volunteers through e-mail, online 
chat, Herrera's webpage,social networking sites, and mobile 
text messaging. Buitrago asserted that hiring a team of 
experts accounted for Herrera's efficient online 
communications whereas her challenger Juan Carlos Navarro 
used campaign volunteers to manage his online network. When 
discussing internet strategies with the competing political 
parties, CD and the Panamenista party confirmed that their 
online campaign was also managed by volunteers within the 
party. Herrera's distinctive approach to hire online campaign 
coordinators produced an effective internet strategy. The 
Herrera campaign responded to POL's online membership 
requested in 24 hours and has submitted daily e-mails that 
publicize her campaign events and highlight her political 
platform, allowing her to promptly frame the debate on issues 
important to the Panamanian youth. 
 
---------------- 
The Obama Effect 
---------------- 

8. (C) Across all political parties, youth leaders noted that 
Barack Obama's popularity with American voters under 30 
accounted for his win in the Democratic primary elections. As 
such, youth secretaries in Panama's political 
parties implemented Obama's campaign strategy to encourage 
youth engagement at the grass roots level. Buitrago and 
Valderrama stated that their parties closely monitored 
outreach strategies and implemented these tactics into their 
campaign. 
 
9. (C) Buitrago noted that a New York Times article which 
outlined Obama's effective use of Facebook, Myspace, and 
YouTube, was the stimulus for Herrera's decision to hire 
online campaign coordiantors instead of recruiting 
non-experienced campaign volunteers. Likewise, Valderrama 
mentioned that a Public Diplomacy "Democratic Leadership" 
International Visitor Program (IVLP) in the U.S. provided him 
the opportunity to catch a glimpse of Obama's campaign which 
courted the youth vote and decided a political platform that 
encouraged youth participation would be more effective than 
conventional tactics used to attract young voters such as 
concerts and rallies. 
 
10 (U). Valderrama's effort paid off.  He organized the 
"Youth for Varela" campaign event that attracted 3,500 
supporters for presidential candidate Juan Carlos Varela. 
Varela defeated his challenger Alberto Vallarino in a 
landslide victory of 56% to 34% in the Panamenista primary 
elections. Following the July 6primary elections, La Prensa 
reporter Ereida Prietto-Barreiro wrote that Varela's 
aggressive outreach to young voters was an important factor 
in his victory against Vallarino. In the same news article, 
Hatuey Castro, a Vallarino supporter, confirmed Barreiro's 
observation and stated, "Varela talked to the youth. The 
Panamenista party has a lot of yong people and Varela 
captivated them with his platform." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 

11. (C) This is the second report in a series of cables that 
track Panama's national elections. The Panamanian youth are 
getting the attention that they deserve. Political parties 
realized that the youth demographic have an enormous impact 
on the primaries and could determine the general election. 
However, the youth movement continues to face the challenge 
of maintaining a cohesive organization and ensuring their 
voice will be heard by presidential candidates. Youth leaders 
will have to mobilize and attract more young voters to 
emphasize the power of their vote on election day. POL will 
continue to follow youth presence and its impact on upcoming 
elections. 
MESA