VZCZCXYZ0011
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #1657/01 1891431
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY PARA AD00B13D2D/MSI1155 508)
R 071431Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6335
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7281
RUEHSUN/USMISSION USUN ROME IT
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4471
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2064

UNCLAS NAIROBI 001657 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (PARA MARKING, PARA 22, SECTION 04) 
 
AIDAC 
 
STATE PLS PASS TO USAID 
USAID/DCHA FOR MHESS, GGOTTLIEB 
DCHA/OFDA FOR KLUU, ACONVERY, KCHANNELL, MSHIRLEY 
DCHA/FFP FOR JBORNS, JDWORKEN, SANTHONY, CMUTAMBA 
AFR/EA FOR BDUNFORD 
STATE FOR AF/E, AF/F AND PRM 
USUN FOR FSHANKS 
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
USMISSION UN ROME FOR RNEWBERG 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PHUM PREL KE
SUBJECT:  KENYA IDP RETURN OPERATION OVERVIEW 
 
REFS:  A) NAIROBI 1213 
       B) NAIROBI 1299 
       C) NAIROBI 1333 
       D) NAIROBI 1509 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (U) The pace of internally displaced person (IDP) returns from 
host communities and formal camps has slowed significantly following 
an initial surge of predominately agricultural IDP returns to 
pre-crisis areas.  The Government of Kenya (GOK) stated during the 
month of June that all formal IDP camps must close as of the end of 
June, yet nearly 69,000 individuals remain in more than 100 camps as 
of July 1.  In addition, the recent proliferation of transit sites 
near pre-crisis homes has complicated humanitarian service 
delivery. 
 
¶2.  (U) The GOK policy on IDP returns remains unclear to the 
international community, and aid agencies working in affected areas 
have noted a lack of coordination, even among GOK district 
commissioners (DCs), regarding camp closures.  USAID Office of U.S. 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) humanitarian advisors 
continue to monitor the situation and advocate for increased 
coordination among GOK representatives and between the GOK and the 
international humanitarian community. 
 
¶3.  (U) We have weighed in strongly with the Kenyan government 
against any forced returns and/or premature closing of camps.  See 
paragraph 21 for the text of the Ambassador's letter to Prime 
Minister Odinga and Minster of Special Programs Shaban.  End 
Summary. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶4.  (U) According to the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS), the number 
of IDPs residing in official camps decreased from 158,891 to 68,519 
individuals between May 2 and July 1, and the number of camps 
declined from 157 to 101.  However, as of July 1, more than 109,000 
of the returning IDPs had settled in 172 transit sites near their 
pre-crisis homes as a result of security concerns and a lack of 
resources at home sites, according to the Office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees.  [Note: Numbers and population figures 
for transit sites vary significantly, due to the lack of 
humanitarian access to and coordinated registration in these sites. 
End note.] 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
REASONS FOR RETURNS AND RELUCTANCE TO RETURN 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) While the June 30 deadline for Rudi Nyumbani, or Operation 
Return Home, has passed, humanitarian agencies agree that the GOK 
continues to desire the closure of official camps, particularly 
large camps in Naivasha and Nakuru districts.  The GOK is pressing 
for these camps to close for several reasons.  First, the GOK 
believes that the camps contain criminal elements posing as IDPs. 
Second, the GOK sees the urban camps as becoming increasingly 
politicized, with IDPs demanding more compensation and using the 
media spotlight to place pressure on the GOK.  Third, the GOK 
desires IDPs to return to their livelihoods, particularly those 
individuals who the GOK believes are in the camps to take advantage 
of free services.  Fourth, the GOK wants to use the land that the 
camps are currently utilizing as it was originally intended (e.g. 
the Agricultural Society of Kenya land in Nakuru for the upcoming 
agricultural show in July). 
 
¶6.  (U) GOK promises to IDPs, whether realistic or not, have led 
IDPs to leave official camps.  Promises vary from one minister's 
 
promise that the GOK will provide a three-bedroom house for every 
IDP family, to the more attainable package of KSH 10,000, or 
approximately 
USD 150, a tent, and two blankets for remaining IDPs to return to 
pre-crisis homes. 
 
¶7.  (U) The return operation to date has been largely voluntary, 
with predominantly agricultural IDPs returning to farming in 
pre-crisis areas or from transit sites nearby.  These farmers, many 
of whom were anxious to begin planting crops during the appropriate 
planting season, either have returned spontaneously without GOK 
assistance or have received GOK assistance packages before returning 
to pre-crisis areas. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) However, USAID/OFDA staff have received reports of strong 
GOK pressure and intimidation employed to encourage IDPs to return 
to pre-crisis areas in some locations, including Kitale and 
Endebess, Trans Nzoia District (REFTEL B).  USAID/OFDA has not 
received further reports of direct intimidation of IDPs but note 
that camp closure deadlines, as well as offers of cash, can coerce 
IDPs who have no other place to go out of camps and into more 
marginal living situations. 
 
¶9.  (U) IDPs who are reluctant to return are predominately business 
people, landless individuals, laborers, and renters, who either have 
no place to go or fear insecurity in re-establishing businesses and 
homes in pre-crisis areas.  For other IDPs, official camps are more 
comfortable than their pre-crisis homes.  Some IDPs are waiting for 
GOK compensation for their losses during the post-election 
violence. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
GROWING TRANSIT CAMPS AN UNSUSTAINABLE SOLUTION 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶10.  (U) According to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, (OCHA), many IDPs leaving official camps are 
settling in transit sites, rather than returning directly to 
pre-crisis homes.  The majority of transit sites, which range in 
size from eight families to 9,000 individuals, lack a sustained 
humanitarian presence, and some lack basic services.  The numerous 
transit sites are difficult, economically and logistically, to 
support.   The GOK has provided food rations and other forms of 
assistance for IDPs in most transit sites, but systematic service 
provision is not in place and the GOK has not articulated a policy 
or strategy for dealing with them at any level. 
 
¶11.  (U) The duration of these sites remains unclear, and some could 
form into permanent villages.  Since the transit sites are often 
located on private land, the creation of new villages on the sites 
could present future legal and humanitarian challenges. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
LACK OF COORDINATION HAMPERS RETURN PROCESS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (U) The abrupt nature of the GOK plan to close camps and return 
individuals to pre-crisis homes, unattainable promises made by the 
GOK to IDPs, and the lack of GOK coordination with the international 
community led to inadequate preparation in some return areas and 
significant concern regarding the sustainability of the return 
process.  The lack of GOK coordination with the humanitarian 
community is exacerbated by parallel structures for the response, 
including the U.N. Cluster system, sector-based meetings, and KRCS 
efforts.  With a lack of clear leadership on the part of the central 
government, district and local officials interpret the GOK directive 
to close camps in very different ways, leading to inconsistent 
strategies for IDP returns. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Several aid agencies believe the strong directives to 
close camps come from senior officials in the Office of the 
President, not associated with the Ministry of State for Special 
 
Programs, which has the GOK lead for humanitarian provision 
following the post-election violence.  According to these 
organizations, the Ministry of State for Special Programs is 
implementing orders from others and is aware of the problems that 
this plan has created. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Whichever section of the GOK is determining and directing 
the return project, it has not clearly communicated a comprehensive 
message on the GOK plan to the humanitarian community or to the 
provincial administration charged with implementing the camp 
closures and return of IDPs. 
 
¶15.  (U) Field staff assessing camps in Naivasha and Nakuru 
districts have reported that DCs change their messages about the 
continuation or closure of camps daily, if not multiple times per 
day.  Since the decision to close or delay closing official camps is 
so variable, it is increasingly difficult to determine the overall 
GOK plan for returns and camp closures. 
 
------------------------------------- 
SUCCESS OF RETURNS VARIES BY LOCATION 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (U) Since May 2, USAID/OFDA humanitarian advisors have been 
conducting field assessments in affected areas, including Nakuru, 
Trans Nzoia, Koibatek, Kwanza, and Uasin Gishu districts, to monitor 
return operations and facilitate information sharing with 
implementing partners and U.N. agencies.  The advisors have reported 
that return operations have had varying levels of organization and 
success in different locations, as described in REFTEL D. 
 
¶17.  (U) In addition, the composition of each camp is different, 
leading to differences in IDP response to camp closures.  Aid 
workers note that, in some cases, camp closure is an appropriate 
step, given the resumption of camp residents' livelihoods in 
pre-crisis areas.  In other cases, most individuals currently 
remaining in the official IDP camps are business people, landless 
individuals, and IDPs with no place to return due to localized 
tensions.  Unfortunately, return operations and livelihoods programs 
largely lack plans for the return of non-farming IDPs. 
 
¶18.  (U) During the week of June 23, local media reported that IDPs 
in Kedong camp in Naivasha District were protesting the Kenya Red 
Cross Society (KRCS) plan to cease services in the camp by June 30. 
More than 
80 percent of IDP families in Kedong camp work in flower farms and 
have received stipends from their employers since the onset of the 
crisis.  KRCS and OCHA representatives noted that IDPs were 
reluctant to let go of free services and that the GOK could have 
closed Kedong camp several months ago, since the large majority of 
the camp's residents had steady income.  As of July 6, Kedong camp 
is closed. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) The security situation in Nakuru remains tense after the 
abduction of an IDP chairperson at the Nakuru Showground camp during 
the weekend of June 20-22.  In response to a demonstration to 
protest the disappearance of the IDP chairperson, police allegedly 
shot live bullets into the demonstrating IDPs, seriously injuring 
two individuals, one of whom died one week later.  The IDP 
chairperson, who sustained burns and severe beatings and whose life 
was threatened during his captivity, was later released.  Although 
local officials initially worked to keep the matter quiet and 
accused KRCS of lying to incite the IDPs, the GOK investigated and 
eventually transferred several district officials, including the DC. 
 During the week of June 23, the GOK announced plans to close the 
camp and provide assistance packages, including KSH 10,000 per 
family, to the IDPs. 
 
¶20.  (U) The level and success of reconciliation efforts also varies 
by community.  Churches, community leaders, and non-governmental 
organizations are leading reconciliation efforts in certain areas, 
while the GOK has done very little to promote peace building in 
 
affected communities to date.  The lack of community-based 
reconciliation in some areas has produced isolated incidents of IDPs 
forced to return to camps by community members in their pre-crisis 
homes, as occurred in Eldoret during the week of June 16.  During 
the week of June 23, one IDP returnee was killed in Eldoret. 
Humanitarian agencies note that the killing could magnify concerns 
IDPs are expressing about remaining tensions in their pre-crisis 
communities. 
 
----------------------------------- 
AMBASSADOR LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (U) On June 30, Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger addressed a 
letter to Prime Minister Raila Odinga and Minister of State for 
Special Programs Naomi Shaban, urging the GOK to provide a clear, 
phased approach for IDP returns from official and transit camps and 
transparent coordination with the humanitarian community.  Below is 
the text of the letter from Ambassador Ranneberger addressed to 
Prime Minister Odinga, dated June 30, 2008. 
 
¶22.  (U) Begin text.  As you know, the United States has been at the 
forefront to provide humanitarian assistance to internally displaced 
persons and to assist in their orderly, voluntary return to their 
homes.  You'll recall receiving a copy of my May 15 letter to 
Minister Shaban on this subject. 
 
It has come to our attention through our extensive field assessments 
and other sources that, in some area, Government of Kenya officials 
are denying humanitarian services to populations in established 
camps in order to compel them to leave.  The efforts of some local 
officials to accelerate the pace of returns by withholding food 
distributions and services violates international norms and raises 
grave concerns. 
 
The United States urges the Government of Kenya to take the 
following steps to address the issue: 
 
1) There is an urgent need for a clearly outlined, phased approach 
for the IDP returns from both the main and satellite camps.  This 
approach must meet the basic humanitarian needs of agricultural, 
small business holder, and landless IDP populations, recognizing 
that each of these distinct groups have special needs that must be 
addressed to ensure their safe return to pre-crisis status. 
 
2) All returns should be completely voluntary with no threats or 
intimidation tactics employed by the district-level officials.  We 
have observed specific incidents in multiple locations whereby IDPs 
are coerced or threatened directly or through the withholding of 
food, water, and other relief services. 
 
3)  The Government should be willing to provide support, and allow 
humanitarian agencies to continue providing support, at the main 
camps, as well as satellite and transit camps. 
 
4)  It is critical that the GOK works closely with the donor, U.N., 
local and international non-governmental organizations, religious 
and community groups in the planning of the phased return strategy. 
It is currently not clear to the international community what the 
official Government of Kenya policy, strategy, and timeline for 
returns is.  We understand that the timeline for closing main IDP 
camps is currently left to the discretion of the relevant district 
officials and has resulted in inconsistent strategies and mechanisms 
for IDP returns. 
 
5) Intensifying peace conciliation efforts is essential in order to 
facilitate the return of people to their homes. 
 
I look forward to our continued cooperation.  End text. 
 
---------- 
CONCLUSION 
 
---------- 
 
¶23.  (U) While the GOK is beginning to deliver on promises to 
provide assistance packages for IDP families who return to 
pre-crisis areas, the lack of full coordination with the 
humanitarian community and the unchecked and ad-hoc proliferation of 
transit sites are complicating monitoring and assistance efforts. 
In addition, the lack of sustained and successful reconciliation 
programs in some local communities  jeopardizes the sustainability 
of returns, as well as the potential of future returns from transit 
sites. 
 
¶24.  (U) The U.S. Government will continue to monitor the situation 
and urge the GOK to provide a clear, phased approach for IDP returns 
without coercion or intimidation in order to address the needs of 
all IDPs. 
 
RANNEBERGER