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Viewing cable 08KYIV1353, UKRAINE: RESPONSE TO BLUE LANTERN PRE-LICENSE END-USE CHECK

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KYIV1353 2008-07-10 14:07 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kyiv
VZCZCXYZ0005
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKV #1353 1921407
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101407Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6001
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0004
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0086
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0358
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS KYIV 001353 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM/DTCC - BLUE LANTERN COORDINATOR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC KOMC UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: RESPONSE TO BLUE LANTERN PRE-LICENSE END-USE CHECK 
ON LICENSE 05-050103848: AVIANT/ANTONOV 
 
REF: A) Sabatini-Habinowski email of 7/9/08 
 B) State 62235 
 
1. This is a reply to a Blue Lantern action request (ref B). 
 
2. Post was requested to conduct a pre-license check on DDTC license 
application number 05-050103848 for the export of power modules to 
Ukraine via Russia (applicant: International Rectifier Corporation, 
233 Kansas Street, El Segundo, CA).  The foreign consignee is Aviant 
State Aviation Plant ("Aviant"), 100/1 Pobedy Prospekt, Kyiv. The 
end-user is Aeronautical Scientific Technical Complex Antonov 
("Antonov"), 1 Tupolev Street, Kyiv. 
 
3.  Economic Officer Matthew Habinowski (U.S. citizen) and FSN 
Economic Specialist Oksana Sukhina (Ukrainian national) met with 
Nikolay Vorobyov, Deputy Chief Designer of the AN-70 at Antonov, on 
July 10, 2008 at the U.S. Embassy to conduct a pre-license check. 
(Note: Post met with Vorobyov at the Embassy because GOU 
bureaucratic procedures to meet with foreign officials in GOU 
buildings can take weeks.  Antonov is a well-known company with 
established relations with the USG, and we did not need to establish 
its bona fides by visiting its facilities.  End note.)  Vorobyov's 
contact telephone number is 380.44.400.2576.  His email address is 
vorobyov(at)antonov.com. 
 
4. Vorobyov's description of the transaction differed slightly from 
the sequence described in reftels.  He told us that Russian company 
Aeroelectromash would install the components into the PTS-15 static 
converter and forward the item directly to Antonov.  This particular 
converter would not/not go to Aviant, but Vorobyov noted that he 
anticipated that Aviant would be placing an order of "no less than 
two" of the converters later this year for mass production of AN-70 
planes.  He surmised this was why they might have been included on 
this license application. 
 
5. Upon receipt of the converter, Vorobyov explained, Antonov would 
conduct limited testing -- a majority of the testing would have been 
done in Russia by Aeroelectromash -- and then install the converter 
into an AN-70 aircraft.  When Econoff inquired about the end-user of 
the aircraft, Vorobyov said that Antonov had no existing sales 
contract, but was hoping to sell the plane to either the Ukrainian 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) or the Ukrainian Aviation Transportation 
Company, a state enterprise owned by the MOD.  Antonov, Vorobyov 
asserted, had no plans to sell the aircraft to a foreign buyer. 
 
6. Vorobyov demonstrated a general familiarity of export controls, 
but was unaware of the specifics of the U.S. Munitions List (USML). 
Econoff explained the contents of the USML, the administration of 
export control on USML commodities, and the prohibition against 
re-export without USG authorization.  To the latter, Vorobyov 
reiterated that Antonov only plans to sell the aircraft to domestic 
customers. 
 
7. Antonov is a large, bureaucratic state-owned enterprise and, as 
is typical in former Soviet countries, decision-making requires 
numerous approvals.  Although the USG already has an established 
relationship with Antonov in other areas, it took Post several weeks 
to track down the appropriate official to answer to ref B questions. 
 Once identified, however, Vorobyov responded quickly to Post's 
meeting request and answered all questions openly.  Post recommends 
Antonov as an acceptable recipient of U.S.-origin commodities. 
 
Taylor