VZCZCXRO0124
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0625/01 2130839
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 310839Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8245
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000625 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG
SUBJECT: STORM CLOUDS GATHER AROUND AMANI PROCESS; WILL FIGHTING 
RESUME? 
 
REF: KINSHASA 613 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Defense Minister Chikez convened a meeting July 
28 with ambassadors of major donor countries and MONUC to discuss 
security sector reform (SSR), focusing specifically on three main 
areas:  peace processes in the east; rapid reaction force training; 
and overall institutional development of the military.  Chikez was 
clear that multilateral approaches to SSR will not interfere with 
bilateral military cooperation programs.  The SSR meeting was held 
against the backdrop of a number of discouraging developments in 
Goma, where the Amani process is losing steam, with the CNDP 
appearing to distance itself from the process altogether.  There is 
no conclusive evidence the process is broken, but several individual 
reports, when taken together, suggest that Amani needs big infusions 
of resources and high-level attention if it is to stay alive.  The 
possibility of renewed fighting between the FARDC and CNDP cannot be 
dismissed.  End summary. 
 
Minister Chikez takes control of SSR 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Defense Minister Chikez called a meeting for July 28 with 
ambassadors of major donor countries and MONUC to discuss several 
security-related issues.  That meeting was preceded by a preparatory 
meeting July 26, called by UN/SRSG Alan Doss to coordinate donors' 
positions.  The July 28 meeting, which was dominated by the Defense 
Minister, centered on topics of the peace processes in the east, 
coordination of training of a rapid reaction force, and the 
military's overall institutional development.  The ambassadors or 
charges of the U.S., UK, France, Belgium, South Africa, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Angola and the EU attended, as did SRSG Doss.  China 
was represented by its defense attache.  DATT's from all 
aforementioned countries were also present.  The FARDC's chief of 
staff, Lt. Gen Kayembe Mbandakulu, was noticeably absent. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Chikez was in an ebullient mood, having just returned from 
South Africa where he received treatment for high blood pressure. 
He described the period after the February Round Table on SSR as 
initially filled with doubt regarding his plan (which Kayembe 
opposed); more recently, however, his plan was being viewed in a 
more positive light.  He saw the next few months as a period of time 
for consolidation of the plan.  A huge step forward, he said, was a 
commitment he has made to monthly co-ordination technical and 
political meetings.  (Note:  Chikez clearly took pleasure in having 
prevailed over Kayembe, with a plan for a much larger army than that 
proposed by the Chief of Staff.  End note.)  Chikez emphasized that 
while multilateral assistance was necessary to implement his plan, 
bilateral military cooperation programs were not to be affected by 
multilateral efforts. 
 
 
Agreement on way forward 
------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Defense Minister emphasized that MOD and donors were 
essentially in agreement in three areas: 
 
-- How to proceed with the conflict in the east, including DDR; 
Brassage of Amani Armed groups; FDLR and other negative forces; and 
Disengagement. 
-- Training of a Rapid Reaction Force, including number of 
battalions (12); post "brassage" units; non Integrated FARDC Units 
-- Long Term Institution Building, particularly in the areas of 
logistics, training, administration, finance, and human resource 
management 
 
A significant outcome from the meeting is that Chikez agreed to the 
holding of regular technical working group meetings around these 
three areas with donor representatives below the 
ministerial/ambassadorial level; he also agreed to more frequent 
meetings with ambassadors on this subject. 
 
Amani process stalled 
--------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Admiral Didier Etumba, Senior FARDC Representative in the 
east, then spoke about developments in that region.  His main points 
were: 
 
-- Stabilization had gone fairly well but there were still problems 
in a number of areas. 
-- Apart from the CNDP and FRF, international groups and other 
negative forces had worked out a plan for brassage although no 
location had been chosen. 
-- CNDP and FRF have effectively withdrawn from the Amani process. 
 
KINSHASA 00000625  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
-- Progress has been made in getting FDLR groups to demobilize. 
Money is needed for processing centers where the FDLR can prepare 
for repatriation. 
-- Resources to support the Amani program are greatly needed. 
-- International pressure should continue to get all parties to 
respect the cessation of hostilities. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) With regard to developments in the east, Amani Program 
coordinator Fr. Apollinaire Malu Malu called USAID-contracted 
adviser Willet Weeks July 26 from Zanzibar to inform him of the July 
28 meeting, which was to be followed by an unscheduled meeting of 
the Amani Steering Committee ("Comite de Pilotage" in French).  Malu 
Malu told Weeks he is cutting short his stay in Zanzibar and 
returning directly to Kinshasa and will return to Goma as soon as 
possible.  He also told Weeks he is fearful that there has been a 
decision by the GDRC and CNDP to return to war. 
 
CNDP and International Facilitation are not talking 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶7.  (SBU) We note there has been no direct contact between the 
International Facilitation and Nkunda for several weeks.  Nkunda did 
not call EU Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer - as requested through 
CNDP intermediaries in Goma - following the July 23 incident in 
which CNDP soldiers prevented a Facilitation convoy from traveling 
to Kirolirwe for a previously scheduled meeting with him (reftel). 
The Facilitation has continuously asked CNDP representatives to 
ensure that Nkunda contact one of the senior envoys as soon as 
possible. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) MONUC and International Facilitation representatives at a 
July 27 meeting in Gisenyi took seriously the threat of renewed 
fighting between the FARDC and CNDP.  Participants highlighted the 
possibility of military action in August, to precede the beginning 
of the rainy season.  They noted too the aforementioned radio 
silence on Nkunda's part as well as the fact that the GDRC is 
showing little political will to reach a diplomatic solution, as 
indicated by GDRC representative Admiral Etumba's absence from Goma 
for over one month. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The participants also discussed the role of Bosco Ntaganda 
in CNDP and the rumors circulating in Goma that he may be trying to 
assert himself within the organization and sideline Nkunda (Note: 
Other rumors are that Nkunda is sick or otherwise incapacitated. 
End note.)  They noted how a Bosco takeover could unleash an 
unpredictable chain of events, to include possible military action. 
Unconfirmed reports suggest, for example, that it was Bosco who gave 
the order to prevent the Facilitation convoy from reaching Kirolirwe 
July 23.  OCHA reports as well that, per their sources, there has 
been a reorganization of top advisors within CNDP and Nkunda has 
decided to work through subordinates with respect to contact with 
the Facilitation.  We emphasize that these are only unconfirmed 
rumors. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Comment:  The reasons for what appears to be the CNDP'a 
disengagement from the Amani process are not clear.  We are 
reluctant to speculate, but we note that many knowledgeable sources 
believe Nkunda and his forces are preparing for a resumption of 
hostilities with the FARDC.  We will monitor the situation closely 
and report on developments.  End comment. 
 
GARVELINK