VZCZCXRO3314
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0603/01 2041245
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221245Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8217
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000603 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG BE
SUBJECT: JULY 18 MEETING OF JMG TASK FORCE DEALS WITH ANTI-FDLR 
ACTIVITIES AND DDRRR PROCEDURES 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: The 31st meeting of the Joint Monitoring Group 
Task Force on July 18 was, overall, a cordial gathering.  U.S. 
members of the International Facilitation in attendance were DCM Sam 
Brock and Program Officer Geoffrey Parker.  In the absence of 
Jean-Michel Dumont, the EU chairmanship of the Task Force was 
delegated to Bernard Sexe of the French embassy.  The Congolese 
delegation first updated the Task Force on GDRC activities in 
support of the Nairobi Process.  MONUC made a presentation on the 
joint MONUC/FARDC operations against the FDLR.  This was followed by 
a litany of reasons by the Rwandan delegation on why operations were 
ill-conceived.  Finally, the Task Force discussed ways to avoid 
continued discrepancies between the DRC and Rwanda on the exact 
number of demobilized combatants that undergo their respective 
screening processes.  End summary. 
 
Recent Congolese Steps 
---------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) After opening remarks, Colonel Mamba of the Congolese 
delegation announced that his government had appointed Major General 
Marcellin Lukama as the commander of all FARDC forces deployed to 
the Kivus to take part in MONUC/FARDC operations against the FDLR. 
MG Lukama would be introduced to the Task Force as soon as he was 
present in the East.  The Congolese delegation also announced the 
creation of a technical commission for the Nairobi Process.  This 
commission would advise members of the Pilot Committee on National 
and International Armed Groups in Kinshasa and would be a resource 
for Special Envoy Ambassador Seraphin Ngwej.  Both developments were 
presented by Col. Mamba as a sign of Congolese commitment towards 
the Nairobi Process.  Major Franco of the Rwandan delegation 
acknowledged the DRC's gesture. 
 
MONUC Briefs anti-FDLR Activities 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) British Colonel Cunliffe, MONUC Chief of Staff for the 
Eastern Region, made a Powerpoint presentation on the concept of 
joint MONUC/FARDC operations against the FDLR.  In developing the 
planned operations MONUC Force Commander Lt. General Gaye had given 
the following four points of guidance: 
 
-- Protecting civilians remains MONUC's number one mission. 
-- Operations against the FDLR must not result in additional IDP's. 
-- All operations carried out must be within FARDC's capacity. 
-- Integrate DDR and DDRRR into operations by conducting military 
and sensitization activities simultaneously. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) MONUC Briefing (continued):  The concept of operations in 
general terms is (a) all activities would grow progressively in 
complexity and aggressiveness; (b) MONUC/FARDC would follow a 
three-pronged approach (initial concentration on two geographical 
triangles each in North and South Kivu, military activity would 
support DDR/DDRRR operations, target FDLR economic resources); and 
(c) the desired end state for Eastern Region was stability, 
extension of state authority, and establishment of rule of law. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) MONUC Briefing (continued):  The four triangles are as 
follows: Lutunguru-Lubero-Kikuko (North Kivu), Walikale-Masisi-Hombo 
(North Kivu), Mwenga-Shabunda-Walungu (South Kivu), and 
Fizi-Lulimba-Mulembe (South Kivu).  The activities in the triangles 
are happening in four phases: 
 
-- Phase 1 (May 15-31): Preliminary operations including 
reconnaissance, force buildup, and base establishment. 
 
-- Phase 2 (June 1-30): Joint reassurance activities such as 
visibility patrols in population centers, ensuring proper behavior 
of FARDC elements vis-a-vis civilians. 
 
-- Phase 3 (July 1 onwards):  Domination activities such as robust 
patrols, removal of illegal checkpoints, restriction of FDLR 
movement at chokepoints, and inviting the Congolese National Police 
(PNC) to join patrols.  This phase is currently ongoing but should 
not be overestimated.  MONUC stressed repeatedly that operations 
were still at a crawl given FARDC capacity.  These activities should 
not be considered aggressive, offensive actions.  The PNC has not 
yet joined the MONUC/FARDC patrols. 
 
-- Phase 4 (September 1 onwards):  Consolidation activities 
including securing of illegal mining sites and physical removal of 
the FDLR from the triangles.  Again, MONUC stressed that phase 4 
could take months and would progress slowly. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) MONUC Briefing (continued):  Col. Cunliffe then cited some 
achievements already attained.  Quality joint patrols were ongoing 
 
KINSHASA 00000603  002 OF 003 
 
 
and about 50% of the time was spent conducting solid planning and 
rehearsal exercises.  Sensitization activities were increasing and 
MONUC was conducting focused training in command and control, 
leadership, small unit tactics, and logistics.  Challenges cited by 
Col. Cunliffe were the size and nature of the terrain, the capacity 
of the FARDC, pressure from the Rwandans to accelerate activities, 
and overcoming FDLR fears over repatriation that prevent them from 
readily entering into DDRRR. 
 
Rwandan Reactions and MONUC/DRC Response 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Having previously been given a written copy of the concept 
of operation, the Rwandan delegation made several comments on the 
plan as briefed by MONUC.  Displaying a rather precise understanding 
of FDLR deployments, Major Franco explained how the triangles did 
not cover what he would consider the areas of concentration of the 
FDLR.  The triangles in particular covered neither the FDLR 1st 
Division Reserve Brigade - considered by the Rwandans as one of the 
strongest FDLR units - nor FDLR deployments in immediate proximity 
to the border and from where infiltrations into Rwanda were 
supposedly conducted frequently. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Rwandans continued, asserting that securing a few 
illegal mining sites would not have much effect since - much to the 
irritation of the Congolese delegation - the FDLR essentially 
controlled all economic activity in the Kivus with perhaps the 
exception of Beni Territory in the North and the island of Idjwi. 
What concrete steps, therefore, were being taken by MONUC? 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Col. Cunliffe replied that MONUC was aware the triangles 
did not overlap the central heartland of FDLR territory.  He felt 
strongly that attempting phase 4 activities in these areas at this 
time would undoubtedly lead to MONUC/FARDC failure.  The eight FARDC 
battalions (8,000 men) and eight MONUC companies (800 men) currently 
deployed were not robust enough to go head to head with concentrated 
FDLR formations.  On the positive side, however, the DRC planned to 
eventually deploy an additional 16 battalions to the area. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Col. Mamba of the Congolese delegation explained that the 
FARDC had multiple brigades stationed in the Kivus, not just the 
eight battalions that were specifically tasked with anti-FDLR 
activities.  These brigades already provided a stabilizing presence. 
 He continued to mention a few examples of where the brigades' 
presence had already led to displacement of the FDLR into the bush 
and the resumption of civilian economic activity.  He felt it was 
absolutely erroneous to state FDLR was "in control" of the Kivus and 
he also claimed to be unaware of frequent FDLR infiltrations into 
Rwanda, but promised to inquire into this matter. 
 
 
DDRRR Discrepancies 
------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The final portion of the meeting dealt with the 
discrepancies between the number of demobilized FDLR combatants 
claimed by both the DRC and Rwanda, the latter's numbers being 
significantly lower.  This is mostly due to the much more stringent 
screening process on the Rwandan side that is slow to label anyone a 
real combatant.  The issue had been discussed in previous meetings 
and it had been agreed to establish a working group to handle the 
issue as well as send a delegation to Kigali to discuss it with 
Rwandan authorities there.  At the 31st JMG meeting the working 
group was supposed to brief the Task Force on how the issue would be 
resolved and prevented in the future. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) It turned out that no working group had been formed and 
that the delegation sent to Kigali included only the EU and MONUC, 
but no Congolese or other Task Force representatives.  Both the 
Congolese and Rwandans were quick to display their unity in blaming 
MONUC for having botched the Kigali visit and done nothing about 
setting up a working group.  Needless to say there was no briefing 
from MONUC DDRRR on how the counting issue had been resolved.  After 
much back and forth the Task Force agreed that on a monthly basis 
MONUC and Rwanda should compare DDRRR numbers and brief these at one 
of the JMG meetings. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Finally, the Congolese delegations felt it would be 
necessary to agree upon a single definition of combatant.  Col. 
Mamba felt the Rwandans would not accept anyone who had not been 
fighting in Congo for several years already - or at least since 
before the signing of the Nairobi Accord.  Since it is assumed that 
the FDLR is actively recruiting, this would mean a lack of incentive 
for recent recruits to disarm.  At the suggestion of U.S. 
representative Brock, MONUC agreed to work with Headquarters in New 
 
KINSHASA 00000603  003 OF 003 
 
 
York to help clarify the definition of combatants, particularly 
irregular combatants, according to international conventions and 
precedent.  This may or may not put the argument to rest, and the 
Task Force agreed that if the problem persisted it should be handled 
at the Special Envoy level. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Comment:  The meeting was unnecessarily long, in large 
part due to the chair's inexperience and lack of familiarity with 
issues.  The Congolese and Rwandans were respectful towards each 
other and agreed on most points.  The DDRRR counting issue is 
important for sensitization purposes.  Resolving it would allow 
MONUC and the FARDC to show that demobilized combatants were 
successfully completing the process and getting on with their lives 
in Rwanda.  Rwanda's continued inability to account for the lower 
numbers of combatants would certainly raise questions about what 
happened to those missing.  The idea of briefing the official 
MONUC/FARDC numbers versus the Rwandan numbers every month is good, 
but it implies going through the lists of names in some forum 
outside the weekly JMG Task Force meeting.  Otherwise, the monthly 
briefing would only prove the two screening processes are not 
compatible and the entire meeting would be wasted trying to lay 
blame for this.  End comment. 
 
GARVELINK