VZCZCXRO6561
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0586/01 1961601
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141601Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8197
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000586 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG BE
SUBJECT:  CNDP UNHAPPY WITH GDRC AMANI PROVINCIAL STRUCTURES DECREE 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: U.S. Embassy Goma office and CNDP leadership met 
July 11 to discuss CNDP concerns about the GDRC decree establishing 
Amani program provincial commissions and CNDP roles in the 
sub-commissions.  The CNDP is concerned about the absence of 
humanitarian structures and the level of CNDP participation, and 
interprets the perceived shortcomings of the decree as indicative of 
GDRC lack of commitment to the Amani program.  U.S. Goma officers 
countered that the CNDP issues are likely explained by oversight and 
errors of omission on behalf of the GDRC vice a directed effort to 
undermine the process. End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Rene Abandi and Bertrand Bisimwa of the National Congress 
for the Defense of the People (CNDP in French) requested a meeting 
with DCM Sam Brock and USAID Goma officer Nicholas Jenks at the 
Ihusi hotel July 11.  Abandi and Bisimwa explained that CNDP 
president Laurent Nkunda had instructed them to meet with U.S. 
representatives to discuss CNDP concerns about the government decree 
("arrete" in French) naming individuals to the provincial structures 
of the Amani Peace, Security, and Development Program. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Amani program coordinator Apollinaire Malu Malu 
distributed copies of the decree to all participants (including 
CNDP) at the end of the Amani Program Joint Technical Commission for 
Peace and Security (JTCPS) meeting July 10.  Abandi did not have 
time to study the document before he left for Kirolirwe and Malu 
Malu departed for Kinshasa.  Abandi took the decree to Kirolirwe 
(CNDP headquarters) and discussed it with Nkunda and the CNDP 
political and military leadership. Nkunda and CNDP leadership were 
displeased with the decree itself and with Abandi and Bisimwa for 
not protesting strongly to Malu Malu about the perceived failings of 
the decree.  Nkunda ordered Abandi and Bisimwa back to Goma to 
discuss the decree with U.S. Goma officers.  (Note: Abandi and 
Bisimwa appeared shell-shocked during the meeting at the Ihusi, in 
contrast with the confidence they usually display. End note) 
 
¶4.  (SBU) CNDP (Nkunda first and foremost) was dissatisfied with 
three points: First, no provincial structures for the humanitarian 
sub-commission were established.  The structures that were 
established are the provincial military committee, the disengagement 
cell, the brassage cell, and the state authority cell.  The 
structures not established were the provincial humanitarian cell, 
the internally displaced person (IDP) return cell, and the refugee 
return cell.  The decree is silent on these latter structures. 
These structures are important to CNDP as CNDP and Malu Malu 
apparently had reached an agreement that it was in the context of 
these structures that the "political" discussions that CNDP wants 
would be held. 
 
¶5.   (SBU) The second point of contention is that CNDP Colonel 
Antoine Manzi was named to the position of "Secretary/Reporter" of 
the Provincial Military Committee, but should have been named to be 
"Secretary/Reporter" of a higher-level coordinating committee that 
would supervise, at the provincial level, both the provincial and 
humanitarian committees.  This CNDP officer has been functionally 
demoted, according to CNDP. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The third point Abandi and Bisimwa made was that instead 
of naming Nkunda explicitly as one of the members of the brassage 
cell, the decree basically leaves the second CNDP seat on the cell 
open, with the notation "a pouvoir" (translation: "to be filled") on 
the list. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) CNDP interprets these concerns as a clear indication of 
GDRC non-seriousness, lack of political will, take-it-or-leave-it 
approach, and generalized disrespect for the Amani process and the 
CNDP.  According to the CNDP, the GDRC is deliberately ignoring the 
humanitarian structures because they want to focus only on military 
issues and do not care about IDPs and refugees and do not want any 
real political dialogue with CNDP.  In addition, per Abandi and 
Bisimwa, the GDRC is disrespecting CNDP and Nkunda by not naming 
Nkunda openly to the brassage cell and not using CNDP military 
titles.  CNDP asked for U.S. Goma office reaction to these points. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) At this point Nkunda called Abandi, who passed the phone 
to Jenks.  Nkunda said that the GDRC wanted them to surrender 
whereas CNDP was interested in "joining" the GDRC vice surrendering 
to them.  He said that the GDRC had to understand that CNDP had 
legitimate concerns that the GDRC was simply refusing to deal with, 
and that they would need to adopt a different attitude.  Nkunda 
stated, "We are not cargo to be wheeled around willy nilly in 
wheel-barrows."   Jenks explained to Nkunda that the U.S. did not 
completely share the radical position that CNDP was taking regarding 
the structures as defined in the decree, and that there could be 
benign explanations for what had been done or omitted.  Jenks and 
Nkunda agreed that Jenks would give uncensored reactions to CNDP's 
concerns to Abandi. 
 
KINSHASA 00000586  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Jenks told Abandi that CNDP analysis was unnecessarily 
radical and that it is not justified to see a nefarious plot lurking 
behind what could be simple administrative errors.  CNDP would be 
ill-served to raise these concerns in public, as they need to be 
seen as being cooperative at this point and working with the system 
with all its faults. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Jenks explained that it was unknown to the U.S. why the 
GDRC did not create the humanitarian structures or changed the 
status of Colonel Manzi's position, but it could have been simply 
that they were focused on getting the military structures 
identified.  Jenks told CNDP that there could be a number of benign 
reasons why this happened and that the best way to approach this was 
to have the Facilitation contact Malu Malu for clarification. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Jenks said that CNDP was being unnecessarily radical 
regarding the nomination of Nkunda to the brassage cell and that it 
is widely known that it would be difficult for the GDRC to name 
Nkunda officially.  The GDRC had quite elegantly opened the door for 
his participation, while not designating him officially.  And what 
CNDP wanted, per their statements, was his participation on this 
cell, which is attained. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) CNDP then raised the idea of putting out a short 
communique describing their issues with the decree, and Jenks 
countered that it would be better to let the International 
Facilitation work on the concerns about the humanitarian 
sub-commission structure and Colonel Manzi's position.  Jenks asked 
about CNDP participation in the establishment of Kimoka, North Kivu 
as a neutral meeting place and CNDP responded that this did not 
depend on them. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Comment.  CNDP's comments indicate the level of concern 
they have about the commission structures and may reflect the 
increasing influence of hard liners within CNDP.  The Facilitation 
will raise these issues with Malu Malu July 12. End comment. 
 
GARVELINK