VZCZCXRO0333
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0992/01 1880618
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060618Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1231
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0262
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000992 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/C, NSC FOR 
BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: DARFUR SECURITY UPDATE 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Tensions are mounting throughout Darfur, 
particularly in North Darfur, where a heightened Government of Sudan 
(GoS) military presence and tightening GoS restrictions on movement 
of all parties seem to signal a reassertion of GoS control over the 
state, possibly in response to rebel machinations on the ground. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
GOS MILITARY EVERYWHERE 
----------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) In the late afternoon on June 27, four Sudan Armed Forces 
(SAF) tanks and at least one brand-new SAF armored personnel carrier 
rolled down Main Street El Fasher, knocking over road barriers and 
leaving spectators speechless along the way.  One tank and the APC 
parked next to the SAF Western Command camp near the Wali's 
(Governor's) office, while two other tanks parked directly in the 
central market area.  This display came on the heels of an increased 
visible presence of armed SAF and GoS police in technicals around 
town and an increased number of overflights by helicopter gunships. 
In the evening of June 28, FieldOffs heard exchanges of artillery 
fire from the west of El Fasher (in the direction of Abu Shouk IDP 
camp and a SAF military base). 
¶3. (SBU) In all of these instances, local officials came off as 
cagey at best when addressing them.  One National Intelligence 
Security Services officer laughed that "everything happens on a 
Friday" when asked about the presence of the tanks in El Fasher.  He 
claimed that they were just simply a show of force (although he 
stopped short of saying a show of force against what threat, when 
pushed by FieldOff).  The same NISS officer feigned ignorance of the 
artillery fire incident, leaving the room to go consult with other 
officers and even making a call to Military Intelligence in front of 
FieldOffs to find out more information, but later still provided no 
explanation. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Local explanations for these displays vary. Most El Fasher 
residents suspect that the June 27 tank parade was in response to 
rumors of another janjaweed uprising due to unpaid salaries.  Rebels 
claim that the GoS was concerned by reports that Minni Minawi had 
been moving at roughly the same time from Chad through North Darfur 
to Dar Al Salaam, south of El Fasher, and that Minni was doing so 
with Justice and Equality Movement escort [NOTE: One JEM contact 
bragged that it was common knowledge that every time a SAF gunship 
overflew El Fasher, it was in direct response to reports that JEM 
were in the region.  END NOTE].  Cell phone networks for the past 
week have been down, save for local calls, usually a harbinger of 
some type of security incident. 
 
UNAMID MOVEMENT RESTRICTED 
-------------------------- 
¶5. (SBU)  On June 29 the United Nations-African Union Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID) reported that members of the Sudan Liberation Army 
of Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) threatened UNAMID after an UNAMID APC 
injured a pedestrian near Zam Zam IDP camp.  SLA/MM demanded $1000 
in compensation for the injury, which UNAMID did not pay, and UNAMID 
J3 warned at this time for the Mission to take this threat 
seriously.  The Mission, however, did not heed this warning.  At 
approximately 1000 on June 30 six armed SLA/MM members stopped a 
38-person UNAMID patrol in Zam Zam (consisting of at least 12 police 
officers, 12 military and five language assistants) and subjected it 
to five hours of negotiation before it was released.  UNAMID J2 
accused SLA/MM of acting with impunity, "like it used to during the 
days of AMIS."  J3 added that GoS police were investigating the 
incident but that SLA/MM was refusing any legal process and 
insisting on immediate compensation. 
 
¶6. (SBU) UNAMID Deputy Joint Special Representative issued a 
statement on July 1 condemning the incident, and media reports 
billed it as a hostage situation.  The Deputy Force Commander (D/FC) 
reportedly vehemently denied this label in an UNAMID meeting on July 
¶2.  He reportedly asked his staff from where the word "hostage" had 
come in relation to this incident, since in his estimation and 
experience, there was no way a six-man group could overtake a. armed 
38-urSoo0ratsoln "J: ffacEr admhtp%l'Tdat&V@MMQRunacceptable for 
anyone in UNAMID to declare places "no-go zones" if they fell into 
UNAMID's Area of Responsibility. 
 
¶7. (SBU) It is not just the armed Darfur movements that have been 
restricting UNAMID's movement; the GoS has been doing so as well, in 
apparent violation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) it 
signed with UNAMID in February.  According to UNAMID J2, on July 1 
at approximately 1000h near Sheiria, South Darfur (northeast of 
 
KHARTOUM 00000992  002 OF 002 
 
 
Nyala), a UNAMID confidence-building patrol, which had been 
dispatched to verify intertribal fighting in the area, met with 
violent resistance at a checkpoint from the SAF, which apparently 
did not want the team poking around the area.  J2 confirmed that the 
SAF fired warning shots at the UNAMID patrol.  There were also 
reportedly Arab militias in the area.  The D/FC is still trying to 
confirm with Sector South what happened, and the CFC said it would 
investigate. 
 
¶8. (SBU) In another apparent SOFA violation in South Darfur, the SAF 
reportedly denied a UNAMID patrol access to the villages of Um 
Dofoto and Gandi (50km west of Nyala, South Darfur), all inhabited 
by the Arab Tarjem tribe, which has been involved in violent clashes 
with the Benihalba Arab tribe over the past week.  These two 
villages, as well as a third called Bulbul Dala Angara, were 
attacked on June 27 by the Benihalba in retaliation for a June 26 
attack by the Tarjem on the Benihalba village of Hireiz, an attack 
which killed four farmers.  In the June 27 retaliation, 60 Tarjem 
tribespeople were reportedly killed and seven Benihalba injured.  On 
June 29 the Commissioner of Nomad Regulation Committee was killed in 
the crossfire of Benihalba-Tarjem fighting in Dandura.  Fighting in 
Gandi (where UNAMID was denied access) continued July 1 with heavy 
casualties reported by both sides.  There are reports of movement of 
the Tarjem from Dandura and Gandi to Abu Zazur and Edd al Fursan as 
a result of the fighting, and the GoS declared the region a 
"military operation area," dispatching police and army forces on 
July 1.  There are reports of clashes between the GoS and the 
Benihalba militia, which resulted in casualties on both sides and 
which no doubt led to the SAF's continued resistance to UNAMID 
patrols in the region. Benihalba have reportedly threatened to kill 
the Governor of South Darfur state, causing him to flee temporarily 
to Khartoum. 
 
MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS FOR EVERYONE ELSE 
--------------------------------------- 
¶9. (SBU) Following the June 30 crash of an IL-76 near Khartoum and 
the subsequent sacking of the Civil Aviation Authority Chief, all 
IL-76 and Antonov planes were grounded in Sudan, dealing a major 
blow to PAE in Darfur, the majority of whose air fleet is comprised 
of these types of Russian-made planes, now reportedly leased by 
Ukranian companies.  Commercial flights from Khartoum to El Fasher 
were closed to non-Sudanese passengers on July 4, with authorities 
demanding paperwork from passengers which only two days before it 
had not.  This ban presents a major operational challenge to PAE, 
which needs to fly its aircraft to bring in equipment for UNAMID 
construction.  The ban also presents a major challenge to all 
residents living and working in Darfur who need to return to 
Khartoum and vice versa.  As of July 4, UNAMID and UN agencies are 
still flying their aircraft, although for how long remains anyone's 
guess. Sudanese Military Intelligence (DMI) also refused to allow a 
USAID chartered flight, which included CDA Fernandez, to go to 
Darfur on June 29, despite the flight and its passengers having 
secured permission from the Foreign Ministry and NISS (DMI may have 
feared Charge was going to meet in the field with Minnawi and his 
troops). 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶10. (SBU) The two trends to watch closely in the coming weeks are 
the apparent SOFA violations, as UNAMID must speak out and demand to 
have free access across Darfur, and more importantly the apparent 
coordination that may be occurring between JEM and SLM/MM.  If this 
extends to SLA/U as well, even a loose Zaghawa security alliance 
would pose a very serious threat to the regime, and would likely be 
met with a strong reaction. Violence among Arab tribes also bears 
watching as they turn on each other and, increasingly, on 
authorities sent from Khartoum. 
 
FERNANDEZ