VZCZCXRO0020
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0983/01 1861223
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041223Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1214
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000983 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/C 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SU
SUBJECT: SLA/UNITY AND SLA/AW APPEAR INTERNALLY DIVIDED 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  On June 26, the SLA/Unity's erratic spokesman, 
Mahjoub Hussein, told poloff in London that his rebel movement is 
planning a massive attack ("the flood") on Khartoum.  In a separate 
meeting with Hussein's colleague, SLA/Unity's Humanitarian 
coordinator Suliman Jamous said he was not aware of any plan, and 
cautioned that Hussein is "often doing his own thing."  Meanwhile, 
in a separate meeting with poloff, SLA/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) London 
representative Yahia Bashir stated that the international community 
should empower voices other than Abdul Wahid's as "the future of the 
Fur people cannot be decided just by one person."  These examples 
demonstrate significant internal division in SLA/Unity and SLA/AW, 
especially in comparison to the organized and integrated Justice and 
Equality Movement. END SUMMARY. 
 
SLA/AW 
- - - - 
¶2.  (SBU)  On June 26, Yahia Bashir, the London political 
representative for SLA/Abdul Wahid, stated that although he supports 
Abdul Wahid Al-Nur and still considers him to be the legitimate 
leader of SLA, that the international community and the media need 
to listen to and empower other voices in the movement.  "The 
international community has built up Abdul Wahid by only asking for 
his opinion and that is one of the reasons why we are stuck in this 
place.  The future of the Fur people cannot be decided just by one 
person" stated Bashir.  Bashir said that there are some SLA field 
commanders and political leaders who constitute an important element 
of SLA that need to be consulted.  Bashir stated that the AU/UN and 
the wider international community need to share information about 
meetings and their plans more widely.  He stated that "if we all 
know what is going on, we might be able to change Abdul Wahid's mind 
on some things." 
 
¶3.  (U)  BIO NOTE:  Yahia Bashir is from Wadi Salih in southwest 
Darfur.  He studied business administration in Khartoum University, 
and became active in student politics.  Since 2005 he has been in 
London working for SLA/AW. 
 
SLA/UNITY 
- - - - - - 
¶4.  (SBU)  On June 26, poloff met the spokesman for SLA/Unity 
Mahjoub Hussein.  Hussein claimed that he would be traveling to 
Paris on June 27 to meet French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner in 
a private meeting. (Note: Attempts to contact Hussein after June 27 
to see if the meeting took place have not been successful.  End 
Note.)  After strongly criticizing all other rebel movements, 
Hussein claimed that SLA/Unity is coordinating a massive attack on 
Khartoum under the operational name, the "flood" (toufan).  "I can't 
tell you the date, but it is coming," stated Hussein.  Hussein was 
not optimistic about the prospects for negotiations saying, "the 
rifle is currently the only way right now."  Mahjoub stated that 
"this will be the last operation we undertake, whether it is for 
good or for bad.  We will either be free or be slaves." 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  (NOTE:  Although a prominent rebel leader since the 
beginning of the conflict and still widely interviewed by 
international journalists, Hussein appeared eccentric, imbalanced, 
and erratic.  Hussein was 1.5 hours late for the meeting with 
poloff, made many exaggerated statements, and smelled of alcohol. 
Poloff asked the Joint Mediation Support Team's Boubou Niang and 
Muin Shrim about their opinion of Hussein and they replied that that 
they no longer consulted Hussein due to his lack of credibility. 
Other rebel leaders from JEM and the London Sudanese expatriate 
community stated that Hussein has an alcohol problem.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  On June 28, Suliman Jamous, the Humanitarian Coordinator 
for SLM/Unity, urged caution with respect to Mahjoub's claim of an 
impending attack and his upcoming meeting with Foreign Minister 
Kouchner, saying "I don't always know what Mahjoub is up to." 
Contrary to Hussein's militaristic vision, Jamous stated that "there 
is no military solution to the problems of Darfur - the only 
military way is to remove Bashir, and that is not realistic at this 
point." Jamous stated that SLA/Unity is ready for negotiations with 
the government, and that he has conveyed this message to the Joint 
Mediation Support Team.  Jamous stated that "the Government of Sudan 
puts forward the idea that no rebel movement is ready for 
negotiations, even though that is not true." 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Jamous stated that his current priority is unifying the 
rebel movements.  Jamous stated that there are only four significant 
movements at this point (JEM, SLA/AW, SLA/Unity, and URF.) He stated 
that URF is quickly losing influence.  He stated that Adam Bakhit 
has run out of fighters and that the GoS bought out groups of URF 
fighters to participate in the attack in Chad. According to Jamous, 
it is likely that the remaining movements in the URF coalition will 
join SLA/Unity. Jamous stated that he occasionally speaks with JEM's 
Khalil Ibrahim, but that  Abdul Wahid refuses to speak with him.  He 
did note, however, that he is in direct communication with many of 
Abdul Wahid's field commanders. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000983  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Jamous characterized (his distant relative and rival) 
Minni Minnawi as a selfish leader "whose time is done."  Jamous said 
that he is not in communication with Minnawi, but that many of 
Minnawi's field commanders have joined SLA-Unity in recent months. 
For example, stated Jamous, the top field commander for SLA-Minnawi 
in Muhajariyya, Babiker Salah Abdalla, recently defected and joined 
SLA-Unity. 
 
¶9. (SBU)  Jamous stated that he has more influence within SLM-Unity 
than its leader Abdallah Yahia (who is currently in Libya, stated 
Jamous).  Jamous stated that Unity's Othman Bushra has a terrible 
relationship with Sharif Harir, the SLA/Unity External Relations 
chief.  Jamous stated that his own focus will be to "lead SLM/Unity 
for the time being until it is stable and then I will go back to 
focusing on humanitarian affairs."  Jamous stated that many of the 
movements' field commanders are very simplistic people "who only 
think of a car, house, and a pistol in their hand" and that these 
individuals require much attention from the political leadership. 
"We need to get our people thinking about the greater political 
goals of our movement," stated Jamous. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Jamous said that his movement is almost self-reliant for 
supply, gaining weapons from raids on GoS installations. He did 
admit, however that "We get insignificant support from Libya and 
Chad and some support from private Chadian businessmen."  Jamous 
stated he is going back to the field after the humanitarian seminar 
led by the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva scheduled in 
July.  He said that he is in good health and that he will travel 
through Chad as "the GoS has some troops posted along the border 
with Libya." 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - - 
¶11.  (SBU) Experienced Darfur observers such as the JMST's Muin 
Shrim have characterized SLA/Unity as "very well placed" to take a 
leading role in Darfur.  This assessment was not apparent in the 
meetings with Hussein and Jamous.  Although we should not downplay 
SLA/Unity based on one erratic personality, it is significant that 
Hussein serves as SLA/Unity's representative to the outside world, 
and that other more respectable leaders such as Jamous have not 
stepped up to correct or "rein in" Hussein.  (Despite his rebel 
involvement, respected international leaders such as Desmond Tutu 
have lavished Jamous with praise calling him "a champion of 
humanitarian principles and human rights.") 
Jamous also admitted (as stated in para 9) that SLA/Unity continues 
to have internal leadership struggles.  JEM leaders and other 
competing movements continually point to this leadership struggle 
when describing SLA/Unity, and while their criticisms are often 
exaggerated, there does appear to be some truth to their claims. 
Yehia Bashir's call for greater inclusivity within SLA/AW makes 
sense and should be supported, as the arrogant and stubborn Abdul 
Wahid continues to reject interaction with the international 
community and other rebel movements. 
 
FERNANDEZ