VZCZCXRO7912
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0974/01 1840908
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 020908Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1209
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000974 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/C, NSC FOR 
BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SU
SUBJECT: JEM'S SENIOR LEADERS DISCUSS REBEL UNIFICATION AND EXTERNAL 
RELATIONS (PART II of II) 
 
REFS: A. KHARTOUM 973 
¶B. KHARTOUM 941 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  On June 27-28, three senior Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) leaders in London separately met poloff and discussed 
JEM's ideas on rebel unification; its relations with the SPLM, 
SLM/Minni Minnawi, Chad, and Libya; and JEM's expectations for the 
content of any peace deal. These leaders also attempted to dispel 
"misperceptions" about JEM including its Islamic agenda, its close 
ties to Hassan Al-Turabi, and its use of child soldiers.  This cable 
is the second of two parts on JEM's senior leadership in London. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (U)  On June 27, poloff met separately with Dr. Gibriel Ibrahim 
(JEM's Senior Economic Advisor and brother of Khalil Ibrahim) and 
later with JEM spokesman Ahmed Hussein Adam. On June 28, poloff met 
lead negotiator Ahmed Tugot. 
 
THOUGHTS ON REBEL UNIFICATION AND OTHER MOVEMENTS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶3.  (SBU) SLA/ABDUL WAHID:  Tugot and Ibrahim stated that Abdul 
Wahid Nur continues to be an obstruction to rebel unification. 
Tugot remarked that during his visit to Paris to meet Foreign 
Minister Deng Alor, Abdul Wahid refused to see JEM representatives. 
Tugot stated that JEM's focus is no longer on Abdul Wahid, but on 
working directly with his field commanders.  Tugot stated that "even 
without Abdul Wahid you will see a great movement of the Fur people 
to JEM." Ibrahim had an equally negative view of Abdul Wahid, saying 
"Abdul Wahid will not join us.  He thinks that the West will fix 
everything and that they will come to his rescue." Like Tugot, 
Ibrahim also stated that JEM is reaching out to the Fur, saying "The 
Fur and the IDPs do not belong to anyone and many of them have been 
very enthusiastic about our work and the Omdurman operation." 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  SLA/UNITY: Not surprisingly, JEM leaders were equally 
critical of their rivals from SLA/Unity.  According to Ibrahim, 
Unity is divided along ethnic lines and has an internal struggle 
between Abdalla Yahia and Sharif Harir.  Ahmed Tugot stated that JEM 
is in direct discussions with Abdallah Yehia and that "JEM is very 
serious about trying to unite the movements but it is difficult when 
there is a clan struggle going on within Unity." 
 
SLM/MINNI MINNAWI 
- - - - - - - - - 
¶5. (SBU)  JEM leaders confirmed that Minni Minnawi met Khalil 
Ibrahim in Eastern Chad in late June, and stated that Minni sought 
guarantee from Ibrahim for the return of his defected commanders to 
SLM/MM and in exchange, Minnawi would agree to significant 
coordination under separate organizational umbrellas.   Tugot stated 
that Khalil Ibrahim turned down this deal, adding, "Minni is no 
longer a player - it is no longer 2006."  Tugot predicted that 
Minnawi's influence will continue to decrease and that "he will soon 
be left with only his very small Zaghawa clan."  Ibrahim also 
criticized Minnawi saying that he never recovered from NCP 
negotiator Mahjzoub Al-Khalifa's death (in June 2007) and Dr. 
Nafie's takeover of the Darfur portfolio.  He said that Minnawi is 
not a capable political leader, and that his own ruthless tactics 
and search for power ended up sidelining many educated and capable 
commanders.  Ibrahim and Adam were more optimistic than Tugot about 
a possible alliance with Minnawi saying, "we are thinking of a broad 
front where everyone can fit in."  Adam separately claimed, "Minnawi 
committed a lot of atrocities and can be ruthless, but we fought 
alongside him and unity with the movements is important to us." 
 
RELATIONS WITH THE SPLM 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶6.  (SBU)  Tugot, Ahmed, and Ibrahim all stated that the Norwegians 
helped facilitate a meeting between JEM and the SPLM in Paris in 
late June.  Ahmed described the meeting as a very discrete 
discussion with Deng Alor (reftel). According to Tugot, the meeting 
focused on SPLM-JEM relations, and "helped dispel SPLM's 
misconceptions about JEM, including our alleged links with Turabi 
and our perceived Islamic agenda."  Tugot stated that the SPLM has 
done very little in Darfur and during the negotiations for the DPA 
the NCP exploited the SPLM for its own goals. Adam stated that he 
realizes that the SPLM is interested in JEM for its own interests, 
as "They [the SPLM] realize that they need friends in the government 
if they want a smooth transition and want to secede."  Adam agreed 
that the "Norwegians were very helpful in facilitating this positive 
meeting," and that he expects that there will be another JEM-SPLM 
meeting sometime in July, maybe in London or in Kenya.  He stated 
that Salwa Benaya, an SPLM representative and member of the National 
Assembly, also recently visited London and met with JEM officials 
informally. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Ibrahim stated that the SPLM should not fear that JEM 
 
KHARTOUM 00000974  002 OF 003 
 
 
will discard the CPA.  He stated that JEM has endorsed the CPA, the 
bill of rights contained in it, and the federal system that it 
initiated.  Ibrahim cautioned though, that the DPA failed because 
the international community attempted to protect the CPA at all 
costs.  He stated that with respect to the composition of the 
National Assembly, the South should retain approximately 1/3 of the 
seats, and that JEM and Darfuris should be allotted 20% from the 52% 
of seats allotted to the NCP.  Ibrahim stated that the south should 
still have the right to the referendum for secession in 2011, but 
that "we should take another look at the timeline laid out by the 
CPA with respect to elections and other things."  Tugot separately 
agreed, stating that JEM has started to generally discuss the 
timeline of the CPA with the SPLM. 
 
REGIONAL PLAYERS 
- - - - - - - - - 
¶8.  (SBU)  CHAD:  JEM leaders stated that the interests of Chad and 
JEM currently overlap, but there is no permanent strategic 
commitment between them.   Ibrahim stated that years ago Deby vowed 
to eliminate JEM and that he will not be a reliable ally for JEM for 
the long term.  Ibrahim also stated that the clan differences in the 
Zaghawa are significant and that Deby appears concerned about a Kobe 
Clan alliance against him (Ibahim is a Kobe).  Nonetheless, both 
Ibrahim and Tugot stated that the GoS seeks regime change in Chad, 
and that this constitutes a threat to JEM.  Ibrahim stated that he 
told GoS officials that it should be easier for the Sudanese 
Government to try to solve Sudan's internal problems than to try to 
overthrow another country, "but they do not listen to us."  Tugot 
stated that JEM did fight the Chadian opposition in Eastern Chad, 
claiming that JEM did not lose many fighters, and took 85 vehicles 
from the Chadian opposition all over Eastern Chad. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  LIBYA:  JEM leaders downplayed their ties with Libya. 
Tugot stated that JEM has an informal relationship with Libya, one 
where JEM "is in touch with them, and nothing more than that." 
Ibrahim stated that Libya has not been supportive of JEM "from day 
one" and that Libya's central motivation in the conflict has been to 
avoid the presence of a strong international force along its 
borders.  Ibrahim said that the GoL has little leverage over the GoS 
and that GoL officials are not patient enough to dig deeply into 
Darfur's root issues.  Ibrahim described Libyan Intelligence Chief 
Abdallah Senussi as "someone who is open to listening to the 
movements" and Ali Trekki as "supportive of the Government of Chad." 
 
 
REFUTING CLAIMS ABOUT JEM 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶10.  (SBU)  JEM leaders refuted the idea that JEM is an Islamic 
movement, funded solely by Chad, and interested more in power in 
Khartoum than in the people of Darfur.  Ibrahim stated, "you in the 
West accuse us of being an Islamic movement and directed by Chad. 
These two things contradict each other."  Ibrahim admitted that some 
JEM members did fight against the South during the civil war, but 
that this should not be a condemnation of the movement as a whole. 
He said that his brother, Khalil, only served as a military 
physician in the war. Adam stated that JEM is not in favor of 
instituting sharia law and that it supports full diplomatic 
relations with Israel. He said that although some JEM leaders used 
to be part of the government, "If you say we came from the same 
group as the regime, you need to ask why we left in the first 
place."  Adam stated that JEM has no significant relationship with 
the Popular Congress Party's Hassan Al-Turabi, and that Al-Turabi 
has no future in any Sudanese government.  Adam, Ibrahim, and Tugot 
also emphatically refuted the idea that JEM used child soldiers in 
the May 10 attack.  Ibrahim and Adam both claimed that the 
Government constructed this, as the children were taken from the 
Suad Al-Fatih Quranic School in Omdurman and were beaten into 
admitting that they were part of JEM's forces 
 
¶11.  (SBU) JEM leaders stated that they see the media as an 
important part of their battle for Darfur.  They said that the 
Government of Sudan viewed Khalil Ibrahim's lengthy interview on 
Al-Jazeera as a major threat, and that GoS officials worked hard not 
to allow the interview's most important segments to be aired. 
Ibrahim stated that presidential advisor Dr. Ghazi Salah Ad-Din 
personally traveled to Qatar to try to prevent the tape from being 
broadcast.  According to Ibrahim, Ghazi was successful in advising 
Al-Jazeera officials to only broadcast trivial parts of the 
interview focusing on the Arab league or Abdul Wahid's office in Tel 
Aviv.  Ibrahim stated that Ghazi was able to accomplish this through 
his personal connections and did not raise the issue with officials 
from the Government of Qatar. Ibrahim stated that although his 
brother's interview was largely undermined by the GoS, that Khalil 
will discuss some of these ideas further in an upcoming interview 
with the pan-Arab newspaper "As-Sharq Al-Awsat." 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000974  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Ibrahim also commented on recent press coverage 
detailing the "confession" of JEM commander Abdel-Aziz al-Nur 
Al-Asher.  (Note:  Asher was arrested on May 22, attempting to cross 
into Eritrea and pro-regime Sudanese press such as "Al-Rai-al-Aam" 
devoted significant front page space to describing his confession. 
END NOTE.) Ibrahim stated that he knows that Asher "would never say 
the things that are coming out in the papers."  Ibrahim added that 
the newspaper articles, however, "do give us signals from where the 
GoS is getting its information and we can figure out who is 
divulging information from what is said."  Ibrahim admitted that 
Asher's capture and Jamali Hassan Jelaladin's death were difficult 
for JEM, but that "is part of the struggle and to be expected." 
 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶13.  (SBU) Ibrahim and the other JEM leaders separately emphasized 
that JEM wants an improved relationship with the U.S. "If we have 
done anything wrong to the U.S., we want to know what, and we will 
try to correct that," stated Ibrahim.  Ibrahim asked whether the 
U.S.'s perception of JEM would change under a new administration. 
Poloff stated that it is unlikely that it would, and emphasized that 
JEM should renounce its military ambitions as a first step. 
 
WHAT JEM WANTS OUT OF A FUTURE DEAL 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶14.  (SBU)  Ibrahim stated that JEM has generally outlined what it 
wants in a peace deal.  According to Ibrahim, power sharing must 
involve a vice president position, significant positions in the 
cabinet, and at least 20% of the national assembly.  Leadership 
positions in the armed forces, police, security, and civil service 
are all necessary components, said Ibrahim.  He said that JEM has 
made it clear that Darfur should be one state with powers similar to 
those granted to the South, though self-determination is not 
important "at this point."  Those affected by war should be 
compensated, IDPs should be supported in the return to their 
homelands, and Darfur should receive reconstruction and development 
funds, said Ibrahim. Ibrahim stated that JEM forces should not be 
disarmed during the interim period, "as this is the best guarantee 
for the implementation of agreement."  Ibrahim also stated that 
wealth-sharing provisions must detail future national revenues and 
an agreement for percentage of oil revenue for Darfur before 
production starts.  Ibrahim insisted that there should be a general 
political framework before there is a ceasefire. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
¶15.  (SBU) JEM's message to poloff tracks almost precisely with what 
JEM told the JMST's Boubou Niang and Muin Shrim on June 26 in 
London.  JEM truly sees itself as the biggest player Darfur and all 
three of its representatives attempted to backhandedly discredit the 
other movements, including SLM/Minnawi.  Its emphasis on bringing 
the Fur into their movement is a wise maneuver, however unlikely 
their prospects for success in this claimed endeavor.  JEM's 
emphasis on working directly with SLA/AW field commanders mirrors 
the strategy of the AU/UN's JMST, not to mention other rebel groups 
including SLM/Unity and even some of Abdul Wahid's own political 
advisors.  Norwegian involvement in bringing together the SPLM and 
JEM and the SPLM's willingness to meet is noteworthy, although 
Norway has on several occasions encouraged SPLM efforts to unify the 
Darfur movements.  The meeting was obviously conducted discretely 
given widespread condemnation of JEM's May 10 attack on Omdurman. 
Although questions remain about JEM's Islamic ideology, its members' 
role in the war in the South, and its ongoing relationship with 
Chad, the Sudanese and the international community will inevitably 
have to work with JEM on a solution to the war in Darfur sooner or 
later, whether we like it or not. 
 
FERNANDEZ