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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1149, UNAMID DEPLOYMENT UPDATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1149 2008-07-31 14:55 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0402
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1149 2131455
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311455Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1471
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001149 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF SE WILLIAMSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT UPDATE 
 
 REF: (A) KHARTOUM 1085 
(B) KHARTOUM 992 
(C) KHARTOUM 872 
(D) CAIRO 1213 
(E) KHARTOUM 502 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: UNAMID and Egyptian embassy sources told us that 
half of the anticipated 335 Egyptian engineers arrived July 24 and 
fully expect the remainder within the coming month. In addition, 
Egyptian advance teams arrived to prepare for the arrival of the 
850-troop Egyptian infantry battalion and a 120-troop transport 
unit.  The Ethiopian embassy also reported that they anticipate that 
half of their 850-troop infantry battalion will arrive August 10 
with the balance to arrive later in 2008. However, both UNAMID and 
the respective embassies cautioned that delays in transporting 
Contingent owned Equipment (CoE) could result in troop deployment 
delays. End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Egyptian poloff confirmed that 126 members of the Egyptian 
Engineering Company arrived on July 24 to join an 83-troop advance 
team. UNAMID sources told us that they expect to receive the other 
126 individuals in the coming weeks to bring the company up to its 
full strength of 335. Both UNAMID and the Egyptian embassy said that 
the cautious deployment of the Egyptians is more related to the 
pending ICC indictment and UNAMID's current Level IV security status 
than to any operational deployment problem. 
 
2. (SBU) Egyptian poloff told us on July 31 that an advance party is 
in Darfur to prepare for the deployment of an 850-troop infantry 
battalion to Um Kadada. The Egyptian poloff said that due to 
technical reasons, the battalion will not have the requested 
engineering component, but added that the planned second Nyala-bound 
infantry battalion will have an engineering component, probably in 
the form of a company-sized light engineering detachment (ref D). 
Both UNAMID sources and the Egyptian poloff could give no firm dates 
for the arrival of these battalions and noted that deployment could 
be delayed until the CoE actually arrived in Um Kadada. 
 
3. (SBU) UNAMID and Egyptian embassy sources told us that a small 
advance team of the Nyala-bound 120 troop transport company arrived 
the weekend of July 25.  UNAMID sources said that the main element 
may be delayed due to transport problems of their CoE, but were 
optimistic that the problems would be resolved in time for the main 
body to arrive in mid-August. 
 
4. (SBU) The Ethiopian DCM told us on July 27 that he anticipates 
that 350 infantry will begin arriving August 10, and that the 
remainder of the 850-troop Ethiopian battalion will arrive later in 
2008.  If the Ethiopians arrive as scheduled, UNAMID sources told us 
that this first tranche of Ethiopians would raise troop levels to 
8,470 up from the current 8,120 on July 29. However, a UNAMID 
official who liaises with the GOS cautioned us that delays are 
always possible. UNAMID told us on July 27 that the GOS, contrary to 
the SOFA stipulation on freedom of movement for UNAMID equipment, is 
refusing to permit transport of twelve CoE containers from El-Obeid 
unless GOS customs opens and inspects the containers. CDA Fernandez 
will raise this specific issue with MFA U/S Siddiq, the NCP's 
pointman on UNAMID deployment, on August 4. While the UNAMID 
official was optimistic on resolving the issue, he cited this as 
another issue that undermined speedy UNAMID deployment. 
 
5. (SBU) The Pakistani DCM told us on July 23 that his government 
will resist sending the Pakistani engineering unit to El-Geneina as 
the UN had asked.  He said that he personally conducted a field trip 
to El-Geneina and concluded that the situation is "too chaotic," 
meaning insecure, for an engineering company. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: With the July arrival of the Chinese (ref A) and 
the arrival of the first tranche of Egyptian engineers, UNAMID 
sources told us that as of July 29 they had 8,127 of its 19,555 
authorized troops.  These additional troops represent steady but 
excrutiatingly slow progress, but just as UNAMID struggles to expand 
its numbers each new soldier and new base represents a need to 
update and expand its logistical support network. Having already 
noted its deployment limitations (ref E), we will look for and 
report on UNAMID efforts to improve its important logistical and 
supply capabilities. 
 
FERNANDEZ