VZCZCXRO9035
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1134 2111445
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291445Z JUL 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1452
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001134 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT:  SPLM POLITICAL BUREAU CONSIDERS ELECTIONS AND ICC 
INDICTMENTS 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Over the last three days ConGen Juba has held 
separate discussions with four members of the SPLM Political Bureau 
(PB) that met in Juba over the July 26 and 27 weekend and two other 
senior members of the GOSS.  Despite press reports that GOSS 
President Salva Kiir has announced that he will run for the GNU 
Presidency in 2009, Political Bureau members and others say only 
that Kiir and the party have agreed to contest the elections at all 
levels.  The agenda of the PB meeting was entirely focused on what 
strategy the SPLM should take to keep the CPA alive until 2011 in 
the event that ICC judges hand down arrest warrants for GNU 
President Bashir. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Although opinions varied on the positive and negative 
impact of the ICC indictments among the six contacts (some viewing 
them as good pressure on Bashir and some as a potential threat to 
the peace), all were focused on how to keep the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) on track no matter what the ICC judges decide.  To a 
person they view their primary objective as getting to the 2011 
referendum so that the South can make a peaceful break with the 
North.  Not one thought there was any longer a hope of Sudan staying 
united after 2011. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Despite persistent press reports that Kiir announced he 
will stand for the GNU presidency in 2009, all these members of the 
SPLM reported that no such decision has yet been made.  What the PB 
unanimously agreed upon, they said, was that the SPLM would "contest 
the elections at all levels, top to bottom."  The clear implication, 
they agreed, was that Kiir would run, but the actual decision has 
not finally been made. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The more candid of the 4 PB members admitted that the 
problem Kiir faced was that it was highly unlikely he could win the 
presidency of the GNU.  For the most part, all of them believed that 
Bashir, especially a Bashir indicted by the ICC, had no choice but 
to hang on to power at any price, often quoting the Sudanese 
proverb, "From the office to the grave."  Bashir must either find a 
way to cheat in the election, call it off, or stage a coup if he 
loses.  His only other option is 4o lose and go to prison, which all 
agreed he would never consider. 
 
¶5. (SBU) If Kiir runs for the GNU presidency and loses, he cannot at 
the same time run fmr the presidency of the GOSS, an$ so he loses 
all elected political positions.  Asked who in the SPLM would run 
for the GOSS presidency if Kiir did not, no one would even venture a 
guess, let alone an answer. There is an unstated fear that, without 
Kiir, GOSS VP Machar could be unchecked. 
 
¶6. (SBU) What is being broadly hinted at is that Kiir will continue 
to imply that he will pun for the GNU presidenay until the last 
possible moment, without making an official comeitment to actually 
do so.  This, it is felt, will keep the pressure on Bashir to work 
out sgme kind of electoral agreement acceptable to an SPLM whose 
primary goal is not to win the national presidency, but to hold the 
2011 referendum.  As one of the five said, "It is time for the NCP 
to decide if it wants half, or nothing." The implication was that 
the SPLM might allow Bashir to steal or simply have the top spot on 
the ticket without protest, provided that the SPLM and its allies 
are allowed to control the National Assembly and write the 2011 
referendum law.  In that event, Bashir keeps his presidential 
immunity, and tHe South gets independence.  By holding off on an 
announcement until late, Kiir can then still run for the presidency 
of the GOSS at the last minute. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Another scenario proposed by a PB member is that the ICC 
indictments will place enough strain on the NCP that it will 
facture, some in support of Bashir and some in support of an 
alternate candidate.  If an anti-Bashir faction of the NCP joined 
with other political parties to elect a more moderate candidate from 
the North, the SPLM might not contest the election at the top after 
all, while still trying to win a majority in the National Assembly. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment: SPLM electoral strategies are still nascent, and 
given the ICC indictment of Bashir, political discussions are in 
flux.  It is difficult in an extremely volatile Sudan, made more so 
by the ICC announcement, to read the political tea leaves a year out 
from elections, though both parties appear intent on maintaining at 
least the status quo.  Although it may not be reasonable for the 
SPLM to expect a majority in the parliament, a guarantee that they 
can control the drafting of the referendum law will probably meet 
their needs.  The SPLM's guiding interest is to keep the CPA on 
track until the 2011 referendum, and constant posturing regarding 
elections should be viewed in that context. 
 
FERNANDEZ