VZCZCXRO9165
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1071/01 1981205
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161205Z JUL 08  ZDK DUE TO GARBLING IN ORIGINAL
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1354
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001071 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF SE WILLIAMSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UN DDR PROGRAM CITES POSSIBLE OBSTACLES 
 
REFERENCE: (A) KHARTOUM 987 
(B) KHARTOUM 927 
(C) KHARTOUM 517 
(D) KHARTOUM 506 
 
KHARTOUM 00001071  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Program Manager of the UN Integrated Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (IDDR) program Basil Massey told 
poloff on July 9 that signing of the June 25 UN-GOS IDDR agreement 
in Geneva (ref A) capped a six-month long effort to move the DDR 
program forward.  Massey said that at the June 25 signing the GOS 
had urged IDDR to start both disarmament and demobilization efforts 
in August, but IDDR refused saying the UN needs both time and 
funding to establish the logistics-intensive $430-million four-year 
program.  In the South, Arop Moyak, the Chairman of the Southern 
Sudan Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission 
(SSDDRC), reports that there is no agreement with the UN on the 
amount of funding required for the program, particularly for the 
Reintegration phase of DDR in Southern Sudan.  Due to a severe lack 
of employment opportunities and an under-developed infrastructure in 
the South, the ability of the local economy to absorb demobilized 
soldiers is almost nil, and the SSDDRC refuse to demobilize men who 
have little prospect of earning a livelihood.  The potential for 
unrest and social upheaval, they feel, is too great to risk. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Massey said that with the Geneva UN-GOS IDDR agreement in 
hand, the UN will begin to establish three field offices in north 
and south Sudan and in Darfur, begin to hire and train staff and 
start an IDDR program public awareness campaign. He said that 
increasing public awareness, particularly with government officials 
and rebel groups, is critical to avoid false expectations of what an 
IDDR program can provide. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Massey said AEC Chairman Derek Plumbly believed the signing 
of the UN-GOS IDDR Geneva agreement represented substantial progress 
on the CPA. He added that the UN Secretary General will also 
highlight this progress in his periodic report to the UN Security 
Council. Massey said that IDDR momentum will continue with a 
technical donor meeting in Khartoum in July, an Ambassadorial-level 
national DDR council meeting in mid-August, and a mid-August DDR 
roundtable conference in Juba where any donor or implementing 
partner can raise its concerns. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Asked about potential obstacles to IDDR success, Massey 
said that financial problems will be the greatest obstacle that IDDR 
needs to be overcome.  He said that no donors have come forward to 
pledge the $385 million needed for the four-year IDDR program, and 
that at least $195 million needs to be pledged before the 
demobilization phase can start.  He added that IDDR needs the 
demobilization funding to be in place by October 2008 in order to 
start the program by April 2009.  He said that the GONU has already 
told him that the GOS is ready to live up to its $45 million 
contribution, but is skeptical that the IC will donate its $385 
million share. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In contrast to this, SSDDRC Commissioner Moyak reports that 
DDR in the South alone will require in excess of $500 million to 
accomplish, and that there will be no DDR in Southern Sudan at all 
until there are sufficient funds to establish what he views as a 
realistic Reintegration program.  "The demobilization and 
disarmament is the easy part," he said.  "The hard part is 
Reintegration, and no DD will start until we know we have sufficient 
R."  He said Reintegration is far more difficult and expensive to 
accomplish in the South because the Southern economy offers few job 
opportunities.  "Everything here is more expensive due to the lack 
of infrastructure."  He estimates it will cost between $3000 to 
$5000 per individual to create a realistic Reintegration program, 
which is the cost of providing the social and economic 
infrastructure needed to properly support a demobilized soldier. 
Currently, only $1750 per person is available.  Demobilized 
soldiers, he said, need some kind of medical support, the promise of 
education for their children, and the realistic opportunity to find 
productive work. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Moyak's concerns were two fold.  First, without adequate 
Reintegration support, ex-soldiers will have little choice but to 
turn to crime or rebellion against the government.  "What they know 
is the gun, and they will return to the gun if that is their only 
option to survive.  This could dramatically destabilize the South." 
Second, "If war returns, no one will fight if they see that the 
veterans have been treated badly."  The South, he said, simply will 
not implement a DDR program that risked these outcomes. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment: The difference in perspective between Massey and 
Moyak on where DDR stands speaks volumes about how out of touch the 
UN DDR office in Khartoum is with Southern views on what is 
currently possible.  Moyak's assertion that it will take between 
$3,000 to $5,000 per individual to establish a realistic 
 
KHARTOUM 00001071  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
reintegration program is, of course, astronomical.  However, what 
the SSDDRC Chairman is really asking for is enough money to develop 
a comprehensive economic and social development plan for Southern 
Sudan, which is an unrealistic objective of a DDR operation, and is 
completely beyond what his Commission could realistically manage. 
That takes nothing away from his point, however, that the South is 
currently poorly positioned to demobilize troops who have little 
chance of finding work, and who will likely then become a major 
destabilizing force in the South.  At least in the South, an 
effective DDR operation will need to find a way to plug into and 
coordinate with donor funded economic development schemes to make 
this process feasible, if and when southern leaders commit to a 
broad disarmament program (until now there have only been efforts at 
civilian disarmament).  The reality of DDR programs, which both 
Massey and Moyak did not acknowledge, is that three years into the 
CPA neither the South nor the North have made a commitment to move 
beyond a war footing and want to remain prepared in case hostilities 
resume. 
 
FERNANDEZ