VZCZCXRO8124
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1067/01 1980957
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 160957Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1350
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001067 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/C, NSC FOR BPITTMAN 
AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: JEM AND SLA/U SHOW INCREASED COOPERATION IN GENEVA 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Europe-based representatives of SLA/Unity and JEM 
met in Geneva last week at meetings hosted by the Center for 
Humanitarian Dialogue ostensibly to discuss greater security for 
humanitarian operations in Darfur, but the workshop served as a 
springboard for mutual recognition and substantive political 
dialogue between these two mostly Zaghawa rebel groups that appear 
to be aligned closely on security issues (both receive support from 
Ndjamena and most observers assume they receive some support from 
Libya as well).  The modest tangible progress from the sessions 
included an agreement to increase security and a method, with 
assistance from OCHA, to try to decrease hijackings and banditry. 
CHD and the JMST view the meeting as a confidence-building measure 
that will lead to additional talks between rebel groups as well as 
shuttle diplomacy once newly-appointed Chief Mediator Djibril 
Bassole arrives in Khartoum later this week.  End summary. 
¶2. (SBU) According to Theo Murphy of the Geneva-based Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD), and Amy Scott, Poloff with the Joint 
Mediation Support Team (JMST), discussions between representatives 
from the Sudanese Liberation Army/Unity (SLA/U) and the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) were positive and even somewhat substantive 
on security issues. Organized by CHD and the U.N.'s Office for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), with the JMST as an 
observer, the workshop was a modest effort at resuming formal 
mediation between Darfur rebel groups through the avenue of 
discussions on humanitarian coverage and security.  The JMST also 
plans to pursue a strategy of shuttle diplomacy between rebels and 
the government once newly-appointed Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole 
arrives in Khartoum later this week and begins his work in earnest. 
Notably absent from the CHD meeting in Geneva were representatives 
from SLM/Abdul Wahid, who had cancelled at the last minute.  Scott 
said the sessions marked a departure from previous JMST attempts at 
mediation; most remarkable was that JEM even agreed to meet with 
representatives from another rebel group, which demonstrates that 
JEM has begun to coordinate with SLA/U. 
¶3. (SBU) Murphy described discussions on security as producing 
"modest progress," as foremost among OCHA's concerns were practical 
steps to improve delivery of humanitarian aid in Darfur, with the 
objective of reducing banditry, looting and carjacking that has 
crippled humanitarian operations. SLA/U and JEM insisted that the 
situation had deteriorated due to communication gaps following the 
fracturing of the rebel movements.  They also said OCHA should play 
a more proactive role in contacting rebels when goods or vehicles 
had been taken, and coordinating their movements in advance. Rebels 
said that when aid agencies call numerous rebel contacts to track 
down the stolen items, thieves move more quickly to move the goods 
across the Chadian border. To remedy this, the participants agreed 
to a series of steps meant to create a network of points of contact 
within the movements to try and recover the goods, while OCHA agreed 
to serve as a focal point for the aggrieved parties. 
¶4. (SBU) Non-humanitarian issues gained less traction with the 
rebels; both movements agreed to take steps to inform their 
commanders in the field not to use child soldiers, while any talks 
of a ceasefire remained hypothetical and only on the sidelines of 
the main discussion. On last week's attacks on a UNAMID convoy, all 
participants roundly condemned the attacks in private, but SLA/U was 
coy when queried as to their participation. According to Scott, both 
groups privately denied taking part in the attacks which left seven 
dead, but SLA/U did not endeavor to deny making the attack in their 
post-workshop public statement. Speaking order at the final press 
conference became a point of tension, but the movements adopted a 
joint statement committing to humanitarian issues on principle, and 
promised to collaborate better with relief agencies. 
¶5. (SBU) Scott noted that the statement in itself was "not at all 
that significant," adding that the rebels were "re-committing to 
things they violate everyday," but the statement may stand for a new 
willingness to engage from a political standpoint and the meeting 
sets the stage for future sessions. A second workshop is being 
planned for representatives of the Government of Sudan, and plans 
are in the works for a third workshop for all parties. Murphy 
believes that this meeting may be the first step to gathering a 
"critical mass" of Darfur rebels, which could eventually lead toward 
talks on a political settlement.  Murphy suggested that obtaining 
this critical mass could begin without SLA/AW, but his participation 
would eventually be required. Murphy believes Abdelwahid should be 
pressured at the international level (e.g., the U.S. and France), 
and by his commanders on the ground, whom Murphy believes would 
welcome substantive discussions. While Murphy sees a Zaghawa 
political alliance as improbable (SLA/U is not fully comfortable 
with Khalil Ibrahim's islamist agenda), both CHD and the JMST remain 
optimistic that their efforts may lead toward more productive talks 
once the new Chief Mediator begins his work. 
¶6. (SBU) According to the JMST and UNAMID, new Chief Mediator 
Djibril Bassole intends to arrive in Sudan at the end of this week 
for negotiations with GOS officials before traveling to El Fasher to 
begin establishing contacts and setting up an office. Still formally 
employed as Burkina Faso's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional 
 
KHARTOUM 00001067  002 OF 002 
 
 
Cooperation, Bassole has yet to appoint a special assistant, hire 
any staff, or deal directly with JMST staff in Sudan. JMST reports 
that JEM appears the most concerned regarding Bassole's appointment, 
as they would have preferred a higher-profile figure whom they 
believe would be less malleable to GOS manipulation. 
¶7. (SBU) Comment: CHD's "critical mass" approach to peace talks 
requires the participation of Abdul Wahid al-Nur, who may never 
participate given his unrealistic demands and comfortable platform 
in Paris from which to pontificate on Darfur.  A more modest 
"domino" approach to engaging the movements on security agreements 
with the GOS and UNAMID may be more realistic.  The arrival of the 
Bassole, who we understand intends to pursue an intensive shuttle 
diplomacy strategy of continuous engagement with the movements, 
should give some momentum to what has been an entirely moribund 
process under the leadership of the part time joint special envoys 
Eliasson and Salim. 
FERNANDEZ