131533Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1328
INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
IGAD COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0252
CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001054 
 
BT 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR M 
DEPT FOR DS/CC 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/AF 
DEPT FOR S/S-O 
DEPT FOR AF/EX 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG 
DEPT FOR CA/OCS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC AEMR AMGT APER SU
 
SUBJECT: SUDAN EAC AND UPDATED TRIPWIRES 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Embassy Khartoum's Emergency Action Committee convened on 
July 13 to review post operations, tripwires, and security 
considerations for Monday, July 14, when the ICC intends to announce 
indictments against Government of Sudan officials.  In attendance 
were the CDA, A/DCM, RSO, MGT, CONS, USAID, RAO, DLO, and PAO. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The EAC recommended that the Embassy be closed to the 
public and only staffed on July 14 with the following 
Mission-critical personnel: CDA, A/DCM, RSO, 2 ARSOs, DLO, AND MO. 
Only two Americans will be at the USAID compound.  RAO will be fully 
staffed.  LES staff will be limited to the RSO senior FSN staff, 
guard force, motorpool, telephone operator, and on-call facilities 
maintenance personnel. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The EAC endorsed ICC indictment-specific tripwires that 
would trigger EAC urgent consideration of an Embassy drawdown: 
 
- Violent demonstrations against Western embassies or UN facilities 
in Khartoum. 
 
- Renewed Darfur rebel attacks on sites in the Nile Valley (such as 
Omdurman, Merowe Dam or Dongola) or the fall of any state capitals 
to Darfur rebels. 
 
- A change in GOS attitude and behavior towards the US Embassy, to 
include but not limited to verbal or media incitement, lack of 
high-level access, massive denial of visas for staff, NEC stoppage, 
or ending of cooperation with NISS. 
 
- Technical constraints affecting Embassy safety and administration, 
such as the crashing of the cellphone network in Khartoum over an 
abnormally long period, a "blue flu" walk-out by diplomatic police, 
or airport/airline disruption. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Generally, actions to be considered should be the same as 
those identified in Post's tripwires for intra-state fighting: 
 
- EAC convenes and documents meeting with front channel cable. 
 
- Request authority for Authorized Departure for eligible family 
members and non-emergency personnel in accordance with 12 FAH-1 
 
- Reduce embassy staffing to Level 2 (Reduced Staffing with minimal 
LES), both FSN and American. 
 
- Request Department Task Force be considered, establish regular EAC 
meetings or form Task Force at post and start sending Situation 
Reports.  Establish a rotational watch and reporting officer 
schedule on eight hour shifts. 
 
- Increase communications with appropriate U.S. military combatant 
command by establishing an opening and closing of business 
conference call with State Ops, DS Command Center, and the 
appropriate combatant command. 
 
- Inform AmCits through a warden notice of possibility that American 
Citizen Services may be terminated or curtailed. 
 
- Review "stand-fast" plans together with review of off-chancery 
operations in light of current and possibly reduced personnel. 
 
- Review transportation security to include consolidating agency 
motorpools to gain command and control of all armored vehicle assets 
and to better account for all movement. 
 
- Update and reissue Travel Warning. 
 
- Evaluate need for enhanced consular operations, such as off-site 
consular presence at airport, additional public announcements, 
additional personnel to field questions, or maintaining sufficient 
LES personnel (including drivers) to assist and process Amcit 
evacuees. 
 
- Consular officer conducts meeting with EmbOffs who have completed 
ConGen training and have served previously as ConOffs to review ACS 
assistance strategy and coordinate Consular duties.  Request 
Consular fly-away team if needed and able to obtain Sudanese visas. 
 
- At Front Office level, meet with Sudanese officials and contacts 
to notify them of probable US intentions. 
 
- Reduce controlled and classified documents to less than one-hour 
destruction time and review flash destruction procedures.  Identify 
appropriately cleared destruction officer teams to assist IRM if 
needed. 
 
- Review local healthcare resources, actual health risk, medical 
evacuation options, and public health and sanitation situation. 
 
- Consult with M/FLO for services to evacuated personnel. 
 
- Coordinate media message and timing of public announcement with 
Public Affairs. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Embassy Khartoum's complete list of tripwires has been 
sent via e-mail to S/ES-O/CMS and AF PDAS Thomas-Greenfield. 
 
FERNANDEZ