VZCZCXRO3752
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1033/01 1921228
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101228Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1293
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001033 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNMIS REGIONAL COORDINATOR ON THE SITUATION IN ABYEI, UNMIS 
MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND ELECTIONS 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 962 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: In a July 9 meeting with Consul General Juba, 
UNMIS Regional Coordinator for Southern Sudan David Gressley 
described UNMIS support for restoring security to Abyei and the 
conditions that must be met before the UN will aid in the return of 
IDPs to the town.  He also reviewed the performance of UNMIS in the 
region, and the limited capabilities of the UN forces deployed in 
South Sudan, as well as the possibility of holding successful 
elections in 2009. End Summary 
 
¶2. (SBU) Gressley opened the discussion of recent events in Abyei by 
explaining that UNMIS currently has 18 people in Abyei town itself 
to monitor the current situation and help to prepare for the return 
of IDPs to their homes.  Until the security situation improves, 18 
is the limit to what the UN will place in Abyei since that is the 
maximum number that can be evacuated in a single MI-8 helicopter in 
the event of renewed fighting.  One of the jobs being undertaken is 
the clearing of mines and unexploded ordinance from the town, a job 
that has largely been completed.  When the SAF moves out of Abyei, 
and the new Administration is in place along with the Joint 
Integrated Unit (JIU) and police, UNMIS will increase its presence 
in the town. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Gressley said that while the training of the Joint 
Integrated Unit by UNMIS had largely finished and the deployment of 
the JIU was now dependent on the final withdrawal of all SAF forces 
from the town, police training had not yet begun.  There were now 
340 police sent by Khartoum in place and ready to be trained, but 
the GOSS had not yet sent in their men, and until both sides had 
their forces in place UNMIS training would not begin.  The hold up 
on the GOSS side was, Gressley thought, their search to find 
candidates to join the contingent who were from Abyei.  That was 
taking time, but when they were ready, the UN was prepared to move 
them from Wau to Abyei.  He expected the total police force to 
number between 700 to 1000 men when fully assembled. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Gressley said that about 400 IDPs had returned to Abyei, 
and he expected more will continue to trickle back over the coming 
days.  However, he stressed that the UN will not encourage or 
support IDP return until the conditions were right for it and 
security could be adequately guaranteed.  This would require the 
complete withdrawal of all SAF soldiers from the town and the 
establishment of an Abyei administration, as well as the insertion 
of the JIU and police forces.  Short of those conditions, IDPs were 
potentially only placing themselves in harm's way again. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Gressley said that the SAF had begun to move out of Abyei, 
but then stopped when a SAF soldier and UN MILOB were wounded in 
Agok, just south of Abyei, by an SPLM soldier.  The SAF soldier was 
not seriously injured, but having been shot in the head the MILOB 
had been evacuated to Nairobi where there is medical scanning 
equipment to determine the extent of his injuries.  Gressley said he 
expected that officer would survive, but that it had been a close 
call.  Asked if he thought the SAF would use this incident as an 
excuse to halt their evacuation from Abyei, Gressley indicated that 
he did not think so, since if the NCP had made the decision to 
withdraw they would probably continue.  If they were not serious 
about withdrawal, they could always find an excuse not to do so, and 
did not need the incident in Agok to call a halt.  In fact, there 
were indications that the SAF would resume withdrawing from Abyei 
within the next 24 hours, and he promised to advise the ConGen 
should that happen.  He said the SPLA had continued to withdraw its 
forces from the region, as agreed. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Asked about the performance of UNMIS in Abyei, Gressley 
said that an independent review had been conducted (reftel) to 
assess what happened before, during and after the fighting broke 
out.  He thought more might have been done to prevent the outbreak 
of violence, but that once the two armies were engaged, in his view 
there was little the UNMIS commander in Abyei could have done. 
There were, he said, only 300 UNMIS soldiers in the Abyei UN camp at 
the time, and their equipment was severely limited.  The opposing 
forces massively outnumbered the UN, and were far better armed with 
heavy weaponry, including tanks and missile launchers.  Fortunately, 
civilian casualties had not been high, and the camp did move to 
provide shelter to over 100 civilians seeking refuge from the 
fighting.  In fact, said Gressley, UNMIS faces the same problem  all 
over Southern Sudan.  They are under equipped anD:*0PXSUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNMIS REGIONAL COORDINATOR ON THE SITUATION IN ABYEI, UNMIS 
MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND ELECTIONS 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) On the subject of elections, Gressley stated his grave 
reservations that preparations can be properly completed in time to 
hold them in 2009.  Even of greater concern, he said, is that if the 
donor community pressures all sides to rush their completion in 
2009, and the ground work as a result is poorly prepared, the 
potential for increasing instability and violence, both North - 
South and well as South - South, might be greatly amplified.  The 
experience with the census demonstrated just how fragile North - 
South cooperation can be, and the holding of elections would be far 
more complicated, with far more at stake for all concerned. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment: We have heard from several sources that the SAF 
31st brigade has resumed its withdrawal from Abyei.  It has taken 
too long already, and there remains a doubt in the minds of some 
observers that the SAF will actually fully withdraw.  CDA pushed NCP 
party officials on this point in a meeting July 10, pointing out 
that there is little hope of the regime changing its image in the 
West if it cannot follow through on the Abyei roadmap (septel).  We 
agree with Gressley's assessment on elections; the Sudanese together 
with the international community must be well prepared for elections 
as the risk of instability is high, especially if the South 
perceives that the North is angling to delay or scuttle the 
referendum. 
 
FERNANDEZ 
 
KHARTOUM 00001033  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) On the subject of elections, Gressley stated his grave 
reservations that preparations can be properly completed in time to 
hold them in 2009.  Even of greater concern, he said, is that if the 
donor community pressures all sides to rush their completion in 
2009, and the ground work as a result is poorly prepared, the 
potential for increasing instability and violence, both North - 
South and well as South - South, might be greatly amplified.  The 
experience with the census demonstrated just how fragile North - 
South cooperation can be, and the holding of elections would be far 
more complicated, with far more at stake for all concerned. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment: We have heard from several sources that the SAF 
31st brigade has resumed its withdrawal from Abyei.  It has taken 
too long already, and there remains a doubt in the minds of some 
observers that the SAF will actually fully withdraw.  CDA pushed NCP 
party officials on this point in a meeting July 10, pointing out 
that there is little hope of the regime changing its image in the 
West if it cannot follow through on the Abyei roadmap (septel).  We 
agree with Gressley's assessment on elections; the Sudanese together 
with the international community must be well prepared for elections 
as the risk of instability is high, especially if the South 
perceives that the North is angling to delay or scuttle the 
referendum. 
 
FERNANDEZ