VZCZCXRO3841
RR RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1892/01 2050537
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 230537Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4838
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001892 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON AF
SUBJECT: BAMYAN PROVINCE: IMPROVING GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Bamyan Governor Sarabi appears to be growing weary 
of the jockeying over her post and may be open to changing jobs. 
The Provincial Development Council has proven itself capable of 
producing a coordinated development strategy.  PRT Bamyan is 
considering improving several districts' security ratings from amber 
to green, but insurgent activity in neighboring provinces and the 
Hazara-Kuchi ethnic conflict threatens stability in the province. 
 
Governance: Governor May Be Growing Tired 
----------------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) As a governor with no party affiliation, Habiba Sarabi has 
few political allies.  Her base remains the support she gets from 
the people of Bamyan and her high profile in the international 
community.  Despite her successes, perceptions that she has failed 
to attract large-scale development projects have undercut her 
popularity.  Political detractors and those with interests in the 
governorship perpetuate these perceptions.  Afghan commentators as 
well as the local population speculate on her replacement.  The 
Governor herself is showing more signs of weariness and possible 
willingness to move on to a new position, if a suitable position is 
offered.  The Governor made a successful and well-publicized first 
visit to New Zealand in March, but the Independent Directorate for 
Local Governance (IDLG) denied several other requests for official 
international travel (IDLG is concerned about governors who spend 
too little time in their provinces, but Sarabi's high international 
profile may also have been a factor). 
 
¶3. (SBU) Bamyan has a new Director of Information and Culture.  This 
is a critical position; the Department of Information and Culture is 
central to Bamyan's tourism and economic development efforts.  The 
new director, Najibullah Ihrar, a Tajik, was head of the same 
department in Parwan and Baghlan provinces. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Bamyan ministry representatives remain weak, but with the 
support of the PRT and UNAMA, they have made strides toward improved 
planning and coordination.  After intensive efforts and 
consultations with Kabul ministries, IDLG, and the Afghan National 
Development Strategy, the Provincial Development Committee (PDC) 
finalized the Provincial Development Plan (PDP).  The PDC, comprised 
of provincial line ministers, members of the Provincial Council, and 
international organizations, is the main development planning body 
in the province.  The new PDP will provide visibility and 
accountability of on-going and planned projects and is a prioritized 
and vetted list for donors. 
 
¶5. (SBU) A new USG-funded Civil Service Training Center trains over 
60 civil servants for six months on management, English, and 
computers.  The Civil Service Commission Priority Reform and 
Restructuring program continues to grapple with the problems 
affecting the civil service.  Lack of oversight and accountability, 
lack of connection to the central government, and politically 
motivated appointments continue to prevent significant progress in 
the civil service, including at the district levels. 
 
Development: New Roads and Other Projects 
----------------------------------------- 
¶6. (U) The new east-west road connecting Bamyan to Yakawlang 
district is the most significant, visible project in Bamyan.  The 
Japanese-funded, USD 20 million, 97-km road will be the first 
large-scale infrastructure project in Bamyan.  The contractors are 
on the ground and have begun surveying.  Work will begin in summer 
2008 and will continue for three years. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding 
remains focused on roads, schools, clinics, and access to potable 
water.  The Singaporean Armed Forces, with six civil-military 
personnel, are in their second building season with the New Zealand 
PRT.  They are currently working on two medium-sized projects in the 
center of Bamyan and want to expand their development program.  All 
projects are closely coordinated with the Provincial Development 
Council.  Singapore has increased the number of troops and projects 
as well as completed a new Status of Forces Agreement with ISAF. 
The USAID Local Governance and Community Development program is 
renewing its efforts in Bamyan.  After a troubled start, the program 
has regained focus, hiring additional local staff and reaching into 
the districts. 
 
¶8. (U) The Agha Khan Development Network remains the largest 
implementer in Bamyan with 11 international staff and hundreds of 
local staff.  They focus on projects that support capacity-building 
 
KABUL 00001892  002 OF 002 
 
 
and community contributions.  Catholic Relief Services also recently 
opened offices in Bamyan. 
 
Security: Improving from Amber to Green 
--------------------------------------- 
¶9. (SBU) The PRT continues to assess two of seven districts at 
security code amber.  The two districts - Khamard and Shibar- are 
located in the northern parts of Bamyan.  Insurgent influence into 
Khamard from Baghlan's Tala-wa Barfak District remains a significant 
concern.  In late June, IEDs in Parwan Province highlighted new 
perils on the primary ground route between Bamyan and Kabul.  As a 
result of the attacks, UNAMA and the international NGOs suspended 
all ground transport to Bamyan from Kabul. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The PRT underwent a review of its current threat state and 
will lower the threat level in Bamyan and Sayghan districts to 
green.  Since May 2008, the PRT has seen decreased threat reporting 
on IEDs, and there has been a decrease in violent crime.  A green 
designation allows PRT personnel to travel with fewer armed 
soldiers.  The local community notices the difference, and it makes 
it easier for patrols to interact with the local population.  The 
lower resource requirements also allow PRT personnel to attend more 
meetings and engage in more activities. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Chief of Police General Ewaz is effective when he is 
present, but he has a pattern of frequent and long absences.  The 
New Zealand Police mentor assesses General Ewaz as having made 
significant progress in leadership command and putting management 
controls into place.  The biggest problem with the police remains 
the quantity and quality of personnel.  Rank reform efforts and the 
demands of police training programs in other parts of the country 
have prompted the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to pull personnel from 
Bamyan.  For example, the Bamyan Regional Training Center (training 
capacity of 90 students) recently lost four of its Criminal 
Investigation Division instructors to a larger facility in Herat 
province.  (In the past, MOI has been hard-pressed to fill 
instructor positions at training facilities around the country; 
however, it has been preparing over 200 new instructors and is 
rapidly closing the gap.)  In the transition to the new tashkil 
(staffing plan) for Afghan Year 1387 (2008-2009), the allocation of 
police positions to Panjab district has gone from 40 to 27 ANP 
without taking into account the seasonal Kuchi migration (see para 
12), which brings an influx of armed nomads into the district. 
However, the overall authorization for Bamyan rose from 706 to 756 
positions, and COP Ewaz remains empowered to deploy his force within 
the province as needed. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The Kuchi (Afghan, Pashtun nomads) migration to the Hazara 
areas of Wardak's Behsood district and southern Bamyan is a 
continuing concern.  Provincial officials deem the central 
government's efforts to resolve the conflict to be overly 
politicized, with political parties choosing sides based on 
electoral calculations.  Despite some deep wounds from previous 
Kuchi atrocities, the Hazara maintain a nuanced view of the Kuchi. 
They acknowledge some have legitimate land rights in Bamyan, but 
they insist Kuchi landowners take up residence on the land and 
become members of the community.  They also insist the pasture lands 
owned by Kuchi should only be used by the owners and their families, 
not offered as open grazing land to all Kuchi, a practice which 
exhausts the pasture lands.  The Hazara objection to the large 
groups of armed Kuchi stems from their prior experiences of the 
Kuchi acting as a proxy for the Pashtun and Taliban penetration into 
Hazarajat.  Fighting has already begun between heavily armed Kuchi 
and Hazara in the Behsood districts of Wardak province bordering 
Bamyan, but has not spread into adjacent provinces. 
 
WOOD