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DE RUEHBR #0999/01 2052132
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O 232132Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2161
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000999 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR L JOHNSON AND L/LEI, WHA/BSC, WHA/CHRIS MCMULLEN, 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR SWARTZ AND OIA, DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
ADMINISTRATION FOR OGC JOHN WALLACE, DEA REGION DIRECTOR US 
EMBASSY LA PAZ PATRICK STANKEMP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018 
TAGS: KJUS KCRM CJAN PREL CVIS SNAR
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: FOLLOW-UP TO DEMARCHE ON JUAN 
CARLOS RAMIREZ ABADIA ("CHUPETA") 
 
REF: STATE 76939 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lisa Kubiske for reason 1.5 (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and action request:  On July 21, 2008, 
Ambassador Sobel brought up the extradition concerns in 
reftel demarche to Minister of Justice Tarso Genro, objecting 
to Brazilian imposition of conditions on extraditions that 
fall outside the bilateral extradition treaty. Minister Genro 
immediately brought up the Juan Carlos Ramirez Abadia 
("Chupeta") case and indicated that he was ready to both 
expel and extradite him without the assurances.  Senior MOJ 
officials have since informed Minister Genro and us that he 
misspoke in making these statements because he lacks the 
power to extradite Abadia absent the assurances demanded by 
the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF).  The President, has the 
power to expel Abadia without regards to court-imposed 
conditions.  Contacts at the Ministry of Justice offered two 
possible courses of action that would allow us to retrieve 
Abadia in the near-term without having to provide assurances 
on sentencing (para 8).  Post requests immediate guidance on 
the options (or others that Washington may suggest).  End 
summary and action request. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Justice Minister Agrees to Extradite 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) During a July 21 meeting with Minister of Justice 
Tarso Genro, Ambassador Sobel raised the issue of reftel 
demarche.  Minister Genro interrupted and confided that he 
and President Lula had talked about the case.  Both agreed 
that it was in the interests of both countries that Abadia be 
sent to the United States.  Ambassador Sobel clarified that 
the only preconditions be what is in the extradition treaty. 
Genro stated that "in this situation Abadia would be expelled 
and he would be turned over to the United States and there 
would be no problem (see also para 5)."   Genro added that it 
was in the spirit of cooperation with the United States and 
because he could get a more severe penalty that Brazil was 
ready to extradite him. 
 
--------- 
Follow-up 
--------- 
 
¶4. (C) On July 22, POL, LEGATT and DEA called on Ministry of 
Justice contacts to hammer out the details of how Abadia 
would be handed to U.S. Custody.  The Chief of the 
Extradition, Expulsions and Deportations divisions, Roberto 
Rubem Ribeiro, a close contact of the Embassy, informed us 
that Minister Genro lacks the authority to overrule the 
Supreme Court's order that the United States provide 
assurances that Abadia will not serve more than 30 years in 
the United States and that, therefore, Minister Genro made 
that commitment without being fully aware of what he was 
promising and what was legally within his power to approve. 
(Note: Brazilian law allows for sentences of more than 30 
years; what it does not allow is for an individual to 
actually serve more than that.  Technically, he could be 
sentenced in the United States to more than 30 years, in 
which case his sentence would have to be commuted down to 30 
years.  End note.) 
 
¶5. (C) Consequently, on July 23, LEGATT sought out the 
Ministry of Justice's advisor for international affairs, 
Ambassador Portella, who was at the July 21 meeting 
accompanying Genro, seeking to enforce compliance of Genro's 
commitment to the Ambassador.  Portella, in confidence, told 
LEGATT that, while Portella agreed with LEGATT on what Genro 
said during the meeting, he had subsequently spoken to 
Minister Genro after the meeting with Ambassador Sobel and 
Genro admitted to Portella that he misspoke during the 
meeting when he indicated that Abadia could be extradited 
absent the assurances.  Ambassador Portella then noted that 
the only option available to extradite Abadia without 
providing the assurances is to expel him under Brazilian law. 
 Ambassador Portella recommended that we contact Genro's 
Legal Advisor, Rafael Thomaz Favetti, who was not present at 
the 21 July meeting due to scheduling conflicts.  Favetti 
agreed to meet us in the highest confidence today in the 
Embassy. 
 
¶6. (C) During our July 23 meeting with Favetti, Favetti 
 
confirmed what Ribeiro and Ambassador Portella had told the 
Embassy.   Favetti stated that Minister Genro was incorrect 
when he used the term "extradite" during the meeting with 
Ambassador Sobel.  But, Favetti indicated, it is within the 
power of President Lula to expel/expel someone without any 
regard to extradition process or any demand for assurances. 
Favetti noted, however, that there is opposition within the 
Ministry of Justice to exercise the option of expelling him, 
but that this was a manageable problem and indicated that he 
expected to be able to overcome this opposition. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Both Favetti, and separately Ambassador Portella, 
warned us that this action could further deteriorate the 
already fragile relations between the executive and judiciary 
branches, as the Brazilian Supreme Court could accuse the 
Ministry of Justice and the President of making an end-run 
around their extradition order by expelling Abadia.  If the 
STF protested the Ministry of Justice expulsion after the 
fact, it could potentially impact U.S. interests in the 
future.  Favetti -- who as a Supreme Court body on loan to 
the Ministry of Justice is in a good position to assess this 
-- told us he thought this could be smoothed over and it 
should not cause long-term problems for anyone. 
 
------------------ 
Available Options 
------------------ 
 
 
¶8. (C) Favetti suggested two possible courses of action that 
would allow us to retrieve Abadia in the near-term without 
having to provide assurances on sentencing.  We look to 
Washington for guidance within the next 24 hours: 
 
-- The Ministry of Justice agrees to expel him and the U.S. 
agrees to simultaneously withdraw the extradition request. 
Under this option, once in the U.S., Abadia would face no 
limits on charges or sentencing. We can plan and arrange the 
transfer ahead of time and we would only submit the 
withdrawal of the extradition after we were certain that 
Brazil has signed the expulsion order. 
 
-- The second option is that Brazilians would give us the 
same extradition authorization they have always been willing 
to give (i.e. the ones Washington rejects) plus the expulsion 
order.  We could then choose either one.  If we chose the 
extradition, we would have to provide the assurances. 
 
--------------------------- 
Comment and Action Request 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Favetti has already begun the process of expelling 
Abadia.  Post urgently seeks Washington guidance within the 
next 24 hours.  We note that Favetti will be out of town 
starting Friday of this week and thus we may lose a key ally 
and opportunity if we cannot indicate our preferred option in 
time for him to act. 
SOBEL