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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRASILIA 000896 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ELLIOTT ABRAMS AND GARY TOMASULO; DEPARTMENT FOR 
S/P, WHA, NEA, AND AF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2018 
TAGS: PREL IR BR
SUBJECT: CONSTRAINING IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN BRAZIL 
 
REF: A. 08 BRASILIA 851 
     ¶B. 08 BRASILIA 756 
     ¶C. 08 BRASILIA 531 
     ¶D. 08 BRASILIA 526 
     ¶E. 08 BRASILIA 420 
     ¶F. 08 BRASILIA 304 
     ¶G. 08 BRASILIA 43 
     ¶H. 08 BRASILIA 9 
     ¶I. 07 BRASILIA 2262 
     ¶J. 07 BRASILIA 2217 
     ¶K. 07 BRASILIA 2151 
     ¶L. 07 BRASILIA 2132 
     ¶M. 07 BRASILIA 1990 
     ¶N. 07 BRASILIA 1889 
     ¶O. 05 BRASILIA 1252 
     ¶P. 05 BRASILIA 760 
     ¶Q. 05 BRASILIA 718 
     ¶R. 05 BRASILIA 574 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel.  Reasons: 1.4 (B and D). 
 
¶1. (U) This is an Action Request, please see paragraph 3. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary:  Brazil's participation in the Annapolis 
peace conference is now cited by every Itamaraty contact, 
from Foreign Minister Amorim to Middle East desk officers, as 
the cornerstone of its growing efforts to exert global 
leadership.  Since Annapolis, discussion of Middle 
East-related topics has become a key agenda item in almost 
all high-level bilateral discussions.  So far, Brazil's 
Middle East-related initiatives can best be described as 
clumsy, and statements by senior GOB officials regarding key 
issues in the region have often been unhelpful. 
 
¶3. (C) Most worrisome is that the GOB's increasing focus on 
the Middle East coincides with aggressive efforts on the part 
of Iran to extend its influence in the region beyond Caracas 
to other countries in Latin America, including Brazil, in the 
hope of forming a front that will resist U.S. influence and 
look favorably on Tehran.  Although a wholesale buy-in by 
Brazilians is not likely, Tehran's anti-imperialist 
sentiments play well with the Brazilian left, and senior GOB 
officials have made it clear that they are looking to 
increase and cultivate their relations with Iran, which they 
view as a key regional economic and political power.  In 
post's view, although we are unlikely to persuade the GOB to 
take an approach fully in step with ours, it is critical to 
engage the GOB both to ensure they have a complete 
understanding of U.S. policy and concerns in the region, and 
to demonstrate that we take Brazil's leadership aspirations 
seriously.  End summary. 
 
¶4. (C) Action request: A number of recent factors point 
towards a new opportunity to engage Brazil on its Middle East 
policies.  In light of this, post seeks Washington support 
for a high-level briefer or briefers from NEA or other 
agencies, preferably at the DAS-level or higher, to come to 
Brasilia for detailed discussions with Brazilian government 
officials, members of Congress, and, where appropriate, 
press, regarding U.S. policy as it relates to the 
Israel-Palestine conflict, Syria, the ongoing situation in 
Lebanon, our policies with regards to designated terrorist 
groups Hamas and Hizballah, and Iran nuclear proliferation, 
support for terrorism, and activities inside Iraq.  End 
action request. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Whether We Like it or Not: Brazil In the Middle East 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶5. (C) Although Brazil's national interests in the Middle 
East traditionally have veered towards commerce and trade, 
Brazil increasingly is dabbling in political matters there. 
In practice, this often means taking potshots at U.S policies 
 
BRASILIA 00000896  002 OF 005 
 
 
in order to burnish its credentials as a relevant, 
influential, and independent player on global issues. 
Brazilian officials hold the belief that the country's global 
leadership aspirations depend in part on having a role on the 
most pressing international issues in the global agenda. 
Foreign Minister Celso Amorim has indicated as much, noting 
that he is "sick of trade" and is looking for opportunities 
to spotlight Brazil's global leadership.  He sees Brazil's 
invitation to Annapolis and continued participation in 
Mideast peace issues as an opportunity to do just that (Ref 
J). 
 
¶6. (C) Extreme GOB sensitivity to being seen as taking 
Washington's side has led to a consistent tendency to express 
sympathy toward countries in Washington's crosshairs, such as 
Iran and Syria.  These sympathies have provoked a number of 
statements and actions running counter to U.S. interests and 
sometimes contradicting long-held tenets of Brazil's foreign 
policy.    Some examples of unhelpful Brazilian actions over 
the past three years include: 
 
-- Mum on Syria out of Lebanon: During its last Security 
Council stint, Brazil abstained on UNSCR 1559 calling on 
foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon and refused to echo 
U.S.-French calls for withdrawal of Syrian forces from 
Lebanon, claiming it was concerned that France, as the former 
colonial power, would attempt to fill the void left after 
Syrian withdrawal (Ref R). 
 
-- No need to consult with U.S.: In 2005, after a nine 
country Middle East trip by Foreign Minister Amorim in which 
he criticized U.S. and Israeli actions, Itamaraty officials 
rebuffed U.S. requests that Brazil consult with the United 
States before making pronouncements that might complicate 
delicate peace talks.  Itamaraty stated that Brazil had no 
need to ask permission of the United States in carrying out 
foreign policy initiatives and that the United States should 
expect more Brazilian statements on Middle East issues (Ref 
R). 
 
-- Arab States-South America (ASSA) Summit:  During the 2005 
summit, despite assurances to the USG that the summit 
declaration would not contain language that the United States 
or Israel would consider problematic, Brazil lost control of 
the Summit and caved to Arab countries on all controversial 
issues. The declaration included language on politically 
sensitive and highly controversial topics, such as a demand 
that Israel withdraw to its June 4, 1967 frontiers and comply 
with the International Court of Justice July 2004 decision on 
dismantling the security wall.  The declaration also 
specifically expresses "profound concern with the unilateral 
sanctions imposed on Syria by the Government of the United 
States and considers the so-called 'Syria Accountability Act' 
a violation of the principles of international law and 
constitutes a transgression against the objectives and 
principles of the United Nations..." The declaration also 
praised the Government of Sudan for "facilitating 
international assistance to the humanitarian crisis in 
Darfur." Furthermore, Brazil refused to grant the United 
States observer status at the summit, claiming the summit's 
purpose to be expanding cultural and commercial ties, and not 
political issues that concerned the U.S.   (Refs O and P) 
 
-- Nuclear Proliferation and Iran:  The GoB opposed the 
effort to refer Iran to the Security Council until the vote 
in the IAEA had become a foregone conclusion, when the PRC 
and Russia agreed to a western compromise proposal.  Brazil 
did not vote to condemn Iran's nuclear activities until Iran 
missed the UN-mandated deadline for allowing international 
inspectors to visit suspicious nuclear facilities. 
 
-- Iran, cont: In September 2007, President Lula defended 
Iran's record of compliance with IAEA and UNSCR regarding its 
nuclear program, even after UNSC had passed two resolutions, 
 
BRASILIA 00000896  003 OF 005 
 
 
1737 and 1747, requiring Iran to fully suspend its 
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and after the IAEA 
had found Iran to be in violation of UNSC.  Lula publicly 
defended Iran's record, stating: "Iran has the right to 
conduct its own experiments provided they are for peaceful 
purposes...so far Iran has not committed any crime against 
the direction of the United Nations in relation to nuclear 
weapons." Afterwards, Itamaraty refused to accept our 
demarche points asking for clarification of Lula's remarks. 
(Ref N) 
 
-- Terrorism and Iran, cont: Brazil twice failed to vote to 
issue international capture notices for the Iranians 
suspected of involvement in the AMIA Jewish center bombing in 
Buenos Aires in 1994.  Although the principal reason for 
their abstention probably had to do with their refusal to 
accept a link between the bombing and the Triborder Area, 
press reports and Argentine contacts speculate that Brazil 
wanted to avoid upsetting its relations with Iran after 
Iranian officials lobbied Brazilian officials prior to the 
vote.  (Ref I) 
 
-- Terrorism, cont: During his February 8-14, 2008 trip to 
the Middle East, Amorim took several opportunities to 
criticize U.S. policy, in particular the U.S. and the West's 
efforts to "isolate" "parties" to the peace process,  among 
whom he included Hamas and Hizballah.  This stance is 
particularly problematic considering the presence of elements 
of those groups within Brazilian territory and the latter's 
demonstrated capability to carry out terrorist operations in 
the region. (Ref F) 
 
-- Possible Lula/Ahmadi-Nejad meeting: Itamaraty contacts 
have told us a meeting between the two presidents is 
inevitable and Lula himself confirmed his interest in 
visiting Tehran during Secretary Rice's March 2008 visit to 
Brasilia.  In a January, Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture's 
Secretary for International Relations Celio Porto told the 
Arab-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce that Tehran was on the 
list of countries Lula would visit on his next Middle East 
trip. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Aggressive Iranian Diplomacy in the Region 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Brazil's increased engagement on Middle East issues 
comes at a time of intensified Iranian activities in South 
America and Brazil.  Although trade-related discussions 
represent a substantial portion of the bilateral 
agenda--Brazilian exports to Iran, about US$1.8 billion in 
2007, have almost quadrupled since Lula took office and 
account for about 30% of total Brazilian exports to the 
Middle East--Iran is keen to expnd their engagement with 
Brazil into non trade-reated areas.  Brasilia has seen the 
visit of seveal high-level Iranian officials in the past 8 
moths, including visits by the Iranian Supreme Councl for 
National Security's Muhammad Nahavandian, by Iranian Deputy 
Minister for Petroleum and former Ambassador to Brazil Dr. 
Mansour Moazami, and two visits by Iranian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Ali Reza Sheikh-Attar, the last of which to take 
part in bilateral talks with Brazilian officials on a range 
of trade and political topics. 
 
¶8. (C) When Iranian officials visit Brasilia, they make a 
point of extending their outreach to the legislative branch, 
holding talks with members of Congress to specifically make 
their case denying their non-compliance with UNSC resolutions 
and exhorting Brazil to join other South American countries 
friendly to Tehran in resisting pressure from the U.S. to 
support action against Iran.  According to Senator Heraclito 
Fortes, chairman of the Foreign Relations and National 
Defense Committee, Sheikh-Attar visited Brasilia to press 
Brazil to join an anti-American bloc in South America 
 
BRASILIA 00000896  004 OF 005 
 
 
composed of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela.  These are also 
the countries that Sheikh-Attar usually visits during his 
trips to South America (Ref D). Two other influential 
Senators have approached U.S. Embassy officials to express 
concerns about Iranian activities in Brazil and to warn us of 
the dangers of Iranian efforts to fan anti-Americanism 
throughout South America (Refs K and M).  Itamaraty contacts 
have also indicated that the Iranian Embassy as well as 
Iranian visitors waste no opportunity to press for a meeting 
between President Lula and President Ahmadi-Nejad--a meeting 
Itamaraty contacts have called "inevitable." 
 
¶9. (U) Iran is also using soft power to engage Brazilian 
society.  Visiting officials from Tehran usually conduct 
extensive press interviews to draw parallels between Brazil's 
peaceful nuclear energy program and their purported wish for 
a "peaceful" one for their own.  The Iranian Embassy also 
arranges for visiting professors to provide lectures at the 
Catholic University of Brasilia several times a year. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Key Year in Middle East Diplomacy: A Window of Opportunity? 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Brazil currently is engaging in another round of 
intense Middle East activity, following on its attempt to 
step out of its traditional geopolitical comfort zone in 
2005, when it organized and hosted the ASSA Summit.  Already 
this year, Amorim traveled earlier this year to Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, and Israel.  He 
also participated in the late February Arab-South American 
foreign ministers' meeting in Buenos Aires.  After that, 
Brazilian officials expect to receive visits of Syrian 
president Asad and the King of Jordan, plan to open new 
embassies in Oman and Qatar, hope to reach trade accords with 
Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, and seek to finish the 
long-delayed trade accord with the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
President Lula is also tentatively scheduled to travel to the 
Middle East in the second half of this year, with likely 
stops in Saudi Arabia, Israel (his first trip there), and the 
Palestinian territories.  It is possible Lula will delay his 
travel to coincide with the ASSA Summit in Doha Qatar early 
next year. 
 
¶9. (C) Itamaraty also has indicated that it intends to follow 
up on Lula's August 2007 letter to Palestinian leader Mahmoud 
Abbas offering to form a Friends of Peace group with other 
interested countries, such as those in IBSA (India and South 
Africa), to seek further engagement in the peace process. 
Amorim also mooted his interest in hosting a conference for 
Israeli and Palestinian civil society leaders during the 
Annapolis meeting and in a subsequent meeting with Ambassador 
Sobel, although there are currently no specific plans on this 
front (Refs A and B). 
 
¶10. (C) Despite Brazil's independent streak, often unhelpful 
actions, and frequently critical comments, in recent months 
we have noted a growing tendency among Brazilian officials to 
engage U.S. officials in broad discussion on Middle East 
issues, during which they never fail to tout their 
participation in the Annapolis conference and to thank us for 
being invited.  Since Annapolis, high-level talks have 
included Secretary Rice,  WHA A/S Shannon (Ref H), and S/P 
Dr. Gordon (Ref B), in addition to multiple conversations 
Ambassador Sobel and other Embassy officials have held with 
Amorim and other Itamaraty officials on Middle East issues 
(Refs A, C, E, F and J). 
 
--------- 
Comment: 
--------- 
 
¶11. (C) Brazil's unhelpful positions and sometimes inaccurate 
statements with regard to the Middle East muddy the waters 
 
BRASILIA 00000896  005 OF 005 
 
 
for U.S. policy and interests in the Middle East.  Moreover, 
as an increasingly influential global player with aspirations 
to a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, Brazil is 
seeking to use its new alliances, such as the IBSA forum 
(India, Brazil, South Africa) and the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China), to exert leadership on issues outside the 
geographical confines of those groupings.  Finally, Brazil 
has real influence in the region.  The Arab-South America 
Summit was a Brazilian initiative, and during the 2005 
summit, many Latin American governments with little 
experience on issues related to Middle East peace deferred to 
Brazil as it negotiated and eventually caved to Arab 
countries on controversial language of the summit declaration 
(Refs O, P, and Q). 
 
¶12. (C) On Iran, although Brazil is in no danger of falling 
into the Iranian "orbit", Brazil's almost obsessive interest 
in pursuing "balanced" relations tends to come at our 
expense, leading the GOB to stay neutral on such issues as 
Iranian support of Hizballah, Iranian activities in Iraq, and 
Tehran's flouting of UNSC resolutions, while remaining blind 
to aggressive Iranian moves in the region. 
 
¶13. (C) Combined with the concern expressed by various 
Senators, we may be seeing a window opening up to bridge the 
gap in our Middle East dialogue with Brazil that should be 
taken advantage of while Brazil is focused on issues of 
strategic concern for the U.S.  In a year when Brazil will 
engage in intense Middle East diplomacy we should seize the 
opportunity to try to steer Brazil away from its usual role 
of sideline sniper and make an attempt to recruit Brazil into 
a helpful or at least truly neutral role.  Although we are 
aware that some briefings have occurred in Washington with 
individual players, we believe there would be immense value 
in a concerted effort here in Brazil to engage the full range 
of interested players within Brazilian society, from the 
executive and legislative branches, to academics, analysts, 
and other opinion-makers.  We believe this to be a propitious 
time for a visit by subject matter experts from Washington to 
provide a detailed look at current U.S. efforts on the 
Palestine-Israeli track, Lebanon- and Syria-related issues, 
our policy with regards to Hamas and Hizballah, Iranian 
activities in Iraq and Iran's nuclear program.  Although we 
are unlikely to persuade the GOB to take an approach fully in 
step with ours, it is critical to engage the GOB both to 
ensure they have a complete understanding of U.S. policy and 
concerns in the region, and to demonstrate that we take 
Brazil's leadership aspirations seriously.  It is our hope 
that doing so will encourage Brazil to consult with the U.S. 
more frequently and will serve to minimize the least helpful 
aspects of current Brazilian policy toward the Middle East. 
SOBEL