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UNCLAS BOGOTA 002597 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR S/P DIRECTOR GORDON FROM THE AMBASSADOR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KJUS PREL CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: VISIT OF POLICY PLANNING DIRECTOR, 
DR. DAVID F. GORDON 
 
¶1.  (U) Your visit comes as Colombia celebrates major 
victories in its fight against the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (FARC), continued strong economic growth, and an 
expansion of democratic governance.  Increased security has 
led to an economic boom that has reduced poverty by 20 
percent since 2002, cut unemployment by 25 percent, and 
attracted record levels of investment. Almost 48,000 
combatants, mostly paramilitaries, have laid down their arms 
and are participating in GOC reintegration programs.  The 
captures or kills of key FARC leaders, the audacious rescue 
of 15 high-profile FARC hostages--including three 
Americans--and rising desertions have weakened Colombia's 
largest terrorist group. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Still, serious challenges remain as Colombia 
consolidates the progress achieved to date.  Socio-economic 
inequality, weak GOC presence especially in rural areas, and 
narcotrafficking will continue to require substantial GOC 
attention and investment.  Nonetheless, a more secure, 
confident Colombia will play a larger role on regional and 
international issues. Our continued commitment to 
Colombia--through approval of the U.S.-Colombia Trade 
Promotion Act (CTPA) and support for Plan Colombia--will help 
lock in Colombia's democratic security gains, promote 
regional stability, and create a Colombia that is a regional 
and international force for deeper economic integration, 
enhanced security cooperation, and stronger democratic 
institutions.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Successes of Democratic Security Policy 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) President Uribe's democratic security policy and free 
market economic reforms have created a more secure 
environment and spurred the economy.  Since 2002, homicides 
have decreased by 40% -- its lowest point in twenty years -- 
while kidnappings have declined by 76%.  GDP growth exceeded 
7.5 percent in 2007, but is expected to return to its recent 
average of 5 percent amid a slowing global economy in 2008. 
Colombia's trade volume has grown more than 65 percent since 
¶2003.  The United States remains Colombia's largest trade 
partner (approximately 34 
percent of exports and 26 percent of imports).  In 2007, 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) exceeded $7.5 billion, 350 
percent greater than FDI in 2002. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The GOC created the Centro de Coordinacion de Accion 
Integral (CCAI) to integrate military, police, and civilian 
programs into a single, coordinated effort to restore an 
integral GOC presence in key conflict areas.  The USG 
provided $13.5 million to support CCAI activities in FY 2007, 
and plans to provide over $10 million to CCAI activities for 
the Consolidation Plan for Macarena, Meta Department (PCIM), 
an area central to the fight against the FARC.  The PCIM 
calls for an integrated, interagency effort to regain state 
control, foster economic development, and support civil 
society.  CCAI programs initially suffered from interagency 
rivalries, but coordination has improved significantly of 
late.  Though some human rights groups criticize CCAI for 
failing to involve local officials and civil society in its 
projects, the project has strong support in Meta.  You will 
visit Macarena, which is the locus of current Colombian 
military operations against the FARC, and speak with military 
and civilian officials integral to the PCIM effort. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Challenges: Strengthening Economy, Security, Democracy 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Still, Colombia faces significant challenges as it 
consolidates the progress achieved to date.  Combating 
inequality, fighting narcotrafficking, and promoting 
social-economic development will require substantial 
resources and attention in the years ahead.  The GOC will 
look for the continued partnership and support of the United 
States, and will also seek regional allies to help it address 
these issues. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In its relationship with the United States, 
ratification of the CTPA remains the Colombian government's 
highest economic priority.  Analysts estimate the agreement 
with the United States would add between one and two 
percent annual GDP growth to the local Colombian economy, 
adding new jobs and contributing to President Uribe,s goal 
of cutting the poverty rate from 45 percent to 35 percent by 
¶2010.  Colombia will also seek continued, but declining, U.S. 
security assistance as it achieves greater economic growth 
and social cohesion. 
 
------------------------------- 
Regional Alliances and Tensions 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Colombia continues to ponder its role in the 
region, but a more secure, prosperous Colombia will play a 
more assertive role in Latin America and the world.  Working 
with like-minded countries such as Mexico, Peru, 
and Chile, Colombia will seek to promote greater economic 
integration through the creation of a web of free trade 
agreements on the Americas' Pacific Coast.  Colombia will 
avoid ideological confrontation with its Bolivarian 
neighbor due to their extensive border and economic ties, but 
we expect Colombia to be a pragmatic advocate for 
enhanced regional security cooperation and strengthened 
democratic institutions in the region. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Colombia,s commitment to free markets, democracy, 
and close relations with the United States are an exception 
to trends in the region.  Following Colombia,s March 1 
air-strike killing FARC senior leader Raul Reyes across the 
border in Ecuador, Venezuela joined Ecuador in breaking 
relations and deployed military forces to its border. 
Venezuela called off the buildup after reaching agreement 
with Colombia March 7 to reduce tensions and reestablish 
commercial and diplomatic ties.  Computers found in Raul 
Reyes, camp have information that appears to implicate 
Venezuelan and Ecuadorian government officials in providing 
support to the FARC, as well as a wider than thought 
international support network for the terrorist group.  After 
months of strained relations, President Uribe and President 
Chavez met on July 11 and affirmed their commitment to 
improve ties, but tensions remain over Venezuela's ambiguous 
relations with the FARC.  Ecuador and Colombia have yet to 
restore relations. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Colombia also seeks to play a greater role in the 
international security architecture, as evidenced by its 
willingness to contribute troops to the NATO effort in 
Afghanistan.  We expect the GOC to make available the 
expertise developed in combating the FARC for international 
peacekeeping efforts and other international security 
activities in the years ahead, although financial constraints 
will remain an issue. 
 
------------- 
U.S. Hostages 
------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) An audacious Colombian military operation led to 
the rescue of three U.S. contractors and twelve Colombians 
held by the FARC.  The three Americans were captured by the 
FARC in February 2003 and were the longest held U.S. hostages 
in the world at the time of their rescue.  The Colombian 
government worked closely with us on hostage issues, and U.S. 
training of Colombian military personnel contributed to the 
operation,s success.  The FARC continues to hold 25 
Colombian "political" hostages, as well as an estimated 700 
economic hostages.  The FARC is believed to continue to hold 
a U.S. citizen who was kidnapped in Panama in April 2008, and 
perhaps a Colombian-American dual national kidnapped in 2003, 
though it has never provided proof of life. 
 
-------------------- 
Human Rights Record 
-------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The Uribe Administration continues to make 
 
progress on human rights cases involving military abuse or 
collaboration with paramilitaries.  All members of the 
military and police receive mandatory human rights training. 
In October 2006, Defense Minister Santos named the first 
civilian -- and the first woman -- as director of the 
Military Criminal Justice System.  Santos has strongly backed 
initiatives to deter extrajudicial killings, 
changing promotion criteria to favor demobilization or 
capture of illegal fighters, and ordering military 
personnel to facilitate civilian investigations of all combat 
deaths.  Still, human rights groups allege that 
security forces committed 955 extrajudicial killings over the 
last five years. 
 
--------------- 
U.S. Assistance 
--------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) In January 2007 the GOC presented a Plan Colombia 
"consolidation strategy" pledging a Colombian 
investment of $78 billion through 2013.  The proposal 
emphasizes the importance of building social cohesion, and 
allocates substantial resources to help strengthen local 
governance, protect human rights, and assist displaced 
people, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous communities.  It also 
aims to reintegrate almost 48,000 demobilized 
ex-fighters and deserters and to promote Colombia's licit 
exports.  The GOC seeks funding from the United States and 
European countries to complement its own resources. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Under Plan Colombia, the USG has provided more 
than $5 billion in assistance, including $800 million in 
economic and social assistance.  USG security assistance 
combats drug trafficking and terrorism through training, 
equipment, and technical assistance.  It supports Colombian 
military aviation, essential for all programs - civilian or 
military - outside Colombia's major cities.  U.S. social and 
economic aid focuses on alternative development, displaced 
and other vulnerable communities, human rights and democratic 
institutions, and reintegration of demobilized fighters. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Drug Eradication and Interdiction 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Eradication of coca and poppy crops and 
interdiction of cocaine and heroin reached near-record 
levels in 2007.  President Uribe supports greater manual 
eradication, but recognizes that continued aerial 
eradication is also key.  He seeks a complementary approach 
using both methods.  In 2008, the Colombian National Police 
and military forces have set a brisk pace for cocaine, coca 
base and marijuana seizures, and are on pace to set a record. 
 We work with the Colombian government to maximize our scarce 
resources to achieve the eradication and interdiction 
targets.  We also continue our productive dialogue on how 
best to transfer key tasks from the USG to the GOC. 
 
----------- 
Extradition 
----------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Since taking office, President Uribe has approved 
over 750 extraditions to the United States, 
including a record number of 164 in 2007.  The Colombian 
Government has extradited over 119 criminals to the United 
States in 2008, including 15 former paramilitary leaders. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Demobilization and Peace Process 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Over 32,000 former paramilitaries have demobilized 
since 2002, and a further 16,000 have deserted 
from other illegal armed groups (about one-half from the 
FARC).  The Organization of American States (OAS) estimates 
there are 30 new criminal groups numbering over 3000 members. 
 Reintegration programs and targeted law 
enforcement are working to counter these groups.  Under the 
 
Justice and Peace Law (JPL) process, many former 
paramilitary leaders have confessed their participation in 
violent crimes. To date, the JPL process has revealed the 
location of the graves of almost 1,200 paramilitary victims 
and provided information on 3,600 crimes.  Over 120,000 
victims have registered under the JPL, with the GOC working 
on measures to accelerate payment of reparations. The Supreme 
Court and the Fiscalia--with GOC support--continue to 
investigate politicians with alleged paramilitary ties; 68 
Congressmen, 23 mayors, and 14 governors have been implicated 
in the scandal. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) The National Liberation Army (ELN) has negotiated 
with the Colombian government for over two years 
on a cease-fire, but ELN infighting and FARC pressure have 
prevented a deal.  The ELN kidnaps civilians to fund its 
operations, but its military capability is declining.  The 
FARC has rebuffed GOC overtures to engage in meaningful 
peace talks, most recently rejecting GOC negotiator Luis 
Carlos Restrepo,s efforts to establish direct talks earlier 
in July. 
BROWNFIELD