VZCZCXRO7403
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #0757/01 2101031
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281031Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0207
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNS/NSC WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000757 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA TO RETURN AMBASSADORS TO EU COUNTRIES 
 
REF: A) BELGRADE 185, B) BELGRADE 684, C) BELGRADE 695 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Despite our multiple warnings that such a move would be 
ill-advised and counterproductive, the Serbian Government voted 
"unanimously" on July 24 to send their ambassadors back only to 
European Union countries that had recognized Kosovo.  Some ministers 
reportedly opposed the partial return but were unable to overcome 
Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic's determination to implement his idea. 
Our contacts claim Serbia will return the remaining ambassadors, 
including the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan anywhere 
from one to five months from now, although most predict the timing 
will be linked to the UN General Assembly and Serbia's effort to 
refer the Kosovo question to the International Court of Justice. 
End Summary. 
 
"Unanimous" Government Decision 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) On July 24, the Serbian government approved a proposal from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to return ambassadors to European 
Union countries from which they were withdrawn in response to 
recognition of Kosovo's independence (Ref A).  Minister of 
Environment and Space Planning Oliver Dulic, tasked with announcing 
the results of the government session, said that the government had 
decided unanimously to alter the Kosovo Action Plan in the interest 
of furthering European integration.  He added that ambassadors would 
not be returned to non-EU countries before the UN General Assembly 
session, where Serbia will seek the referral of Kosovo's declaration 
of independence to the International Court of Justice. 
 
¶3.  (U) The move will result in the return of Serbian ambassadors to 
Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, the 
Netherlands, Italy, Hungary, Germany, Slovenia, and Sweden. 
According to press reports, new ambassadors will also be sent to the 
UK (Dejan Popovic) and Belgium (Radomir Diklic), posts that were 
unoccupied at the time of recognition.  Ambassadors will not yet be 
returned to the United States, Australia, Croatia, Japan, Canada, 
Norway, South Korea, Switzerland, or Turkey. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) MFA Political Director Borislav Stefanovic confirmed to us 
on July 22 that the return of ambassadors to EU countries would also 
result in the lifting of all Action Plan-related restrictions on 
contacts by EU countries with the GOS in Belgrade.  When asked why 
the new government did not do away with the previous government's 
contact policy, Stefanovic claimed the Action Plan was drafted 
jointly by the DS and DSS and that President Tadic fully supported 
it.  We reminded Stefanovic that the Action Plan had been former PM 
Kostunica's brain-child and that DS representatives, including FM 
Jeremic, had claimed never to have seen the plan. 
 
No One Willing to Stand up to Jeremic/Tadic 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Post engaged a wide range of government and party contacts 
to discourage such a move by the Serbian government.  G-17 Plus 
leader Mladjan Dinkic, Democratic Party official Dragan Djilas (Ref 
B), and even Socialist Party leader Ivica Dacic (Ref C) all agreed 
with our assessment that a decision to return ambassadors only to EU 
countries would be counterproductive.  G-17 Plus whip Suzana 
Grubjesic told us on July 24 that none of DS's coalition partners 
supported the move, adding that the coalition "should act like it 
had won the elections" and scrap the Action Plan.  The daily "Blic" 
later quoted G-17 Plus as favoring the return of all ambasasadors 
simultaneously. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In a meeting immediately after the government decision, 
Minister of Telecommunications Jasna Matic (G-17 Plus) described the 
move as "unfortunate." She said that some ministers had expressed 
opposition during the government meeting, but the junior coalition 
partners had been unable to overcome the DS's "personality driven" 
(read: FM Jeremic) initiative.  Deputy Prime Minister Dinkic, who is 
not shy about expressing his opinion, was on vacation and did not 
participate in the meeting.  (Although those opposed to the partial 
return of ambassadors could in theory have pressed for a vote in 
hopes of splitting the DS ministers, such a move would be unusual; 
almost all issues are decided by consensus rather than by vote 
during government meetings.) 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Serbian Ambassador to the United States Ivan Vujacic told 
us on Julyh 24 that he had advocated an "all or nothing" approach to 
Jeremic, but that he had been rejected.  "What can we do," Vujacic 
said, "Tadic is President." 
 
Next Steps? 
----------- 
 
 
BELGRADE 00000757  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Predictions on the return of the remaining ambassadors 
vary.  Vujacic said that he did not expect to return to Washington 
for several months.  The British ambassador was told by a member of 
President Tadic's inner circle, however, that relations with non-EU 
countries would be normalized just before or after the UNGA, i.e. in 
just over a month.  The most pessimistic prediction came from 
Defense Ministry State Secretary Dusan Spasojevic (DS), who warned 
us that the government might not restore high-level contacts with 
the United States until after U.S. presidential elections. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Although Jeremic believes that he is mitigating criticism 
from the opposition by continuing to block high-level relations with 
the United States, he is mistaken.  The move simply ensures that the 
government will have to face the criticism twice.  Jeremic also 
believes that the action will drive a wedge between the United 
States and Europe on the ICJ referral issue, an outcome we will seek 
to avoid by continuing to engage with our European counterparts in 
Belgrade.  The most tangible result of the government's unanimous 
decision will probably be diminished leeway for ministers to ignore 
the contact policy and meet with us.  They may assume that they will 
still be able to do business with us through "unofficial" channels; 
post intends to minimize these contacts for the time being in order 
to underscore the costs to Serbia's national interests of this 
decision.  End comment. 
 
BRUSH