VZCZCXRO8137
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #0695/01 1981253
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161253Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0159
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNS/NSC WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000695 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA: AMBASSADOR'S COURTESY CALL WITH IVICA DACIC, FIRST 
DEPUTY PM AND MINISTER OF INTERIOR 
 
REF: A. BELGRADE 671, B. BELGRADE 533 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) In a July 14 meeting, new First Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Interior Ivica Dacic expressed his willingness to meet 
with the Ambassador despite the Serbian government's Kosovo-related 
contact policy.  Dacic said that he would not be an obstacle to ICTY 
cooperation.  On Kosovo, he said that Serbia would cooperate with 
all security actors in the region to maintain peace.  He pledged 
that attacks on foreign embassies would never again be allowed, and 
said that he would support efforts to resolve the Kovacevic case. 
Dacic explained that his duties as First Deputy Prime Minister had 
not yet been fully defined and that he was focused primarily on 
running the Ministry of Interior.  Wearing his party leader hat, he 
confirmed that the Socialists would not form the Belgrade government 
with the nationalist-radical camp; he did not exclude the 
possibility of new municipal elections.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) The Ambassador paid a courtesy call on new First Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Ivica Dacic on July 14 at 
the Ministry of Interior (MOI).  Dacic was accompanied by Chief of 
Police Milorad Veljovic, his government chief of staff Vlada Ilic, 
and his MOI chief of staff Branko Lazarevic. 
 
Bilateral Issues 
---------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) After thanking Dacic for agreeing to meet despite the 
government of Serbia's policy restricting contacts with countries 
that have recognized Kosovo, the Ambassador cautioned that a 
proposal by the MFA to lift the contact restrictions for European 
countries and not the U.S. would be ill-advised and 
counterproductive.  Dacic responded that he found it "logical" to 
meet and begin work on issues of mutual concern, and agreed that it 
would be wrong for the new government to differentiate between the 
U.S. and Europe. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Dacic assured the Ambassador that MOI's security forces 
will always be at the Embassy's disposal, and said that Serbia would 
never again allow an attack on a foreign embassy such as occurred on 
February 21. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The Ambassador briefed Dacic on U.S. efforts to convince 
Miladin Kovacevic to return to the U.S. voluntarily to face trial in 
the assault of Bryan Steinhauer (Ref A), explaining that the next 
step would be to request formally that the GOS fulfill the 
commitment made by the vice consul in New York to ensure that 
Kovacevic appear in court.  Dacic indicated that he understood the 
implications of the case for the bilateral relationship, would carry 
out any instructions to apprehend Kovacevic, and would support 
efforts to find a solution. 
 
ICTY Cooperation 
---------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) When asked about his approach to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Dacic responded 
that the law and Constitution leave him no choice but to support 
cooperation.  He personally believed it would be best for the 
remaining indictees to surrender, although MOI would immediately act 
on any information provided by the intelligence services on their 
whereabouts or any order from the prosecutor. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Referring to Dacic's July 13 comments on B-92 that Hague 
cooperation should not be a government priority, the Ambassador 
stressed that the U.S. government believes that the entire Serbian 
government, not just the intelligence services, must view Hague 
cooperation as a priority given that it is a key to Serbia's 
European future.  Dacic explained that he understood the importance 
of the issue but preferred to refer to it as an obligation or 
program objective, because the Serbian public wants to hear that the 
government's priorities are economic development, social justice, EU 
integration, and anti-corruption efforts.  Regardless of the 
terminology, Dacic said, "I will not be an obstacle to cooperation 
with The Hague." 
 
Kosovo 
------ 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Ambassador informed Dacic that the U.S. was urging the 
new government not to carry out the previous government's plan to 
seek a referral of the Kosovo question to the International Court of 
Justice at the UN General Assembly, as such a move would highlight 
Serbia's disagreements with its western partners and deflect 
attention and energy from common goals such as EU accession.  Dacic 
noted that his Socialist Party had not helped formulate the existing 
 
BELGRADE 00000695  002 OF 002 
 
 
policy on Kosovo, and promised to bear the U.S. position in mind 
when the government discussed the question. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) When asked how the parties involved can best avoid 
misunderstandings and ensure the security of all people in Kosovo, 
Dacic said that the best way forward would be a UNSCR approving the 
EULEX mission.  Serbs object to the fact that EULEX is implementing 
the Ahtisaari Plan, he explained; it should remain status neutral 
like the UN.  Maintaining peace in Kosovo is of the utmost 
importance and Serbia is ready for cooperation with all security 
actors in the region, Dacic said. 
 
Dacic's Role in Government 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Dacic explained that the scope of his duties as First 
Deputy Prime Minister for foreign policy and security had not yet 
been fully defined.  He expects the role to be more one of 
coordination than implementation, saying "my job is the police -- 
that's enough, I don't need the BIA [intelligence service]!" 
(Comment:  We had heard elsewhere that Dacic would seek to maximize 
his influence as FDPM and minimize his profile as MOI; although he 
is clearly downplaying the FDPM role now, his approach could change 
once ICTY issues are resolved and/or negotiations over Belgrade are 
finalized.  End comment.) 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Dacic said that he expects the Serbian National Security 
Council (chaired by President Tadic) to handle a range of issues 
from personnel decisions, such as appointing a new BIA head, to ICTY 
cooperation; he did not foresee conflict between the work of the 
Council and his mandate as First Deputy Prime Minister. 
 
Belgrade Government 
------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Dacic confirmed that his Socialist Party (SPS) had pulled 
out of the agreement signed in May with the Serbian Radical Party 
(SRS) and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) to form a coalition 
government in Belgrade (Ref B).  He said that he could not predict 
whether the SPS would be able to conclude a coalition agreement with 
President Tadic's Democratic Party (DS).  (Such a coalition would 
require minority support from Ceda Jovanovic's Liberal Democratic 
Party.)  Dacic left open the possibility that new elections might be 
required, a process that could take six months.  (Comment: Most 
other experts in Belgrade predict that the SPS will make the deal 
with DS rather than face new elections where the SPS could expect to 
take a beating.  End comment.) 
 
MUNTER