VZCZCXRO7196
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2342/01 2091434
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271434Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8529
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002342 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
FOR NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON IZ
SUBJECT:  DROUGHT SAPS KRG DAM LEVELS, POWER GENERATION 
 
This is an RRT Erbil reporting cable. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Site visits in May and June by RRTOff to the 
Kurdistan Region's Dokan and Darbandikhan hydroelectric dams in 
Sulaimaniyah governorate revealed facilities severely limited by 
drought and producing at near-minimal capacity.  Officials at Dokan, 
a large and well-maintained facility, indicated that the only 
challenge they faced was a lack of rain; while their counterparts at 
Darbandikhan, a more modest facility by comparison, admitted they 
were operating with no spare parts on hand and could not maintain 
the facility effectively.  Severe drought has reduced water levels 
between ten and 20 meters, forcing the facilities to reduce power 
generation to half of normal levels.  Despite the low water levels, 
both dams are continuing to provide electricity to the national 
grid.  Both dams are taking advantage of a $40M World Bank soft loan 
to fund Milan-based ELC Electroconsult, S.p.A. to assess the 
condition of both lakes, sediment build-up in the dams, and land 
erosion.  The KRG's inability or reluctance to release water for 
irrigation and municipal water supply needs is causing problems for 
provinces south of the dams.  The KRG faces fierce competition 
between the demands to provide water and electricity, and the Kurds 
argue that they are not receiving ample electricity from the 
national grid.  Different perceptions of the issue suggest that 
better communication between the relevant national and KRG 
ministries is necessary to overcome the impasse.  End summary. 
 
---------------------- 
Dokan Down Ten Meters; One Turbine Operating 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) During a May site visit to the Dokan Hydroelectric 
Facility, dam officials discussed obstacles confronting the 
facility's ability to generate power.  The concrete dam, built for 
irrigation in 1959 with Soviet assistance, is situated on the 
southern end of man-made Lake Dokan and was fitted with five 
turbines in 1976-80.  Each turbine is capable of producing 80MW, 
with total production capacity of 400MW/hour.  The dam's water 
capacity is 6.8bn cubic meters, but with a 300mm shortfall in rain 
this year (one-third of 2007 levels), the hold on May 11 was only 
2.374bn cubic meters.  Dam officials indicated that when levels fall 
below 1.3bn cubic meters the facility cannot generate any power. 
The drought had forced the dam to operate only one turbine, 
producing 60-65MW per hour, about half the average production seen 
in June 2007.  Dokan is connected to the national grid at Tasluja, 
about 20km west of Sulaimaniyah. 
 
¶3. (U) Both Dokan and Darbandikhan are being assessed by Milan-based 
ELC Electroconsult, S.p.A.  A $40M soft loan from the World Bank has 
funded the Italian firm to check the condition of the lakes and dams 
and to assess the sediment build-up in each as well as land 
erosion. 
 
---------------------- 
Darbandikhan Twenty Meters Down; Operating at One-sixth Capacity 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Equally beset by the drought, the smaller earthen dam at 
Darbandikhan, near the border with Diyala, faced shortfalls in water 
levels of 20 meters in its man-made lake that is fed by the Sirwan 
river (Diyala).  The capacity of the lake is 3bn cubic meters, with 
three turbines producing 83MW (total capacity 249MW/hour) when water 
levels are adequate.  The lake's volume was at 1.57bn cubic meters 
as of mid-June.  With water levels almost half of where they should 
be for the year, Darbandikhan was running two turbines for ten hours 
per day and was able to produce 55MW per unit, per hour, (total 
current production 110MW/hour - less than half the facility's 
capacity).  Total production over a 24-hour period on June 17 was 
1107MWH.  The dam would not be able to produce power if water levels 
were to fall another 20m (down to 445m above sea level).  Officials 
at Darbandikhan estimated that reduced water levels due to the 
drought combined with half a billion cubic meters lost to sediment 
meant the dam was actually functioning around one-sixth of its 
capacity. 
 
¶5. (U) Also originally built for irrigation, Darbandikhan had three 
turbines built and installed by Mitsubishi, with separate assistance 
from UK, U.S., and Yugoslav companies, between 1951 and 1962.  After 
a power station study was completed in 1979, construction began on 
the power station portion of the dam, reaching completion in 1982. 
During the Iran-Iraq war, the area was shelled heavily, and Iran 
targeted the facility's transmission lines.  The Iraqi government 
sealed the turbine sets and kept Darbandikhan separate from the 
national grid.  After 1991, the Kurdistan Regional administration 
installed two 132-kV transmission lines to Sulaimaniyah and one 
132-kV line to Kalar and Kifri to link up to the national grid.  An 
explosion in 1991 destroyed two of the three turbines and both were 
repaired in 1994 and 1997 by exhausting all the facility's supply of 
 
BAGHDAD 00002342  002 OF 002 
 
 
spare parts.  During the first Gulf War, Mitsubishi was unwilling to 
maintain the turbines, citing existing unpaid debts, and the dam has 
been struggling to obtain spare parts for maintenance and repair 
ever since.  Darbandikhan's life span was expected to be 150 years; 
the facility just celebrated its 50th anniversary. 
 
---------------------- 
KRG Controlling Generation and Flow in Face of Drought 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) The Sulaimaniyah Directorate of Electricity confirmed to RRT 
Erbil on July 1 that, despite the drought and low water levels, both 
Dokan and Darbandikhan are feeding electricity into the national 
grid at a rate of 50MW/hour from Darbandikhan and 60MW/hour from 
Dokan.  The Kurdistan Region of Iraq also draws from the national 
grid.  Persistent drought, however, may cause water levels to fall 
further and threaten the dams' ability to generate even minimal 
power.  The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is controlling power 
generation and water flow to conserve energy in the face of severe 
water shortfalls as it deploys a region-wide plan to address the 
drought. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The drought has also affected downstream consumers who are 
desperate for more water from Darbandikhan.  In April, RRT Erbil, 
PRT Diyala, and MND-N organized a meeting in Erbil between the 
governor of Diyala and KRG Deputy PM Omar Fatah to discuss releasing 
additional water from Darbandikhan.  The meeting resulted in KRG 
agreement to increase the flow 50 cubic meters/second, with promises 
to revisit the issue.  Additionally, MND-N and PRT Kirkuk have 
worked to inform local farmers of the severity of the water 
situation in the dams to lessen accusations of Kurds withholding 
water from Arabs. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment:  Dokan and Darbandikan Dams are overseen by the 
KRG Ministry of Water Resources, but the dams are supposed to be 
operated, and water released, according to a national water plan 
developed by the Iraq Ministry of Water Resources in Baghdad.  The 
actual releases from these two dams for this summer season, as well 
as the previous two growing seasons have not been in accordance with 
the national water release plan, (which stipulates that water 
releases should be determined by downstream irrigation and municipal 
water supply needs -- the top priority for water use in Iraq). 
Power generation from dams in Iraq has always been a byproduct of 
meeting irrigation and municipal water demands.  The inability of 
the KRG to adhere to the national water release plan has caused 
considerable problems downstream with respect to water supply and is 
expected to lead to serious water crises later this year in parts of 
Iraq.  We understand that the Iraq MoWR indicated it has been in 
continuous contact with the KRG MoWR over its failure to release 
water according to the national plan, and the Minister has briefed 
the Parliament on the situation. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Comment (cont'd):  There is fierce competition in the KRG 
between competing demands for water and electricity.  In response to 
criticism they are not releasing water at the correct rate to the 
south, KRG officials argue they are not getting from the south the 
share of electricity from the national grid they are owed.  In any 
case, the disconnect between the provisions of the national water 
plan and the levels that the KRG MoWR is releasing suggests that 
communication and agreement between the two ministries needs to be 
improved.  RRT will continue engagement with KRG MoWR to resolve the 
issue. 
 
CROCKER