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Viewing cable 08BAGHDAD2244, PRT SALAH AD DIN: ENCOURAGING SIGNS OF SUNNA-SHIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BAGHDAD2244 2008-07-19 16:58 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO1631
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2244 2011658
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 191658Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8385
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 002244 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: ENCOURAGING SIGNS OF SUNNA-SHIA 
RECONCILIATION 
 
1.  (U)  This is a PRT Salah ad Din cable. 
 
2.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  The Deputy Governor of Salah ad Din says 
he had a very good meeting with the Prime Minister July 16, 
resulting in a promise of more money for the province and the 
prospect of an office of provincial affairs within the Prime 
Ministry.  The Deputy Governor has previously indicated to 
the PRT that PM Maliki's willingness to take on Shiite armed 
groups opened the door to rapprochement with Sunni Arabs who 
were previously very suspicious of him.  We see encouraging 
signs of grassroots efforts at Sunna-Shia reconciliation, 
aided by improved security in Samarra:  Salah ad Din tribal 
leaders visited Karbala, Shia pilgrims from Najaf visited 
Samarra, and Salah ad Din expects visits by leaders from 
Najaf, Karbala and Amara in the near future.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Salah ad Din Deputy Governor Abdullah Hussein 
al-Jubara al-Juboori (Abu Khaled) told PRT Team Leader July 
17 that he had had a very good meeting with PM Maliki the 
previous day.  He said the Prime Minister had promised to 
allocate more money to the province - perhaps doubling its 
original 2008 allocation of 176 billion Iraqi Dinars.  Abu 
Khaled made clear his pleasure at the state of relations with 
the Prime Minister.  From what he has told the PRT 
previously, the turning point was the PM's willingness to 
take on armed Shia groups earlier this year:  that opened the 
door to rapprochement with Sunni Arabs (like Abu Khaled) who 
were previously very suspicious of him. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Since then, and thanks in part to the much 
improved security situation in Samarra (a Sunni town in Salah 
ad Din that has a major Shia shrine twice devastated by 
terrorist bombings in 2006-07), we have seen encouraging 
signs of efforts at reconciliation between Sunna and Shia: 
tribal leaders from Salah ad Din were invited to (heavily 
Shia) Karbala; Sunni Vice President Hashemi visited Samarra, 
then ISCI leader Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim did likewise; thousands 
of Shia pilgrims from Najaf followed suit; and Salah ad Din 
is expecting visits in the near future by leaders from Najaf 
and Karbala as well as from Amara. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Abu Khaled happily informed PRT Team Leader that 
an office of provincial affairs will be created in the Prime 
Minister's Office.  As he understood it, there would be 
roughly one coordinator for every two provinces.  This, he 
felt, would facilitate communications to the point where "we 
won't need to go to Baghdad any more."  (COMMENT:  A 
well-connected local who was listening in observed 
good-naturedly:  "We won't need the PRT any more."  To which 
the Team Leader replied:  "That's the whole idea."  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
6.  (SBU)  COMMENT:  There is an unmistakable air of optimism 
in the provincial leadership of Salah ad Din these days, 
which is all the more striking considering that this, Saddam 
Hussein's home province, has been one of the biggest losers 
in the change of regime.  Six months ago, the Deputy Governor 
was refusing to go to Baghdad for fear of being arrested or 
killed.  The PRT facilitated some trips to the capital for 
meetings with national leaders in the intervening months; 
this time, the Deputy Governor traveled without any American 
involvement.  The PRT will continue to report on the progress 
of reconciliation between sects and between the province and 
the national government. 
CROCKER