VZCZCXRO7406
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2210/01 1971418
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151418Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8331
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002210 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID ECON PHUM IZ
SUBJECT:  EPRT DIYALA: LACK OF NGO SUPPORT IMPEDES FURTHER PROGRESS 
IN SOUTH DIYALA 
 
¶1. (U) This is an ePRT Diyala reporting cable. 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Development at the Qa'da and Nahia level in South Diyala 
is being held up by lack of Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) 
support.  Efforts by the South Diyala embedded Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (ePRT) have had a significant impact in 
improving local governance; however, further progress will require 
the assistance of programs targeting capacity building and economic 
development.  These programs are implemented by NGOs with specific 
expertise not found at the ePRT.  The continuing difficulty for NGOs 
- both USAID implementing partners and others - to operate in South 
Diyala due to the variable security situation has hindered progress 
in the areas of governance, economic development, and civil society. 
 End Summary. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Since our team's inception in October of 2007 the bulk of 
our activity has been in helping Qa'da and Nahia governments in 
South Diyala operate more effectively.  Through a program of 
mentorship we have engaged with Qaim Maqams, Mudiyars (city 
managers), and councils in order to enable them to address their 
issues.  As governance has improved, we have begun to shift more of 
our focus toward economic development. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) When we first began our work, local government in many 
areas was barely functioning.  Security in South Diyala was such 
that many council members refused to attend meetings, or had fled 
the area entirely.  Recent gains in security have enabled local 
governments to re-form, and the ePRT has assisted the process by 
mentoring key leaders, helping re-establish the lines of 
communication (LOCs) from the Mukhtars through the Nahia and Qa'da 
governments to the province.  However, our ability to affect change 
is limited by the vast needs of local governments for capacity 
building, and the relatively small size of the ePRT.  Our mentoring 
efforts are focused on a handful of local leaders - usually just the 
mayors and council chairmen - of our area. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Likewise, our ability to affect economic growth is limited 
to one-off engagements with key business leaders.  A broader and 
more and systematic approach is needed in order to continue progress 
and reinforce the gains that have been made.  Specifically, South 
Diyala requires training programs for local government, economic 
development programs that address shortfalls in financing and 
technical assistance, and civil society programs that can provide 
support for nascent political organizations and communities seeking 
reconciliation or a greater voice in political affairs. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) There are NGOs operating in Iraq that already offer 
programs in these areas.  The bulk of these are USAID implementing 
partners; however, there are other international and local groups as 
well.  NGOs fled South Diyala during the fighting in 2007 and have 
been hesitant to return to the area citing security concerns.  This 
was understandable based on the security situation in the past. 
However, today the security situation is increasingly permissive. 
Local governments are operational, local economies are flourishing, 
and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are returning to their 
homes.  To solidify and expand on the gains achieved by the military 
surge, it is imperative that we bring to bear the expertise of USAID 
implementing partners and other NGOs. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) There are several specific examples of USAID-funded 
projects that have been hindered by the security situation and with 
which we are working closely to expand their current focus to 
include South Diyala as security improves: 
 
-- The Local Governance Project (LGP), implemented by Research 
Triangle Institute (RTI), provides training for local government 
officials principally at the governorate level, but also at the 
Qa'da and Nahia levels.  This program has suffered loss of life, 
kidnapping and injuries to their staff in their efforts to support 
activities in Diayala. As a result, some training sessions are 
cancelled when the security situation is not permissive for staff to 
operate safely.  Building governmental capacity at the local level 
is the most critical task of the ePRT, and we need to begin 
implementing a programmatic solution that can provide wholesale 
training to councils, mayors, and service managers rather than 
relying only on the ePRT's mentoring efforts of a few key leaders. 
RTI currently has training sessions scheduled from July 12 - 30, and 
in concert with our military counterparts, all parties are doing 
everything they can to support their efforts and ensure the training 
takes place.  Recently, the RSO posted to the USAID compound in 
Baghdad cautioned that the security situation is still uncertain in 
Diyala, and would not advise the implementing partner to attempt any 
activities at this time.  The LGP program will move forward with 
implementation in Diyala as soon as the security situation permits. 
 
 
-- The Community Action Program II (CAP II), implemented in Diyala 
by ACDI/VOCA, has so far been hesitant to operate in South Diyala 
 
BAGHDAD 00002210  002 OF 003 
 
 
due to security concerns.  CAP II is currently operating in the 
Kurdish-dominated Khainaqin and Kifri Qa'das, but has limited its 
activities to individual war victims' assistance under the Marla 
Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund in the south.  ACDI/VOCA did an 
assessment of Baqubah in February, but we have not seen any action 
on the ground.  In its next iteration, there are plans for CAP III 
to include Baqubah Qada in the area of operations covered by the 
Baghdad CAP region.  It is hoped that this will provide better 
access to the area for the CAP III implementing partner. 
 
-- The Community Stabilization Program (CSP), implemented by IRD, 
has been operational in Baqubah since the fall 2007.  This program 
is designed to operate in post-kinetic areas, but has been and 
continues to be, hindered by its security restrictions.  For 
example, IRD expatriate personnel have not been allowed to go to 
Khan Bani Sa'ad due to the recommendation of the IRD security 
provider despite the fact that an ePRT officer lives at the Joint 
Combat Outpost (JCOP) for a week at a time.  This delays the 
program, as the IRD expatriate personnel need to be in the area to 
hire local nations to implement CSP on the ground.  Pending a change 
to the IRD security assessment, IRD has begun using local staff to 
begin the process of commencing operations in South Diyala.  CSP 
continues to implement projects in and around the city of Baquba, 
which shows that they are able to adapt as the security situation 
improves.  Likewise, everywhere IRD personnel travel they have to be 
escorted by their personal security detail.  Despite the fact that 
IRD only moves in military convoys with PRT and ePRT officers when 
traveling to Khan Bani Sa'ad, they still require an extra level of 
protection per the terms of the contract with their security 
sub-contractor.  While these security assessments are necessary 
before engaging in an area, they may slow the ability of CSP expat 
staff to move about the battle space and manage their programs. 
 
-- Iraq Community-based Conflict Mitigation (ICCM), implemented by 
Relief International (RI), has completed assessments of four 
communities in Diyala and is currently analyzing the factors 
contributing to conflict in these locations.  ICCM will proceed by 
identifying projects that will contribute to mitigation of these 
conflict factors.  We have high hopes that this project will be able 
to conduct conflict mitigation in key areas of our operational 
environment. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) With elections looming, the ePRT would welcome greater 
engagement with groups such as the National Democratic Institute and 
the International Republican Institute headquartered in the KRG to 
provide our local partners with assistance for political party 
organizational and platform development skills training, voter 
registration, and get out the vote campaigns. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) As security improves, Iraqi NGOs have begun to resurface 
in the province.  We are currently engaging three NGOs - The Happy 
Family Organization, The Beautiful Diyala Association, and Iraqi 
Women for Gender Equality - to asses how we can partner together. 
There has been a paucity of local NGOs in South Diyala, but the fact 
that they are starting to trickle back into the province is an 
indicator of the improving security situation in the province and 
should serve as an example to other NGOs. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The most successful NGO in South Diyala has been the 
micro-finance institution al Thiqa.  Al Thiqa has received funding 
from CPA and various USAID implementing mechanisms (Izdihar and 
QRF/IRAP).  Additionally, technical assistance is provided through 
the USAID-funded Tijara program.  They have returned to Baqubah 
after being forced to flee during last year's fighting and are now 
preparing to open an office in Jedida as well.  As of the end of 
May, al Thiqa had disbursed 44 loans totaling $107,400 in Baqubah. 
Al Thiqa is an Iraqi-run NGO, operating on its own without any 
visible support or connection to CF.  This is precisely the kind of 
programmatic solution that South Diyala requires.  Where Quick 
Reaction Funds (QRF), Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), 
and Iraqi CERP (ICERP) tend to be limited to unsustainable one-off 
engagements, NGOs like al Thiqa can offer long-term solutions that 
support sustainable economic activity.  Additionally, the 
USAID-funded Tijara program Business Development Services team is 
closely working with ePRT South Diyala to establish a new Small 
Business Development Center to improve the capacity of the local 
business community. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The security situation today in South Diyala has improved 
considerably from last year.  Important indicators of this 
improvement are that several NGOs are now operating in the area with 
great success.  We are pushing hard to bring in more NGOs and will 
engage with them directly to show concrete evidence of the improved 
situation.  Intermittent attacks in Baqubah show that there are 
still substantial risks to working in the area, but such incidents 
have at last become the exception rather than the norm.  Until NGOs 
with the required development skills begin operations in South 
Diyala, we will not have the required resources we need to push our 
 
BAGHDAD 00002210  003 OF 003 
 
 
success to the next level.  While we acknowledge that South Diyala 
is not a risk-free environment, the security situation has greatly 
improved over the last five or six months.   Now is the time to take 
advantage of security gains that Coalition Forces have fought for 
and help bring greater stability to the region.  End Comment. 
 
CROCKER