VZCZCXRO4905
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2158 1931232
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111232Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8261
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 002158 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM KJUS PINS IZ
SUBJECT: POST RESPONSE TO LEAHY VETTING IN IRAQ 
 
REF: STATE 69301 
 
¶1.  Post concurs with recommendations detailed in reftel. 
 
¶2.  As the security situation continues to stabilize in Iraq, 
specific USG security assistance programs will need to 
further comply with Leahy Amendment vetting.  Post recommends 
the programs detailed below be vetted according to provided 
guidelines.  Post recommends the continuation of current 
Embassy vetting procedures for the IMET program of checking 
names against FBI databases at Post and Department databases 
via cable, and that vetting does not apply retroactively. 
Since 2006, Iraqi military personnel nominated for IMET have 
been vetted in accordance with standard Leahy procedures, 
using the automated fingerprint identification system through 
the FBI and then sending candidate nominations to the 
Department for vetting by NEA/I, INR, and DRL. 
 
¶3.  Post recommends Leahy vetting begin as prescribed in this 
cable at the beginning of fiscal year 2009, October 1, 2008. 
Until this date, Post will develop new procedures and 
coordinate new policy with affected agencies and groups.  At 
the beginning of fiscal year 2010, Post will re-examine 
current policy to determine whether Leahy vetting should 
expand to include more, or all, individuals in each unit and 
program.  As security improves in Iraq, this modified 
procedure will be re-evaluated.  To facilitate these efforts, 
Post requests that the Department send relevant vetting 
models in use for other countries, such as Afghanistan, 
Colombia, and Sri Lanka, as case studies. 
 
INCLE-FUNDED PROGRAMS:  PLAN OF ACTION 
 
¶4.  Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF):  Post recommends that any 
future individuals assigned to the MCTF be vetted using the 
Embassy's current Leahy vetting procedures for the IMET 
program.  If credible allegations of human rights violations 
arise, assignment to MCTF will be deferred pending review and 
decision, per the procedures described in the Leahy Vetting 
Guide (April 2007).  Post recommends that any future tactical 
component dedicated to the MCTF be vetted as a unit, 
including its commander and other senior officers. 
 
¶5.  Commission of Integrity (CoI):  Post recommends that, for 
purposes of Leahy vetting, only the CoI investigative unit 
and CoI security personnel -- departments whose staff are 
authorized to carry weapons -- merit categorization as a 
security force; other CoI departments (public affairs, public 
disclosure, etc.) do not function as a security force.  Post 
agrees that CoI investigators and security personnel selected 
for USG-funded training should be vetted using Post's 
existing procedures for the IMET program.  Post proposes to 
initiate vetting of CoI leadership, including the 
commissioner and deputy, directors general, and the heads of 
each CoI geographical unit, as well as vetting of 
investigators/security personnel nominated for USG-funded 
training at the beginning of FY09. 
 
¶6.  Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS) Prisons and Detention 
Facilities, the Kurdistan Regional Government Prisons and 
Detention Facilities and MoLSA Juvenile Detention Facilities: 
 Post recommends that the top leadership, including the 
directors and deputy directors in the ICS and prison wardens 
and deputy wardens, where applicable, be vetted using Post's 
existing Leahy vetting for the IMET program. 
 
¶7.  Judicial Protection Service (JPS):  At this time, the 
Higher Judicial Council (HJC) has yet to form an officially 
recognized JPS.  Until a JPS is formally organized, Post 
proposes to submit senior HJC leaders directly responsible 
for overseeing security operations at the HJC and at Iraq's 
major crimes courts for vetting, following Post's existing 
procedures, at the start of FY09. 
 
¶8.  Iraqi Police Service (IPS):  This State-funded IRRF 
program is not programmed yet, and Post recommends deferring 
a decision on whether to vet participants in this program at 
a unit or individual level until more information about the 
program is available. 
 
¶9.  IMET vetting will continue according to previous 
established procedures. 
 
¶10.  Post concurs that any organization receiving future 
funding subject to section 620J of the FAA will be Leahy 
vetted on a yearly basis.  Newly funded units/organizations 
and their commanders will be vetted before receiving State 
funding. 
CROCKER