VZCZCXRO2017
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHAH #0923/01 2030751
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210751Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1190
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4048
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1865
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1732
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 2301
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2708

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASHGABAT 000923 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
OSD CCGTT FOR HOWELL 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, ISN/ECC, INL/AAE, S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN:  POST RESPONSE TO CUSTOMS CHAIRMAN 
CONCERNS OVER DOD COUNTERNARCOTICS SUPPORT 
 
REF: A. SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//GSA COUNTERNARC//121132Z 
        JUN 08 
     ¶B. ASHGABAT 0881 
 
¶1.  Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet 
 
¶2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  At a meeting on May 12 at the Department 
of State (Ref. A), the former Chairman of Turkmenistan's 
State Customs Service raised some concerns regarding 
discrepancies in Department of Defense Counternarcotics 
support at two Border Control Checkpoints.  On July 10, 
Emboffs discussed the issue as requested with new State 
Customs Service Chairman Yaylym Berdiyev.  Berdiyev was 
unaware of the issues raised at the meeting in Washington, 
but intends to review the details of the border control 
checkpoint construction projects.  Both sides agreed to work 
together to resolve any issues and continue cooperation. 
The Nevada National Guard Partnership Project was aware of 
some of the issues and had been working to resolve them. 
Guard representatives said that many of the issues have 
already been resolved.  Apparently, inaccurate inventory 
procedures by a sub-contractor under the Nevada National 
Guard Project largely led to Customs' concerns.  Embassy 
believes that the Nevada National Guard Project needs to 
exercise greater oversight of its program.  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE ALLEGATIONS 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Former State Customs Service Chairman Muratberdi 
Annalyev raised concerns regarding the DoD/CENTCOM 
Counternarcotics-funded border control checkpoint 
construction program at a May 12 meeting at the Department of 
State (Ref. A) during an EXBS-funded trip to the United 
States.  He alleged that the Altyn Asyr and Imamnazar border 
control checkpoints were not fully operational, the equipment 
provided at these two sites did not match the requested list 
of equipment, and the equipment provided was a cheap version 
of what they requested.  Annalyev was fired before Post could 
meet with him in person, and his dismissal means we can no 
longer reach him to clarify the basis for his list of 
concerns. 
 
POST'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUES 
 
¶4.  (SBU) What follows is a description of Post's 
understanding of the issues based on an interview and 
follow-up information from the Nevada National Guard Project 
Leader, who is the program manager for the border control 
checkpoint construction program.  The Project Leader said 
that he had been aware of at least some of Customs' concerns 
and had been working for some time with lower-level Customs 
officials and the prime contractor, Gap Inshaat, to resolve 
them.  In addition to addressing the specific concerns below, 
the Project Leader believed that Annalyev may have had other 
motives -- still unknown to us -- for raising his concerns 
the way he did during the 12 May meeting with U.S. officials. 
 
 
OPERATIONAL STATUS OF BORDER CONTROL CHECKPOINTS 
 
¶5.  (SBU) According to the Project Leader, the Altyn Asyr 
customs station chief said during a site visit on July 9 that 
the border control checkpoint was fully operational with the 
singular exception of a section of pavement which had 
deteriorated prematurely.  The checkpoint was in operation at 
the time of the visit and the condition of the deteriorated 
pavement section was not affecting checkpoint operations. 
The Project Leader said the pavement is under contractor 
warranty and will be repaired. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Post understands, based on several USG visits to 
Imamnazar, that the checkpoint is and always has been 
operational since its opening in August 2007. 
 
ASHGABAT 00000923  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
INVENTORIES AND PERCEPTIONS 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Annalyev's concerns over the property on the 
inventory lists at the two sites appear to be based on a 
variety of reasons, including poor inventory practices, 
Turkmenistan government pressure to turn over the Imamnazar 
checkpoint before the inventory was complete, 
misunderstandings over the expected quality and quantity of 
equipment provided, and Customs officials' reports that items 
were missing or unaccounted for during subsequent internal 
inventories, when in reality they just could not find or 
identify them.  (For example, two missing pumps at Altyn Asyr 
were actually imbedded within the plumbing.  Two drinking 
water pumps at Imamnazar were supposedly missing, however, 
one is on site, and the other is in Ashgabat for service 
under warranty.)  Post is not aware of any party's 
intentional wrongdoing or intent to deceive any other party 
involved. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Due to the timing of the grand opening of the 
Imamnazar border control checkpoint in August 2007, State 
Customs Service insisted on receiving keys before the joint 
inventory could be conducted.  The State Customs Service, Gap 
Inshaat, and Nevada National Guard Project Leader later made 
a joint inventory, but by then, some of the questions over 
accountability were also present.  Turkmenistan also later 
requested a dollar value for each item on the inventory. 
Nevada National Guard Project Leader assigned the task to Gap 
Inshaat, which produced inventories for the border control 
checkpoints containing greater detail than in the joint 
inventories.  These inventories did not completely match. 
Post believes that the differences between these inventories 
gave rise to Annalyev's concerns as expressed on May 12. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) No major discrepancies existed over the Altyn Asyr 
property inventory, which was conducted prior to the turnover 
of the checkpoint in November 2006.  The State Customs 
Service, Gap Inshaat, and Nevada National Guard Project 
Leader also recently signed a new joint inventory at the 
Altyn Asyr border control checkpoint that reportedly has 
clarified any and all apparent "administrative" disputes. 
 
CHEAPER EQUIPMENT PROVIDED THAN REQUESTED 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Regarding Annalyev's claim that the program was 
providing cheaper versions of equipment than what was 
requested," the joint inventory lists a Rapiscan scanner 
Meteor 150 model, but Gap Inshaat's inventory lists a more 
advanced, more expensive Meteor 250.  This led to the 
misperception that the United States had promised a Meteor 
250 but only delivered a "cheap version" of a lesser model. 
Nevada National Guard Project reports that the United Nations 
procured the scanner at Altyn Asyr.  The original order was 
for a Meteor 150.  The United States procured the scanner at 
Imamnazar, for which the original order was also a Meteor 
¶150.   The original description of the border control 
checkpoint design provided to Turkmenistan merely noted 
"scanner" without any mention of a particular model.  Also, 
Turkmenistan did not provide a written statement of 
requirements.  It appears that Gap Inshaat's inaccurate 
accounting on the inventory was the source of the problem. 
Nevada National Guard Project's lack of quality control led 
to an inaccurate reflection of the project results. 
 
PROVIDED EQUIPMENT DOESN'T MATCH REQUESTED EQUIPMENT 
 
¶11.  (SBU) According to the Project Leader, Annalyev's 
reference to "requested equipment" also is misleading since 
Customs never formally requested the vast majority of 
equipment it received at these two sites.  Rather, the 
equipment list was generated off the architectural drawings 
and other planning documents used by Gap Inshaat to build the 
 
ASHGABAT 00000923  003 OF 004 
 
 
checkpoints.  Customs' approval in essence was obtained 
through its agreement to the drawings and supporting 
documents.  Furthermore, the documents used for 
accountability purposes by, between, and within the USG, Gap 
Inshaat, and the Turkmenistan government are not seamless and 
have created additional layers of complexity to achieving 
agreement on property accountability at these sites. 
 
MISSING INVENTORY - IMAMNAZAR 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The Nevada National Guard Project Leader is unable 
to adequately explain numerous discrepancies on the Imamnazar 
inventory and is currently working to resolve them. 
 
-- The joint inventory listed six expansion tanks at 
Imamnazar, but only four were located on site.  Nevada 
National Guard Project stated they "don't know why there was 
a joint inventory of six." 
-- The joint inventory listed four filters, but only two were 
found on site.  Again, "We don't know why there was a joint 
inventory of four." 
-- The joint inventory listed four portable sump pumps, but 
now there are only two on site. 
-- The joint inventory listed 58 armchairs.  While Nevada 
National Guard Project had ordered 70 and Gap Inshaat 
indicated 70, there are only 61 on site. 
-- The joint inventory listed 48 desks.  Gap Inshaat listed 
47 but State Customs Service could only find 46 on site. 
 
This pattern repeats for other items such as wardrobes, 
regular chairs, and a missing trash cart.  In some cases, the 
inventories match, but items still are missing.  It is not 
clear whether Gap Inshaat failed to deliver goods according 
to contract, or whether the items were delivered but later 
stolen.  Post's concern is that the initial inventories did 
not match, raising questions about Nevada National Guard 
Project accountability and oversight in managing its 
construction projects.  The fact that some items are now 
missing is a matter of State Customs Service internal 
accountability, but from the outset there should be no 
question of what the United States provided and at what cost. 
 Nevada National Guard's approach to reach a resolution with 
State Customs Service has been to agree to a new inventory 
listing the current number of items on site.  However, it is 
not yet clear if both parties agree about which organization 
is responsible for the missing items. 
 
POST'S MEETING WITH NEW CUSTOMS CHAIRMAN BERDIYEV 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Emboffs met with Berdiyev on July 10 to discuss 
the stated discrepancies and our ongoing cooperation (Ref. 
B).  Berdiyev previously served as the Chairman of the State 
Immigration Service and was familiar with U.S. 
counternarcotics efforts to cooperate with Turkmenistan.  He 
was grateful for previous U.S. assistance and responded 
positively that we can work together to resolve any issues. 
He admitted that he has not yet reviewed the entire matter 
concerning border control checkpoint discrepancies, but that 
he intends to conduct a full review of all purchases covering 
the last 8-10 years, including the border control 
checkpoints.  He mentioned only the crumbling pavement 
problem at Altyn Asyr as an issue that he knew about. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Relations between the Embassy and the 
new State Customs Service Chairman indicate that the issue of 
mismatched inventories is one both sides can overcome. 
Fortunately, several of the discrepancies were easily 
explained and therefore are resolved.  A concern remains 
about accountability and necessary internal quality controls 
in Nevada National Guard Project's management of Department 
of Defense's Counternarcotics projects.  The Nevada National 
Guard Project Leader is aware of this concern and is working 
to resolve the discrepancies on the inventories.  However, 
 
ASHGABAT 00000923  004 OF 004 
 
 
the inaccurate inventories raise the question of whether 
calculations for billing are reliable.  END COMMENT. 
CURRAN