VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0999/01 1910904
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 090904Z JUL 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9450
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8429
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9657

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000999 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
¶1. Summary: Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused their 
June 9 news coverage on the plummeting Taiwan stock index; on the 
controversy over the construction of the Suhua Freeway; and on the 
screening process of the Examination Yuan candidates nominated by 
President Ma Ying-jeou.  Both the pro-independence "Liberty Times" 
and the pro-unification "United Daily News" reported on their inside 
pages on a speech by U.S. Undersecretary of Commerce for 
International Trade Christopher A. Padilla at the American 
Enterprise Institute Monday, in which he declined to reply whether 
the United States will negotiate a Free Trade Agreement with Taiwan 
but emphasized that Washington will deal with trade issues vis--vis 
Taiwan through the mechanism of APEC. 
 
¶2.  In terms of editorials and commentaries, a "Liberty Times" 
editorial discussed China's approach of using its relations with the 
United States to 'pull Washington to its side to restrain Taiwan.' 
The article also criticized the Ma Ying-jeou Administration's 
cross-Strait policy, saying Beijing has seen through Ma's guiles in 
defending Taiwan.  A "United Daily News" op-ed piece urged the Ma 
Administration to send high-ranking national security officials to 
the United States and express clearly Taiwan's interest in buying 
weapons from the United States.  An op-ed piece in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times," written by a 
Western commentator, suggested that Ma follow a more prudent 
approach in terms of his cross-Strait policy.  End summary. 
 
A) "China Has Seen through Ma Ying-jeou's 'Determination to Defend 
[Taiwan]'" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 720,000] 
editorialized (7/9): 
 
"... As a result, the way China imposes pressure on Taiwan has 
constantly been done via its relations with the United States.  In 
other words, for China, the most effect way to put pressure on 
Taiwan is not to intimidate Taiwan directly but to 'draw Washington 
to its side to restrain Taiwan.'  The most evident case was Taiwan's 
UN referenda held in tandem with this year's presidential election. 
China had tried every way it could to obstruct the referenda from 
passing but, in the meantime, it was afraid that open and flagrant 
intimidation would arouse strong aversion among the Taiwan people 
and thereby create a bad influence on the campaign of the 
presidential candidate that it preferred.  As a result, China used 
its relations with the United States and asked the latter to impose 
pressure on Taiwan.  Under the approach of 'pulling Washington to 
its side to restrain Taiwan,' China did not have to accomplish its 
evil purpose toward Taiwan directly and could let the Taiwan people 
vent their anger on the United States.  It was a dual gain for 
Beijing. 
 
"Such a change in China's diplomatic strategy has done as much harm 
to Taiwan as military intimidation would do.  But the trick of 
hiding evil behind one's smile has slackened the sense of crisis of 
many [Taiwan] people.  What is even more regrettable is that the Ma 
Administration, which has been enthusiastic about the one-China 
consensus, has not only turned a blind eye [to Beijing's guiles], 
but in order to beg China to open direct charter flights and allow 
its people to tour Taiwan, it has also requested that Washington 
shelve its arms sales [to Taiwan] so as not to sabotage the 
atmosphere for the talks between Taiwan's Straits Exchange 
Foundation and China's Association for Relations across the Taiwan 
Strait.  Judging from such a development, it appears that the 
so-called 'no use of force' advocated by President Ma, who calls for 
ultimate unification [with China], is not to demand that China 
renounce its use of force against Taiwan but to disarm the island 
itself and adopt an inactive attitude toward weaponry procurement. 
..." 
 
B) "Truth about Shelving [U.S.] Arms Procurements Remains 
Mysterious; Long Delay Usually Means Many Problems" 
 
Professor Edward Chen of Tamkang University's Graduate Institute of 
American Studies opined in the pro-unification "United Daily News" 
[circulation: 400,000] (7/9): 
 
"U.S. officials said lately that the shelving of [U.S.] arms sales 
to Taiwan was a request made by the Taiwan side, but Taiwan's 
national security officials have recently told the U.S. State 
Department via a formal channel that it 'has no intention to suspend 
the arms deal.'  All of a sudden, it has become an unsolved puzzle 
as to whether it is Washington that wanted to shelve the arms sales 
to Taiwan or it was Taiwan that has proactively requested a delay in 
the arms procurements. ...  Is such a development a result of 
miscommunication between the high-ranking national security 
officials of Taiwan and the United States, or is it because AIT or 
State Department officials have been misinformed and thus misled? 
Or is it because Washington regards Taipei's concerns over the 
impact of arms procurements on cross-Strait talks as a kind of 
'hint' by Taipei to shelve the arms deal? 
 
 
"Regardless, there is really no reason for Taipei to shelve the arms 
procurements.  First, Ma Ying-jeou's statement in his inaugural 
speech that he will raise Taiwan's defense budget to three percent 
of the island's GDP was a clear response to the United States' 
expectations that Taiwan should strengthen its national defense. ... 
 Fifth, the chances are slim that Taipei is not aware that if it 
postpones its arms procurements proposal until after the Olympic 
Games, the U.S. presidential election will be entering the last 
stage of the campaign.  Approximately one-third of the Senators and 
all House representatives will devote themselves to campaigning for 
re-election.  It is thus likely that the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan 
will be postponed until January 2009.  When that time arrives, 
President George W. Bush, who has always hoped to sell many weapons 
to Taiwan, might become discouraged and leave the decision of the 
arms sales to the new president.  Sixth, if John McCain is elected 
the next U.S. president, he will perhaps follow Bush's previous 
decision, but should Barack Obama be elected, it is likely that the 
U.S. arms sales policy toward Taiwan will be changed greatly. ... 
 
"Thus, to prevent the many problems that may be caused by such a 
delay, the Taiwan government, in addition to stating more clearly 
[to Washington] that Taiwan's arms procurement policy remains 
unchanged, should also send high-ranking national security officials 
to the United States to secure the deal." 
 
C) "Ma Must Build Position of Strength" 
 
Gerrit van der Wees, editor of "Taiwan Communique," a 
Washington-based publication, opined in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 30,000] (7/9): 
 
"... First, the Ma administration did not attempt to achieve any 
consensus in Taiwan before recklessly rushing ahead into its 
adventure with China. ...  Second, the Ma administration has hitched 
itself inextricably to the goodwill of the Beijing regime. He has 
mentioned the reduction of the missile threat and more 
"international space" for Taiwan as desirable, but he has little 
leverage. If Beijing doesn't deliver or only makes token moves, Ma 
has little room to maneuver and is dead in the water.  Third, Ma has 
zigzagged on the issue of arms sales from the US. There were earlier 
reports that right after the inauguration the Ma administration had 
urged the US to slow down the timing of the notifications of arms 
sales. Subsequent reports indicated that the Ma administration had 
not initiated a freeze in the sales. Be that as it may, the fact 
remains that from 2002 to last year, the KMT opposition did 
everything possible to sabotage the US-offered arms package by 
blocking even a discussion in the Legislative Yuan, thereby 
undermining Taiwan's security. 
 
"Fourth, by allowing Taiwan to drift into China's orbit and sphere 
of influence, the US risks losing an important friend and ally in 
the region. Taiwan's strategic location astride the major sea lanes 
from Japan and Korea to Southeast Asia makes it an important asset 
in support of free shipping and free trade. The US needs to set 
clear markers and red lines that - if crossed - would represent a 
threat to US interests.  Fifth, by linking Taiwan's economy so much 
closer to China's, Ma has placed Taiwan at risk of being pulled down 
in the event of a severe downturn in the Chinese economy. ... 
 
"So, if Ma is wise, he would follow a more prudent approach, based 
on first developing an internal consensus in Taiwan on how to move 
ahead, consultations with the US and Japan on security and strategic 
boundary conditions, and diversifying Taiwan's economic and 
political links with the international community.  Only if he works 
along these lines will he be able to negotiate from a position of 
strength. The present approach will only lead to Taiwan being pushed 
into a corner from which it will be very difficult to extract 
itself. The Taiwanese people who have worked so hard for democracy 
deserve better." 
 
YOUNG