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Viewing cable 08AITTAIPEI1109, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08AITTAIPEI1109 2008-07-29 23:24 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1109/01 2112324
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 292324Z JUL 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9610
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8486
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9703
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001109 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage July 26-29 on Typhoon Fung-wong, which swept across the 
island Monday; on the current status of the U.S.-Taiwan arms deals; 
on the title of Taiwan's Olympic team; and on President Ma 
Ying-jeou's upcoming trip to Paraguay and the Dominican Republic. 
Taiwan's interest in obtaining submarines, either by purchasing them 
from the United States or by building its own, has grasped close 
media attention.  The pro-unification "United Daily News" ran a 
banner headline on page four July 28 reading "The Submarines 
Procurement Surface Again Following Four Year's of Silence."  In 
addition, the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" continued carrying 
reports over the weekend on the Rim of the Pacific joint military. 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an editorial in the 
centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" discussed the true meaning of 
"diplomatic truce" between Taiwan and China and urged President Ma 
Ying-jeou to strengthen communication with the United States over 
the developments in cross-Strait relations.  A "China Times" column 
also listed the major challenges that Ma's national security team is 
facing and questioned whether Ma has really tried to maintain good 
communication with the United States.  A separate "China Times" 
op-ed piece discussed Washington's and Tokyo's doubts about the Ma 
Administration's international strategy and the way it handled 
Taiwan's relations with the United States and Japan.  An editorial 
in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" discussed 
the remarks by former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense and now World 
Bank President Paul Wolfowitz to the American chamber of Commerce in 
Taipei last week and the current state of U.S.-Taiwan arms deals. 
The article said "if U.S. President George w. Bush does not live up 
to Wolfowitz's expectations and does not release the arms, then 
these things will become crystal clear: the pro-China group in the 
State Department will have triumphed, ... and Taiwan's security will 
be at the mercy of the U.S. electoral process, giving China even 
more time to tighten the screws."  An editorial in the conservative, 
pro-unification, English-language "China Post" also discussed the 
U.S.-Taiwan arms deals and said despite the warming cross-Strait 
relations, Taiwan has yet to regard Beijing as a neighbor of peace. 
As a result, the article said, arms procurements are important for 
Taiwan.  End summary. 
 
A) "The True Meaning of 'Diplomatic Truce' as Seen in Light of 
President Ma's Overseas Visit" 
 
The centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 400,000] 
editorialized (7/29): 
 
"... Another task that President Ma [Ying-jeou] needs to do [during 
his overseas trip to Paraguay and the Dominican Republic in 
mid-August] is to reinforce his communication with the United 
States.  The alarm over the cross-Strait tension has been terminated 
for the time being since the Ma Administration assumed position. 
But the warming cross-Strait relations are a big issue for the 
United States as well.  This is because [Washington] is not as sure 
as it was before as to whether at this moment Taiwan is on the U.S. 
side or on Beijing's side.  Unfortunately, it is the hard fact that 
Ma has yet to come up with a clear exposition on this matter.  The 
[Ma] Administration's governance so far is also deemed by most 
people as leaning toward Beijing and does not have a mechanism for 
self-correction or keeping vigilant. 
 
"Nevertheless, in terms of military, economy and international 
space, the United States is Taiwan's most important support.  Since 
the alleged reports that [the United States] has frozen the arms 
sales [to Taiwan] began to circulate, the United States has been 
waiting for the Ma Administration to give an explanation.  If given 
a chance, Ma should try hard to dispel the [United States'] doubts 
on this matter during his transits in the States, and he might as 
well clear the matter to the Taiwan people.  A president is someone 
who is meant to make great deeds.  Instead of being fussy about 
meticulousness such as taking a chartered flight to save money, it 
is better that [Ma] spend his energy on managing the direction of 
the country's development." 
 
B) "The Challenges that Confront Ma Ying-jeou's National Security 
Policy" 
 
Deputy Editor-in-Chief Kuo Chen-lung wrote in the "International 
Column" in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 
400,000] (7/29): 
 
"The national security policy of the Ma Ying-jeou Administration has 
apparently become a target of public criticism.  The criticism 
include the [administration's] haste in easing cross-Strait 
policies, not doing its best to realize the United States' arms 
sales to Taiwan, and being slow in appointing [whom to be] Taiwan's 
representative to Japan.  Looking into the seventy days after Ma 
assumed office, Ma's national security team is facing following 
challenges in four aspects: 
 
"First, in terms of mainland China, although [both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait] started the economic negotiation first, when would 
the political negotiation start? ... 
 
"Secondly, in terms of Japan, under the principle that [Taiwan's] 
sovereignty cannot be compromised, how [do Taiwan and Japan] set 
aside controversies [over the Tiaoyutai Islands and Taiwan's role in 
the Japan-China dispute in exploring the gas field over the East 
China Sea]?  Is the brinkmanship one of the strategies [of Ma's 
national security team]? ... 
 
"Thirdly, in terms of the Untied States, whether [Ma's national 
security team] has been fully communicating with and informing the 
United States?  Have the relations between Taiwan and the United 
States had significant progress after [Taiwan's March 22 
presidential] election? 
 
"Undoubtedly, during the two months after Ma assumed office [on May 
20], Ma has been setting cross-Strait relations as the first 
priority.  Latter on, [Ma] had to deal with the crisis resulted from 
the collision between a Taiwan fishing boat and a Japanese frigate 
over the waters surrounding the Tiaoyutai Islands.  [Ma] takes the 
United States for granted and does not regard it as a priority.  The 
communication between [the United States and Taiwan's] senior level 
of officials has been relatively less. 
 
"The Ma Administration claimed that the United States has been very 
satisfied with the progress of cross-Strait relations.  In other 
words, [the Ma Administration] means that it has done better than 
the previous [Chen Shui-bian] Administration.  However, the United 
States does not simply make judgment based upon the result after the 
event.  The United States wants to have full control over the whole 
circumstance, including knowing what the cross-Strait issues are, 
what the public and private channels are, whether there are any 
extra private deals.  If there is any omission [in aspects mentioned 
above], the Untied States would start to suspect what Taiwan and 
China have talked about clandestinely? 
 
"The Ma Administration recently has noticed the United States' 
concerns.  [Taiwan's] National Security Council Deputy 
Secretary-General Lee Hai-tung and [Taiwan's] Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Andrew Hsia have gone to California to hold the 
'Monterey Talks' with the United States.  In the future, between a 
higher level of officials [of both Taiwan and the United States], it 
is possible to build a national security channel which is similar to 
the 'talks between [Taiwan's former National Security Council 
Secretary-General] Ting Mao-shih and [former White House Deputy 
National Security Advisor] James B. Steinberg.'  However, the 
current [atmosphere] between Taiwan and the United States is not 
quite as good as when the United States-Taiwan relations were at 
their peak. ..." 
 
C) "Why Do the United States and Japan Have a Crisis in Confidence 
Regarding Ma?" 
 
Lai I-chung, an executive committee member of the Taiwan Thinktank, 
opined in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 
400,000] (7/26): 
 
"... The basic reasons that the Uited States and Japan changed 
their attitudes toward Taiwan were because the two countries have 
doubts regarding the Ma [Ying-jeou] Administration's diplomatic 
strategy and the [administration's] clumsiness in handling the 
diplomatic issues in terms of the tactics.  First, in terms of the 
handling [of the diplomatic issues], on the second day after Ma was 
elected president, without having initial negotiation [with the 
United States and Japan, Ma unilaterally announced that he would 
like to visit the two countries.  Secondly, the brash way in which 
the Ma Administration left no room for compromise in handling the 
Tiaoyutai issue, gave no consideration to the fact that the issue 
affects Taiwan's subtle relations with the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan.  The 
Ma Administration's changeable attitude also set up new variables 
during the negotiation [with Japan].  The arms procurement, an 
indicator of the security and cooperation between Taiwan and the 
United States, has become a mystery that Taiwan and the United 
States accuse each other [for delaying the procurement].  Without 
consultation with Japan, [the Ma Administration]'s release of 
allegations regarding the candidate for Taiwan's representative to 
Japan has put Tokyo in an awkward position.  All of these incidents 
have consumed the United States and Japan's trust on the Taiwan 
government. 
 
"However, the most basic issue is that the United States and Japan 
have doubts about Ma's international strategy.  Ma considers that 
the improvement of cross-Strait relations is in accordance with the 
interests of the United States and Japan.  However, the United 
States and Japan would not necessarily agree with the argument that 
cross-Strait relations and relations among Taiwan, the United 
 
States, and Japan is a zero-sum game.  Ma declared before he assumed 
office that 'cross-Strait relations are far superior to foreign 
affairs.'  Then Minister-designate of Foreign Affairs [Francisco Ou] 
even called for a 'diplomatic truce.'  In response, United States 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has reminded Taiwan that 'the 
relations between the United States and Taiwan have their own 
independent aspects,' which was a hint to Ma that he should not use 
cross-Strait relations to define the relations between the United 
States and Taiwan.  However, the following developments have made 
many people on the United States side suddenly realize that 
significant strategic changes had already taken place in Taiwan.  In 
the past, [Taiwan] regarded the security cooperation between the 
United States and Taiwan as beneficial for Taiwan when dealing with 
cross-Strait [relations].  However, nowadays, Taipei wanted the 
United States to suspend announcing the arms sales to Taiwan before 
[Taiwan's] Straits Exchange Foundation and [China's] Association for 
Relations across the Taiwan Strait resumed negotiation [in June]. 
This means that the new [Ma] Administration considers the security 
cooperation between the United States and Taiwan as a negative 
factor, not a positive bargaining chip, in cross-Strait relations. 
..." 
 
D) "If Only Paul Wolfwitz Is Right" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (7/26): 
 
"But [World Bank President Paul] Wolfowitz's words also had the 
flavor of a warning: Taiwan's security, now as then, hinges on the 
regard in which Taiwan - or more precisely, its government - is held 
by Congress and the US administration, and that this affection had 
been tested in recent years by the Democratic Progressive Party 
government.  That affection is still there, though a combination of 
US wars in the Middle East and the pro-China machinations of members 
of the State Department and their academic networks, not to mention 
the China lobby, tends to stifle this affection.  That may all be 
changing, judging from Wolfowitz's confidence (amid none-too-subtle 
prodding) that the arms freeze conceded by US Admiral Timothy 
Keating will be lifted, possibly before the end of the congressional 
session in September, and hence before the next US president takes 
office. 
 
"Amid gloomy forecasts by local defense analysts, there are 
increasing reports of activity in and around Congress to deliver the 
arms that the government agreed to so long ago. And yesterday's 
comments by Jason Yuan, Taiwan's new envoy to Washington, that the 
delivery of the arms is 'almost a done deal,' suggest that senior 
KMT figures know more about maneuvering in Washington than it cares 
to admit - right down to the visit to Taiwan of a top US figure in 
the weeks to come.  This is all well and good. If we can assume that 
Yuan's comments are a reflection of the reality and not just bluster 
from an envoy who seems not to know when to close his mouth, then 
there is hope on the horizon that Taiwan will be able to lurch back 
in the direction of keeping the Chinese military threat within its 
capabilities.  But if US President George W. Bush does not live up 
to Wolfowitz's expectations and does not release the arms, then 
these things will become crystal clear: the pro-China group in the 
State Department will have triumphed, Taiwan's new envoy will have 
been discredited even before arriving in the US and Taiwan's 
security will be at the mercy of the US electoral process, giving 
China even more time to tighten the screws." 
 
E) "Cracks in U.S., Japan Ties" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China Post" 
[circulation: 30,000] editorialized (7/29): 
 
"... A dramatic contrast to Washington's initial welcoming of Ma's 
election was the Bush administration's pronouncement to freeze arms 
sales to Taiwan.  This gesture was especially odd because for eight 
years the Bush administration has been urging Taipei to take more 
responsibility for its own defense and to buy US$16 billion-worth of 
American arms, including anti-missile systems, warplanes and 
submarines. ...  On July 16, Admiral Timothy Keating, chief of the 
U.S. Pacific command, said Washington had instituted a freeze on new 
arms sales to Taiwan.  However, the next day in Taipei, President 
Ma's spokesman reiterated Taipei's traditional need of U.S. arms for 
self defense.  In response, State Department spokesman Sean 
McCormack said on July 18 that the U.S. policy on supplying arms to 
Taiwan remained unchanged.  The U.S. is Taiwan's main arms supplier, 
and even though ties between Taipei and Beijing have warmed since 
Ma's inauguration in May, the island has yet to regard the communist 
mainland as a neighbor of peace.  Despite increased economic, 
cultural and social interchanges, Taipei and Beijing remain deeply 
suspicious of each. ...  The U.S., Japan, Singapore and all other 
democracies in the world may be pro-Taiwan at heart, but they are 
not so in deed." 
 
YOUNG