VZCZCXYZ0018
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1074/01 2040948
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220948Z JUL 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9560
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8463
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9687

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001074 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN ARMS DEALS 
 
Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused July 22 
news coverage on former President Chen Shui-bian, who appeared at 
court Monday to defend himself in a defamation lawsuit involving 
Taiwan's procurement of Lafayette frigates in 1990; and on the 
Cabinet's plan to resolve the flooding problems in Taiwan.  In terms 
of editorials and commentaries, several op-ed pieces in the 
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" discussed the current state of U.S. 
arms sales to Taiwan.  One article urged Taiwan to pay close 
attention to the warning signals behind the alleged U.S. decision to 
shelve arms sales to Taiwan.  Another one asserted that Washington 
is just using the arms sales matter to remind the Ma Ying-jeou 
Administration to act more prudently when seeking to improve 
cross-Strait relations.  A third op-ed said that the Ma 
Administration's attempts to improve cross-Strait relations have 
made both the United States and Japan nervous about the changing 
dynamic in the region.  An editorial in the conservative, 
pro-unification, English-language "China Post" said "peace or not, 
Taiwan must buy weapons for war, and only from the United States." 
End summary. 
 
A) "Pay Attention to the Warning Signals behind the U.S. Decision to 
Shelve Arms Sales [to Taiwan]" 
 
Andrew Yang, Secretary-General of Chinese Council for Advanced 
Policy Studies, opined in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" 
[circulation: 500,000] (7/22): 
 
"... It seems to have become a reality that, during the remainder of 
its term in office, the Bush Administration will not make any 
decision regarding U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.  Congress will go into 
recess at the end of July, and it appears that the eight arms 
procurement items for Taiwan, which are now pending in the Congress 
awaiting its final approval, are not likely to be included on the 
agenda of the current Congressional session.  When the Congress goes 
back into session in late September, the U.S. presidential election 
will be drawing near, making it improbable for Congress to discuss 
the issue.  Therefore, chances are slim that Taiwan's expectations 
will be realized for the eight decided-upon arms procurement items 
to be approved within the Bush Administration's term of office. 
Regarding Washington's decision to shelve the arms sales to Taiwan 
this time, we need to be vigilant about the following aspects: 
 
"First, [Admiral Timothy] Keating revealed that the U.S. policy 
assessment of its arms sales to Taiwan is related to the proactive 
engagement between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and the 
increase of peace factors in the Taiwan Strait.  In other words, 
this is the first time that Washington has linked its arms sales to 
Taiwan to factors concerning peaceful interaction between the two 
sides of the Taiwan Strait.  Even though Washington has emphasized 
over and over again that it adheres to the Taiwan Relations Act, its 
policy has actually been affected by interactions across the Taiwan 
Strait. 
 
"Second, Keating also revealed that, while determining its arms 
sales policy toward Taiwan, Washington has taken into consideration 
China's intent to use force against Taiwan, instead of the fact that 
Beijing is targeting Taiwan with [over] a thousand missiles.  As 
long as China shows no political intention to use force against 
Taiwan and is working proactively to strengthen peaceful interaction 
across the Taiwan Strait, the United States will begin to think 
about how it is going to sell arms to Taiwan.  But Keating also 
emphasized that the U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific is 
strong enough to deal with China's military threats.  In other 
words, the question regarding whether Taiwan has sufficient defense 
capabilities has gradually become a less important factor behind 
Washington's deterrence against China. 
 
Third, Keating's remarks also manifest that there are hardly any 
powerful political activists or policy promoters in Washington 
political circles to help proactively to push the U.S. bureaucracy 
and to lobby Congress to make arms sales decisions more favorable 
for Taiwan. ...  The United States' decision to shelve arms sales to 
Taiwan has made clear the following two points:  First, the United 
States has a new assessment of the geo-strategic changes in the 
Taiwan Strait.  Its decision also shows that, in terms of future 
peace in the Taiwan Strait, Washington will put its primary focus on 
diplomacy, then on military.  Taiwan will face more difficulties in 
the future if it wants to solicit Washington's support for U.S. arms 
sales to Taiwan.  Second, even though Washington will not discuss 
its arms sales to Taiwan with Beijing unilaterally, it is obvious 
that Beijing has found another channel, namely, using its foreign 
relations, economy and cross-Strait relations as tools to strengthen 
its lobbying and political maneuvering toward the United States. 
These two major changes are significant warning signals to which 
Taiwan should pay close attention." 
 
B) "The U.S. Uses Arms Sales to Remind the Ma Administration" 
 
Emerson Chang, director of the Department of International Studies 
 
at Nan Hua University, opined in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" 
[circulation: 500,000] (7/21): 
 
"... The freeze of arms sales [to Taiwan] was just a move that the 
U.S. government used to caution the Ma Administration that it should 
not look after one thing and lose track of another while improving 
cross-Strait relations.  U.S. Pacific Commander Admiral Timothy 
Keating's remarks that the situation across the Taiwan Strait is 
stable, so there is no need to sell arms [to Taiwan] for the time 
being, is mostly diplomatic rhetoric. ... 
 
"The existing competitive and cooperative relations between the 
United States and China will not change simply because the United 
States freezes or continues its arms sales to Taiwan.  This argument 
was the accepted view when [U.S. President George W.] Bush responded 
to [former Chinese President] Jiang Zemin's proposition of '[China] 
withdrawing missiles [targeting Taiwan] and [the United States] 
ceasing arms sales [to Taiwan]' in 2002.  Some officials in the Bush 
Administration argue that [Washington] had better not upset China at 
the current stage.  However, it is impossible to neglect Taiwan, an 
important bargaining chip for the military hedge of the United 
States, in the long run. 
 
"The freeze of arms sales [to Taiwan] at this time highlights a 
question that the Ma Administration has been mulling privately, 
which is, in order to bring about China's greatest concessions in 
other aspects, should Taiwan show its weakness or strive to be 
strong militarily?  Judging from China's request [to the United 
States] for a permanent freeze of its arms sales to Taiwan as well 
as the United States' discontent with Taiwan [recently], Taiwan's 
better option should be to strive to be strong first and negotiate 
[with China] later." 
 
C) "The U.S. and Japan Take Turns to Test Taiwan's Bottom Line" 
 
Chen I-hsin, a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the School of 
Oriental and African Studies at the University of London, opined in 
the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 520,000] (7/21): 
 
"United States Pacific Commander Admiral Timothy Keating indirectly 
confirmed during his speech at the Heritage Foundation that the 
Pentagon might freeze arms sales to Taiwan.  This incident, and a 
previous incident in which [a Taiwan fishing boat and a Japanese 
frigate] collided in the waters near the Tiaoyutai Islands, might 
have the same implication -- namely, Washington and Tokyo are taking 
turns to test the new Taipei administration's real intentions.  In 
other words, those who feel the impact of cross-Strait relations are 
definitely not solely people from both sides of the Strait.  The 
thawing cross-Strait [relations] do not necessarily benefit multiple 
parties. ... 
 
"Taiwan's new policies, such as cross-Strait reconciliation and a 
diplomatic truce, differ greatly from the backdrop that forms the 
United States' current Taiwan Strait structure.  If [President] Ma 
Ying-jeou eventually decides not to return to the position of 
cross-Strait confrontation held by [former Presidents] Chen 
[Shui-bian] and Lee [Teng-hui], the structure of the United States' 
'Taiwan Relations Act' and the 817 Communique used in handling 
[cross-Strait relations] will lose their attached backdrop.  As a 
result, [the United States] will have to change the hypothesis of 
such a backdrop in order continuously to maintain the United States' 
interests.  In other words, if Washington is ready to change the 
paradigm, it will have to find out Taipei's and Beijing's real 
preferences.  Freezing arms sales to Taiwan has thus become the 
[United States'] best touchstone [in its plan] to kill two birds 
with one stone. ..."  [Ed. Note: the 817 Communique refers to the 
August 17, 1982 joint Sino-American communique on arms sales to 
Taiwan.] 
 
D) "U.S. Arms vs. PRC Missiles" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China Post" 
[circulation: 30,000] (7/22): 
 
"Had Washington given former President Chen Shui-bian a similar 
public 'ultimatum' that President Ma Ying-jeou's government received 
last week, Taiwan would not have stalled procurement of U.S weaponry 
for so long.  For the past 15 years, Taiwan has not made significant 
arms purchases from the U.S.-first, under the second six-year 
presidential term of the then-KMT's Lee Teng-hui, a hidden Taiwan 
independence promoter; and then the eight years under Chen of the 
openly separatist Democratic Progressive Party.  Washington was 
tolerant of both Lee and Chen because their anti-China and 
pro-independence rhetoric provided bargaining chips for the U.S. in 
dealings with Beijing.  The two countries' relatively poor 
background in state and external affairs made it easy for the U.S. 
to exploit the no-unification-no-independence and 
no-war-no-independence status quo. 
 
"Ma and the KMT have been trained by the American game long and 
well.  He has forsaken the impossible goal of mainland recovery, 
freeing the KMT from its one-China spell; and Beijing becomes a 
cousin next door, not an enemy.  The U.S. is a democratic friend, 
not an anti-China partner.  For Chen and Lee, threatening to declare 
Taiwan's independence from China while refusing to buy more U.S. 
weapons was a viable game of balancing potential friend and foe. 
But Ma has neutralized their game. ...  Peace or not, Taiwan must 
buy weapons for war, and only from the U.S.  Taiwan's destiny, like 
that of the U.S., is in the hands of arms dealers." 
 
YOUNG