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Viewing cable 08AITTAIPEI1030, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN ARMS SALES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08AITTAIPEI1030 2008-07-14 08:16 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1030/01 1960816
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 140816Z JUL 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9496
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8443
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9666
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001030 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN ARMS SALES 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage July 12-14 on the alleged telephone conversation between 
U.S. National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and Taiwan's National 
Security Council Secretary-General Su Chi at the end of June; on 
eight Taiwan businessmen who went missing in a shipwreck in the 
waters off Madagascar; and on President Ma Ying-jeou's planned 
August visit to Latin American with transit stops in the United 
States.  The pro-unification "United Daily News" on July 12 had a 
banner headline on page four saying that "the White House Phoned Su 
Chi: Several Items of the Arms Sales Are Frozen."  Both the 
centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" and the pro-independence 
"Liberty Times" followed up the news on July 13 and devoted more 
than half of a page reporting on the circumstance of the arms sales 
between Taiwan and the United States. 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an editorial in the 
"Liberty Times" lashed out at the Ma Administration's alleged 
inferiority complex toward China and the delay of U.S. arms 
procurements.  The article said it would be a disaster for Taiwan if 
the Ma Administration continues leaning toward China and giving up 
its self-defense capabilities.  An op-ed in the "China Times" 
reasoned that the United States is still leaving the door open for 
Taiwan to procure arms.  Therefore, Taiwan should implement 
state-of-the-art political negotiation skills to make the United 
States understand Taiwan's determination to defend itself as well as 
maintain long-term amicable relations with the United States.  End 
summary. 
 
A)  "With an Inferior Mentality Which Regards China as Its Savior, 
How Is [Taiwan] Able to Talk about Its National Defense?" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 700,000] 
editorialized (7/14): 
 
"...It goes without saying that the truth regarding the United 
States' decision to shelve its arms sales to Taiwan must be probed 
clearly and the question regarding who should be held responsible 
for such a decision must be investigated and clarified.  But all 
these remain minor details.  What one really needs to look into is: 
What are the national identity, international strategy and foreign 
policy direction of the new administration which assumed office [in 
May]?  The key to this question hinges on the new administration's 
cross-Strait policy direction.  In other words, since President Ma 
assumed office, the introduction of China's power [into Taiwan] has 
been the only panacea he has been relying on to solve all the 
political, economic or diplomatic problems he runs into, including 
the commodity price hikes and the plunging stock index on the 
island. ...  Under such circumstances in which China is regarded as 
superior while Taiwan is inferior, the answer to the question of who 
in the world it is who hopes Washington would shelve its arms sales 
to Taiwan so as to avoid irritating China, thereby sabotaging 
[Taiwan's] engagement with China, is already self-evident." 
 
B) "In the Talk of Freezing the Arms Sales" 
 
Professor Edward Chen of Tamkang University's Graduate Institute of 
American Studies opined in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" 
[circulation: 400,000] (7/14): 
 
"... From the circumstance that the United States released various 
pieces of information via different channels [regarding the arms 
sales between the United States and Taiwan], the purpose of the 
United States should be that, it hopes the Ma Administration will 
declare its position on arms sales formally, instead of shutting out 
its arms sales to Taiwan.  The reasons are as follows: 
 
"First, AIT Director Stephen Young has been keeping close contact 
with senior officials both in Taiwan's Blue and Green camps and has 
spared no efforts to promote [U.S.-Taiwan] arms sales.  To say that 
a major misunderstanding exists between Taiwan and the United States 
regarding the issue of arms sales would be a major insult to Young. 
When Ma was inaugurated [on May 20], the United States sent envoy 
Andrew Card to lead a congratulatory delegation.  AIT Chairman 
Raymond Burghardt also had visited Taiwan twice after Ma was elected 
President.  [The United States] should have a comprehensive 
understanding regarding the Ma Administration's determination to 
increase the defense budget to three percent of [Taiwan's] GDP and 
the Administration's position on arms procurement. 
 
"Second, when [Taiwan's former President] Chen Shui-bian was in 
power, [the DPP government] bundled the three most expensive items 
of the arms procurement (the submarines, the P-3C anti-submarine 
aircraft, and the PAC-3 missiles) as a package.  The DPP also 
threatened to sell the country's assets and wanted to issue 
government bonds [to raise money for the procurement].  Legislators 
of the Blue camp were therefore forced to oppose [the arms 
procurement from the United States].  This still makes many people 
in the United States misconstrue the Blue camp as being opposed to 
the arms procurement.  The arms procurement was finally approved in 
 
[Taiwan's] Legislative Yuan after the ruling and opposition parties 
communicated several times in the latter stages, reaching consensus 
to cut down the amount of the arms procurement and budget it year by 
year.  It is impossible for the United States not to have any idea 
about the arms procurement budget that the Legislative Yuan has 
approved.  The United States must understand that the approval of 
the arms procurement budget is legally binding. 
 
"Moreover, during the time when Chen promoted the referendum for 
Taiwan to enter the United Nations, the Bush Administration indeed 
refused to sell Taiwan F-16 C/D fighter jets and froze the arms 
sales for fear that the cooperation between the United States and 
China to resolve the North Korean nuclear weapons issue would be 
jeopardized.  Now, as the situation has changed, since the United 
States hopes for Taiwan to strengthen its national defense, it 
should not freeze arms sales to Taiwan.  Otherwise, what does the Ma 
Administration's increase of the defense budget mean? ... 
 
"According to precedent, if the United States has made decisions, it 
only needs to inform Taiwan and does not need to give Taiwan any 
opportunity to explain.  Now, the United States not only allows the 
Ma Administration to send senior national security officials as well 
as diplomatic and national defense officials to attend U.S.-Taiwan 
senior-level military talks to be held in Monterey, California, 
starting July 14, but [the United States] also agrees to allow the 
delegation of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee of 
the Legislative Yuan to visit Washington, D.C. at the end of July to 
meet United States national security and national defense officials. 
 This demonstrates that the United States is still leaving a small 
door open with regard to the issue of arms sales. ..." 
 
 
YOUNG