VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1026/01 1952224
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 132224Z JUL 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9488
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8441
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9664

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001026 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN ARMS SALES 
 
Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage July 11 on the government's possible deregulation of Taiwan 
chipmakers' investment in China; on the stock market fall; and on 
the screening process for Examination Yuan nominees.  In terms of 
editorials and commentaries, an op-ed in the mass-circulation "Apple 
Daily" recounted why U.S.-Taiwan arms sales are alletgedly frozen 
and the prospects for Taiwan to obtain arms in time of need.  End 
summary. 
 
"Analyzing the Mystery of the U.S.-Taiwan Arms Sales" 
 
Fu S. Mei, director and editor-in-chief of the Taiwan Defense 
Review, opined in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 
520,000] (7/11): 
 
"The United States suspended its arms sales to Taiwan, which 
resulted in the delay of the procurement of eight items with a total 
value exceeding US$11 billion.  The prospects are unpredictable. 
 
"In fact, [different items in] the arms sales could have been sent 
to the U.S. Congress in batches in March to undergo (paper) review. 
There were two reasons that the review was not pushed forward at 
that time.  One was partly because the official documents which the 
U.S. Army was responsible for were not ready yet.  The second reason 
was that the Bush Administration was purposely looking at the 
results of Taiwan's presidential election.  However, when it came to 
the eve of President Ma [Ying-jeou]'s inauguration [on May 20], U.S. 
officials reckoned that the best timing [to deal with the arms 
sales] was gone already. 
 
"Just before May 20, AIT Director Stephen Young did convey to the 
United States the message, which was proposed by the national 
security team of the new [Ma] Administration, hoping that the United 
States would 'take interaction across the Strait into consideration' 
when it processed the arms sales.  Taiwan did not clearly clarify on 
what it meant [by the message].  Nevertheless, quite a few officials 
in Washington interpreted this message as 'the Ma Administration 
would not necessarily worry if the notification to the U.S. Congress 
regarding some items in the arms sales was postponed.'  This is what 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs 
James J. Shinn's accounts were based upon, in which Shinn pointed 
out in a Congressional testimony at the end of June that the 
suspension of arms sales was because of Taiwan's 'internal 
politics.' 
 
"In addition, the Taiwan issue apparently has hardly been a priority 
for the Bush Administration in the last few months.  This is because 
the United States' strategic focus has been on issues such as Iran's 
nuclear weapons.  U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and U.S. 
National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley both think that they do not 
have time to process the U.S.-Taiwan arms sales and thereby upset 
Beijing. ... 
 
"In fact, the White House so far has not made any concrete response 
to Ma's letter to [U.S. President George W.] Bush care of former 
White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, who came to Taiwan and 
attended Ma's inauguration.  [The White House] even delayed Card's 
debriefing about his Taiwan trip.  How the Bush Administration 
values the Taiwan issue is pretty obvious here. 
 
"The Ma Administration's original attitude about the arms sale was 
that it was necessary to review the sale.  However, [the Ma 
Administration] was forced to adjust part of its way of speaking 
[regarding its attitude about the arms sales] after it was suspected 
of delaying the arms sales.  [The Ma Administration] also clarified 
to the United States at the middle and the end of June that it never 
meant to suspend arms procurement and would also carry out the 
project of investing in the military, whose budget has been passed 
by the Legislative Yuan.  At the same time, after noticing the issue 
of U.S.-Taiwan arms sales becoming grim, several U.S. think tanks 
which are friendly to Taiwan and the American Chamber of Commerce in 
Taipei (AmCham) have motivated senators to write President Bush a 
letter asking that [the administration] to send the notification of 
the arms sales to Congress for review and to complete the final 
legal procedure that is required before signing the 'Letter of Offer 
and Acceptance' (LOA). ... 
 
"This move obviously has added pressure to Bush's national security 
team.  As a result, Hadley telephoned [Taiwan's] National Security 
Council Secretary-General Su Chi at the end of June and expressed 
hope that the Taiwan administration would keep silent concerning the 
arms sales for fear of disturbing the Bush Administration's 
strategic planning and operations around the globe.  Theoretically, 
the Ma Administration should not make a big move concerning the arms 
sales in the short term. 
 
"Unless the United States has made concrete promises (such as 
proceeding on the execution of the arms sales after the Olympic 
Games), then the intentions and the actions of the policy-making 
 
team of Bush, Rice, and Hadley should be watched closely.  Moreover, 
it is possible to mobilize U.S. Congressmen and groups who are 
friendly to Taiwan to lobby [for Taiwan] proactively and put 
pressure [on the U.S. government] if necessary. ... 
 
"The United States, Taiwan, the Blue, and the Green should all be 
held responsible for the delay in the U.S.-Taiwan arms sales over 
the last seven years.  Now, it is time to try to bring the issue to 
a successful conclusion.  The arms sales of eight items (plus the 
procurement of the F-16 C/D fighter jets) are not only the Bush 
Administration's most concrete legacy in U.S.-Taiwan security 
cooperation but also the Ma Administration's trump in the short term 
while it is actively improving relations with the Chinese Communists 
as well as rebuilding mutual trust with the United States. 
Furthermore, the way of handling and the final result of the arms 
sales are also likely to cause great implication on how the next 
U.S. President views the United States' overall strategic relations 
with Taiwan.  The Ma Administration, which is focusing on 
cross-Strait relations now, must not be careless!" 
 
YOUNG