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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 001772 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/27/08 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Nuclear programs, abduction, and peace (Part 1): Time of trial 
for abduction-and-nuclear issue dual policy (Mainichi) 
 
(2) Dispatch of GSDF personnel to Sudan in August or later as 
command center personnel (Sankei) 
 
(3) Editorial: North Korea's nuclear declaration -- Insufficient 
report unacceptable (Sankei) 
 
(4) Editorial: U.S. government should reconsider decision to delist 
North Korea (Nikkei) 
 
(5) Editorial: North Korea's declaration must lead to complete 
nuclear abandonment (Asahi) 
 
(6) Defense exchange isolated (Sankei) 
 
(7) Editorial: IWC plenary meeting; moves underway for normalization 
of organization (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Nuclear programs, abduction, and peace (Part 1): Time of trial 
for abduction-and-nuclear issue dual policy 
 
MAINICHI (Pages 1 and 2) (Abridged slightly) 
June 27, 2008 
 
President George W. Bush in a press conference on June 26 announced 
that the United States would delist North Korea as a state sponsor 
of terrorism. The President also emphatically said: "The United 
States will never forget the abduction issue." 
 
The President detests tyrannies. He seemed so sympathetic to the 
abduction issue that the Japanese public had expected the United 
States would not delist the North unless there was progress on the 
abduction issue. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage 
once indicated that the abduction issue was a reason why the United 
States put North Korea on its terrorism blacklist. 
 
In reality, the U.S. government has not officially promised anything 
beyond "giving consideration." In April 2007, when then Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe visited the United States, Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice said to him clearly that resolving the abduction 
issue was not a condition for delisting North Korea. 
 
President Bush started to use the phrase, "We will not forget the 
abduction issue," from around that time. He used the same expression 
when Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda visited the United States in 
November 2007. That can be taken as a U.S. announcement that though 
it harbors sympathy, Washington's decision on whether to delist the 
North would not be affected by the prime minister's preference for 
pressure or dialogue in dealing with Pyongyang. 
 
The turning points were the January-February 2007 U.S.-DPRK Berlin 
talks that reached an agreement on resolving the nuclear issue and 
the six-party Beijing agreement on first-phase steps. This was 
immediately followed by a series of visits to Japan by high-ranking 
U.S. officials. While in Japan, they all asked the definition of 
progress on the abduction issue. People began to fear that the 
 
TOKYO 00001772  002 OF 010 
 
 
abduction issue might cause a split in the Japan-U.S. alliance. 
 
Former Prime Minister Abe once at the Diet defined progress as 
specific steps by North Korea for the resolution of the abduction 
issue. A Japan-DPRK normalization working group also began 
functioning under the six-party framework. Momentum was gathering 
even under the Abe administration to move the abduction issue 
forward in tandem with progress on the nuclear issue. 
 
Prime Minister Abe was replaced by Fukuda in September 2007. Fukuda 
soon made it clear that his administration would pursue the nuclear 
and abduction issues at the same time with the aim of resolving the 
abduction issue while he was office. The phrase "dialogue and 
pressure" has rarely been heard since. 
 
Japan-DPRK talks were held on June 11-12 and an agreement was 
reached for Pyongyang to reinvestigate the abduction issue and hand 
Japanese radicals who hijacked a Japan Airlines plane to North Korea 
in 1970 over to Tokyo and for Japan to partially lift its sanctions 
against the North. It is widely believed that behind this 
development, there was a nudge by Washington, which wants to proceed 
with the denuclearization of North Korea's nuclear disarmament. 
 
Although Prime Minister Fukuda has welcomed the series of 
developments, the North's declaration in not covering nuclear 
weapons, uranium enrichment, and other activities is clearly 
imperfect. Japan has lost the leverage of delisting the North, and 
the future of the implementation of the reinvestigation into the 
abduction issue remains unclear. 
 
There is a proverb that goes: "He who runs after two hares will 
catch neither." The Fukuda administration's North Korea policy is 
facing a testing time. 
 
On the night of June 13 at a Cabinet Office conference room, Foreign 
Ministry Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Director-General Akitaka 
Saiki briefed abductees' families on the Japan-DPRK talks held in 
Beijing. In the session, Saiki said, "I did my very best, but I am 
ready to take any criticism." His explanation lasted an hour and 40 
minutes. 
 
Some of the family members who were assembled together after 
receiving fax messages from the government the day before were 
hopeful that surviving abductees would be able to return to Japan. 
Family members fiercely criticized Pyongyang's plan to reinvestigate 
the abduction issue and Tokyo's plan to partially lift its 
sanctions. The abduction issue was reinvestigated in 2004 after the 
second Japan-North Korea summit, and Pyongyang did not change its 
previous claim that eight abductees had died. 
 
Family members had high hopes for Saiki, who headed the government's 
investigation team that visited North Korea immediately after the 
first Japan-North Korea summit that took place in September 2002. 
His expression was stony throughout the meeting with the family 
members. 
 
The Association of the Families of Victims of Kidnapped by North 
Korea (AFVKN), which regards abductions as an ongoing act of 
terrorism, has been waiting for the Untied States to identify 
"abduction" as a ground for keeping North Korea as its terrorism 
blacklist. Since its then representative Shigeru Yokota, 75, first 
visited the United States in February 2001, AFVKN members have often 
 
TOKYO 00001772  003 OF 010 
 
 
visited Washington to lobby U.S. officials. 
 
In the spring of 2004, the abduction issue made the State 
Department's Annual Country Report on Terrorism. The AFVKN took this 
as Washington having recognized abductions an act of terrorism. In 
April 2006, Sakie Yokota, 72, visited the United States and met with 
President Bush in person. The AFVKN was convinced that unwavering 
ties were established with the United States. 
 
North Korea conducted a nuclear test six months later, in October 
2006, promoting Washington to put high priority on Pyongyang's 
nuclear programs. AFVKN members visited the United States last fall 
and this spring to lobby against delisting the North in vain. 
 
At a regular AFVKN meeting in Minato Ward, Tokyo, on the night of 
June 25, Sakie Yokota bitterly criticized the government's decision 
to ease sanctions against the North. 
 
Her daughter Megumi Yokota, who was abducted at the age of 13, 
scratched so desperately at an iron door during the boat ride to the 
North that she lost all her fingernails, according to a former North 
Korean agent. 
 
What Sakie fears the most is the reopening of Japanese ports for the 
North Korean cargo-passenger ship Mangyongbong-92. The ship is used 
for Korean residents in Japan to visit their kin back in North 
Korea. It has also become clear through police investigations that 
the Mangyongbong has been used for activities by North Korean 
agents. Abductees' families, including Sakie, have been conducting a 
dive to keep the vessel out of Japanese ports. The government has 
imposed a ban on the ship's entry into Japan in the wake of the 
North's missile launches in July 2006. But based on the recent 
bilateral agreement, the vessel will be allowed to enter Japanese 
ports strictly for transporting humanitarian supplies. 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura met on June 17 with 
family members with a letter opposing the government's decision to 
partially lift the sanctions. The government's spokesman said to 
them: "The reinvestigation must be based on the repatriation of 
(abductees). We are now at the stage of word for word, so we will 
not lift sanctions immediately." Representative Shigeo Iizuka, 70, 
did not conceal his mistrust in the government which keeps pace with 
the United States. The blog of Teruaki Masumoto, 52, the 
organization's secretary general, reads: "The United States has 
completely betrayed us. The Japanese government, too, has abandoned 
the victims of kidnapped by North Korea." 
 
On the night of June 26, Machimura discussed (the delisting of North 
Korea) with Stephen Hadley, assistant to the President for national 
security affairs. In the conversation, Machimura had to make a 
request to the U.S. government, saying: "The Japanese public is 
shocked (by the delisting), although it is a predetermined step. We 
would like to see the U.S. government handle the matter carefully." 
 
(2) Dispatch of GSDF personnel to Sudan in August or later as 
command center personnel 
 
SANKEI (Page 5) (Full) 
June 27, 2008 
 
The government on June 26 decided to dispatch several Ground 
Self-Defense members to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which is 
 
TOKYO 00001772  004 OF 010 
 
 
operating in southern Sudan, as central command personnel. It will 
undergo coordination with the UN with the aim of dispatching them in 
August or later. 
 
This will be the first dispatch of SDF personnel to Africa since 
1993-1995, when they were sent to join UN operations in Mozambique 
(ONUMOZ). The government's aim is to play up Japan's international 
contributions in the run-up to the G-8 in July, where Africa 
assistance will top the agenda. 
 
SDF personnel will be dispatched to the UNMIS command center located 
in al-Khartum, the capital of Sudan. They will be serving as liaison 
and coordination officers dealing with troops taking part in 
peace-keeping operations (PKO) there. The government yesterday held 
a meeting of Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura, Foreign 
Minister Masahiko Koumura and Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba. 
However, coordination has been still underway as no agreement was 
reached at that meeting over the posts they will assume. 
 
Regarding the dispatch of SDF personnel to Sudan, the government has 
considered dispatching GSDF personnel for the reconstruction of 
roads and the removal of land mines. However, only command center 
personnel will be dispatched at least for the present. The 
government is also looking into dispatching SDF personnel to PKO 
centers in Ghana, Kenya and Egypt for the first time as 
instructors. 
 
(3) Editorial: North Korea's nuclear declaration -- Insufficient 
report unacceptable 
 
SANKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 27, 2008 
 
In the wake of North Korea handing over a declaration of its nuclear 
programs, U.S. President George W. Bush has notified Congress of his 
decision to delist Pyongyang as a state sponsor of terrorism. 
 
It is extremely regrettable that Pyongyang's declaration has 
excluded or forgone a list of its actual nuclear weapons, which is 
especially vital for Japan, even though it had been expected in the 
report. 
 
We have to wonder how effectively and completely verification can be 
done in the 45 days before delisting goes into effect. 
 
If North Korea is removed from the U.S. blacklist, it will be able 
to get international economic support. "No economic assistance to 
North Korea before resolution of the abduction issue" has become 
common public opinion of Japan. Therefore, the U.S. government's 
decision this time around may put the brakes on resolving the 
abduction issue, and it may also harm Japan's national interests. 
However, delisting has not yet been finalized. It is time for Japan 
to devote all its energies to prevent Japan from being left in the 
lurch. 
 
The declaration stipulates the amount of extracted plutonium, the 
reactor records, among other matters. A separate report should have 
itemized nuclear weapons that use highly-enriched uranium and 
indicate Pyongyang's cooperation to Syria's nuclear development. 
But the United States appears to have given in to North Korea's 
assertions. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001772  005 OF 010 
 
 
Pyongyang has put off providing a list of its nuclear weapons to a 
later phase of the complex negotiations. 
 
The declaration this time around was made based on the joint 
statement by the Six Parties in September 2005. The joint statement 
stipulated that the DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons 
and existing nuclear programs. Therefore, it is evident that the 
declaration is a major backsliding. 
 
The United States put North Korea on its list of state sponsors of 
terrorism in 1988 after its agents were found to have bombed a South 
Korean airliner the previous year. In order to remove a country from 
the list, the two points must be proved: 1) the country has not 
supported any terrorists for the past six months; and 2) the country 
is committed to not supporting terrorism in the future. 
 
What should be forgotten was that the U.S. government has clarified 
that it would add the issue of abductions to the conditions for its 
designation as terrorist-sponsoring state. This is the remark made 
by then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage after then Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi had visited Pyongyang. The issue of 
Japanese abduction of nationals by North Korea agents was first 
stipulated in the annual report on global terrorism in 2004. The 
phrase that the abduction issue is not resolved should be written 
into the annual report. 
 
We wonder how much the Japanese government made efforts to share 
such a view with the governments of the United States and other 
countries. In order for the U.S. Congress to reverse the Bush 
administration's decision to delist the North, new legislation is 
necessary. We want the Foreign Ministry and Diet members from the 
ruling and opposition forces to do their best to bring about a 
rollback by taking advantage of their channels to the U.S. 
Congress. 
 
(4) Editorial: U.S. government should reconsider decision to delist 
North Korea 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 27, 2008 
 
Following North Korea's submission of a declaration of its nuclear 
development programs, the U.S. government notified Congress of its 
decision to delist the North as a state sponsor of terrorism. The 
U.S. came up with the decision in disregard of Foreign Ministry's 
Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Director General Akitaka Saiki's 
warning that a delisting decision may negatively affect the 
reliability of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Things are going as North 
Korea intended. The foundation of the Japan-U.S. alliance could be 
undermined under the current serious situation. 
 
During the 45-day delisting process, if North Korea presents 
measures to verify the contents of its report effectively and if 
progress is made toward settlement of the issue of Japanese 
nationals abducted by North Korean agents, the situation will turn 
around. Otherwise, the Bush administration should retract the 
delisting decision. 
 
The delisting plan contains a number of problems. First, the deal 
between the U.S. and North Korea might make it more difficult to 
move negotiations on North Korea's denuclearization forward since it 
lacks rationality and balance. 
 
TOKYO 00001772  006 OF 010 
 
 
 
North Korea's declaration is not linked to the U.S. removal of North 
Korea from its blacklist under U.S. domestic law. Moreover, North 
Korea had promised in an agreement reached in the six-party talks 
last October to produce a complete and accurate declaration of its 
nuclear programs and activities by the end of last year. The 
declaration came out six months later. 
 
An extravagant reward is given to a student for the homework the 
student turned in six months later. The spoiled student will 
continue to get around doing homework. According to this logic, it 
will become less hopeful for North Korea to denuclearize itself. 
 
Second, the nuclear report, though taken as a one step forward for 
form's sake, contains no information concerning the nuclear weapons 
Pyongyang has produced. Further, the report sets out no principle on 
how to verify its contents. A state of closed nature, like North 
Korea, can deport investigators from the nation at any time, as the 
North did in the past. As long as North Korea remains closed, the 
effective verification of the report will be difficult. 
 
Third, it is an open question that North Korea is no longer a state 
sponsor of terrorism. The terrorist attacks on the U.S. on Sept. 11 
in 2001 and North Korea's abductions of Japanese citizens are both 
challenges to the civilized world. North Korea has yet to launch the 
reinvestigation of the Japanese abductees based on its pledge to 
Japan. The perpetrators of the abductions, who can even be called 
state terrorists, are still in the hands of North Korean 
authorities. 
 
Fourth, the delisting policy of the U.S. will deal a serious blow to 
the Japan-U.S. alliance. The Bush administration is strict with Iran 
but is not so with North Korea. The delisting decision exposed that 
Japan and the U.S. have different senses of menace toward North 
Korea. 
 
Sharing the same sense of menace should be a premise for the 
alliance. If Japan and the U.S. do not have common sense, their 
security treaty would be just a scrap of paper. 
 
A U.S. informed source said that the feeling or sense of U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill has not changed from 
that when he was serving as U.S. ambassador to South Korea in the 
days of the administration led by President Roh Moo Hyun. If Prime 
Minister Yasuo Fukuda turns a blind eye to the cracks that are 
appearing between Japan and the U.S. and officially falls in step 
with the U.S. policy of reconciliation toward North Korea, Japan's 
cornerstone supporting the alliance would be undermined. 
 
North Korea is apparently taking into account the Bush 
administration's term of office drawing closer. We want to ask 
President Bush if he would like to go down in history as the 
president who made a decision that caused the U.S. to lose its most 
important alliance in the Pacific region. 
 
(5) Editorial: North Korea's declaration must lead to complete 
nuclear abandonment 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
June 27, 2008 
 
At long last, North Korea came up with a declaration of its nuclear 
 
TOKYO 00001772  007 OF 010 
 
 
programs. Its details have yet to be unveiled. This declaration, 
however, is an important step in line with an agreement reached at 
the six-party talks for North Korea's nuclear abandonment. 
 
Last year's six-party agreement anticipates three phases. The first 
phase is to freeze and seal North Korea's nuclear-related 
facilities. The second phase is to disable these facilities so they 
cannot be used and is to declare all nuclear programs. The third 
phase is to complete North Korea's nuclear abandonment. 
 
So far, the first phase is over. North Korea is currently in the 
process of disabling its nuclear-related facilities. The declaration 
is the last thing of what North Korea should do in the second phase. 
North Korea was to have come up with its nuclear declaration by the 
end of last year. However, it was six months overdue due to its 
protracted talks with the United States. 
 
In return, the United States is now in the process of delisting 
North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. 
 
We would like to welcome the resumed process of translating the 
six-party agreement into action. However, we cannot say we totally 
welcome it. 
 
First of all, North Korea has yet to disable all of its nuclear 
facilities. North Korea will reportedly invite the six-party 
members' news media to see North Korea demolish one of its nuclear 
facilities today. This is probably aimed at visual effects. However, 
North Korea should disable its nuclear facilities through such 
substantive measures as removing spent nuclear fuel from the 
reactor. 
 
Second, we wonder if the submitted declaration really clarifies 
North Korea's nuclear development in its entirety. It reportedly is 
a far cry from being a "complete and correct declaration." 
 
That is because the declaration is said to contain no core 
information, such as how many nuclear weapons North Korea has and 
where they are stored. North Korea is said to have only declared its 
nuclear development using plutonium and reportedly does not touch on 
its uranium enrichment. It looks like the declaration fails to 
account for its suspected proliferation of nuclear-related 
technologies to Syria. 
 
All these doubts must not be left vague. 
 
Even so, the declaration itself should be viewed as progress. It 
will not ease North Korea's nuclear threat. However, North Korea 
will be disabled at least from making raw materials for nuclear 
weapons. 
 
More importantly, the third phase-which is for North Korea's 
abandonment of its nuclear programs-is finally in sight. 
 
What should be done from now is clear. The six-party talks should 
resume at once and decide on how to verify North Korea's 
declaration. North Korea should sincerely respond to on-the-spot 
inspections and hearings from its engineers. After that, we want the 
six-party talks to work out specific procedures for the third 
phase. 
 
We probably cannot say U.S. President Bush, whose term is to run out 
 
TOKYO 00001772  008 OF 010 
 
 
shortly, is not impatient. If the declaration is found false, the 
United States could bring back the process. Bush stressed in his 
press remarks that he will not forget the abduction issue. 
 
For the sake of Japan's national security, we must prod North Korea 
to abandon its nuclear development. In that process, we should pave 
the way to resolve the abduction issue or tragic crime. We should 
make headway without losing sight of this starting point. 
 
(6) Defense exchange isolated 
 
SANKEI (Page 6) (Abridged) 
June 26, 2008 
 
Toshu Noguchi 
 
ZHANJIANG, Guangdong, China-The Maritime Self-Defense Force 
destroyer Sazanami, now visiting China for the first time, went 
through main exchange events yesterday. China apparently tried to 
make an appeal to the international community on its stance of 
disclosing information, with the exchange this time as a symbol of 
confidence building between Japan and China in the military area. 
With an eye on anti-Japanese sentiment, the MSDF ship's visit to 
China was isolated from the Chinese public. This gives the 
impression that it is difficult to build confidence. 
 
The Sazanami had about 100 visitors from the naval forces of the 
Chinese People's Liberation Army yesterday. On the deck, they were 
taking pictures and listening to an MSDF officer's briefing on the 
Sazanami's hardware. I asked them about historical issues that lie 
between Japan and China, and I also tried to ask them about the 
issue of marine interests in the East China Sea. "Please ask our 
officer," one of them said. 
 
China stressed that the "military exchange" is based on the Japanese 
and Chinese leaders' common understanding" (in the words of China's 
South Sea Fleet Commander Su Shiliang). In November last year, the 
South Sea Fleet's missile destroyer Shenzhen made its first port 
call in Japan. This time around, an MSDF ship visited China. Japan 
and China are now set to go on with bilateral exchanges in the most 
delayed area of military affairs. "Looking back on history," one of 
the Sazanami's crew said, "it wouldn't be so easy to build a 
relationship of mutual trust in a real sense." This is also true, 
however. 
 
In Zhanjiang, China was wary of 'anti-Japanese' moves. The Sazanami 
remained berthed at the naval base, where the South Sea Fleet is 
headquartered. An MSDF band's downtown performance was canceled, and 
a joint concert planned to be held in the city was suddenly 
rescheduled to take place on base. 
 
Such measures were taken for "security reasons." Public security 
authorities were guarded against anti-Japanese demonstrations. 
Anyone suspicious was barred from the gate to the base. On the 
Internet were write-ins for demonstrations against the Sazanami's 
port call. 
 
There were no citizens at the base ceremony upon the Sazanami's 
arrival. The Sazanami's crew felt a welcome mood. In their eyes, 
however, the scene there looked somewhat bare. The Sazanami will be 
opened to the public on June 27. This event, however, is reportedly 
for only those permitted by Chinese authorities. 
 
TOKYO 00001772  009 OF 010 
 
 
 
The Chinese media is friendly toward the Sazanami's visit, but their 
coverage of the MSDF ship's port call is not so prominent. Local 
residents voiced their mixed feelings. "History is history," a 
taxicab driver said. "It's important to promote exchange and 
friendship," he added. "A naval ship flying the Japanese flag is 
here," a restaurant manager said, "so I can't help but imagine the 
history of aggression." 
 
Japan and China have somehow started their defense exchanges. 
However, one of those concerned voiced misgivings: "It's also 
important to promote open exchanges like visiting each other's 
ships. However, I wonder if we can understand each other without 
exchanging views or holding discussions, including sensitive issues. 
The slogan of exchanges may take on a life of its own, and I fear 
that China may only use this exchange for their image strategy to 
make an appeal on what they call 'transparency.'" 
 
(7) Editorial: IWC plenary meeting; moves underway for normalization 
of organization 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 5) (Full) 
June 27, 2008 
 
The International Whaling Commission (IWC) at its 60th plenary 
meeting, now underway in Santiago, Chile, has decided to set up a 
working group joined by major member nations. Both whaling and 
antiwhaling countries need to seriously make efforts to normalize 
the organization. 
 
It has been more than 20 years since Japan withdrew from commercial 
whaling in late 1982, when the IWC imposed a 10-year moratorium on 
such at a plenary meeting. The outcome of the Santiago meeting has 
paved the way to put an end to an annual verbal battle between 
whaling and antiwhaling countries seen at IWC meetings. 
 
The IWC at its Santiago plenary meeting, which has started this 
week, agreed to establish a working group tasked with dealing with 
the future of the organization and key issues. 
 
The membership of the IWC is now 81, of which 24 major countries 
will join the envisaged working group -- 10 countries, such as 
Japan, China, South Korea, Norway, Iceland, etc., from the whaling 
countries' side, and 14 countries, including the U.S., Britain, 
Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Argentine, etc., from the 
antiwhaling countries' side. 
 
Main items the envisaged working group will take up include the 
resumption of small-scale coastal whaling, as sought strongly by 
Japan, and the completion of the revised management scheme (RMS) for 
the proper control of cetacean resources. Antiwhaling countries will 
bring up a total of 33 items, including the expansion of sanctuaries 
and the way Japan's whaling should be. 
 
The IWC says that the working group will aim at submitting a package 
of agreed proposals at the plenary meeting in Madeira, Portugal, 
following a first meeting this fall and a series of discussion 
sessions to be held with the IWC's interim meeting next March in 
between. 
 
In view of the fierce conflict in the past, the agreement reached 
this time is groundbreaking. It is praiseworthy that participants 
 
TOKYO 00001772  010 OF 010 
 
 
vowed to find common ground through talks for the normalization of 
the stalemated organization. 
 
Japan, which has been calling for long-term whaling, once hinted at 
its intention to walk out of the IWC, after the Anchorage plenary 
session last year. It cast a ballot in favor of aboriginal 
subsistence whaling in the U.S. and Denmark.  However, its proposal 
for resuming coastal whaling was voted down by antiwhaling 
countries. 
 
The IWC is an international agency established in 1948, based on the 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. Its 
objective is to preserve cetacean resources and develop the whaling 
industry in an orderly manner. Member nations are obligated to 
restore the original form of whaling. 
 
However, the future of whaling is far from reassuring. The key is to 
what extent whaling and antiwhaling countries will make concessions. 
Antiwhaling countries will probably seek the curtailment of or 
withdrawal from research whaling in the Southern Ocean, if Japan 
focuses on the resumption of coastal whaling. The barrier to the 
resumption of commercial whaling is even higher. Revising key items 
requires approval by a two-thirds majority or more at a plenary 
meeting. Making decisions from a broad perspective is 
indispensable. 
 
SCHIEFFER