VZCZCXRO2627
OO RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1748/01 1770927
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 250927Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5393
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4099
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2685
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0139
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0307
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2394
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 1197
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0094
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0663
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 8579
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0955
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 2308
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 9164
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3357
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1263
RHMFISS/USFJ  PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0506
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 001748 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOD FOR OSD/APSA BASALLA 
JOINT STAFF FOR J5 WEIR/KOSINSKI 
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5 
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2023 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS PGOV JA NATO
SUBJECT: OSLO CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS WILL NOT 
PREVENT U.S.-JAPAN MILITARY OPERATIONS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 66793 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joseph Donovan. Reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Japan believes the Oslo Convention on Cluster 
Munitions (CM) will not interfere with United States Forces 
in Japan's (USFJ) operations or restrict interoperability 
with Japan's Self Defense Forces (JSDF), Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Deputy Director General Shimbo told the Embassy's 
Political Minister Counselor and USFJ representatives.  Tokyo 
interprets Article 21 as allowing continued military 
cooperation and operations involving CM.  Examples include 
transportation of U.S.-owned CM by JSDF or Japanese civilian 
personnel, increased stockpiling of CM at U.S. military 
facilities and civilian ports during contingencies.  DDG 
Shimbo warned, however, that if the United Kingdom asks the 
United States to remove its CM from UK territory there would 
be tremendous domestic pressure for Japan to do the same. 
Japan expects to sign the convention in December, barring a 
positive outcome of the Conventional on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (CCW), which Japan sees as the only way to restrict 
China's and Russia's CM activities.  Legislation implementing 
the Oslo Convention could be sent to the Diet as early as the 
next regular session opening in January 2009.  In the 
meantime, the Ministry of Defense and JSDF will consider how 
to get rid of Japan's CM stockpiles while preventing gaps in 
defense capabilities.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Oslo No Affect on U.S.-Japan Operations 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) The Oslo Convention text agreed to at Dublin will not 
interfere with USFJ's operations or restrict interoperability 
between U.S. military and Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF), 
MOFA Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department 
Deputy Director-General Masatoshi Shimbo told Embassy 
Political Minister Counselor and USFJ representatives during 
a briefing on the May Dublin conference.  Japan decided to 
join the consensus approving the text after much discussion 
at Dublin on definitions and insertion of language allowing 
military cooperation and operations with non-State parties. 
By joining the consensus, Japan is also being consistent with 
its policy to take seriously the humanitarian concerns caused 
by CM.  DDG Shimbo said Japan will be taking security issues 
into account as it considers concrete steps toward signing 
and ratifying the Convention 
 
------------------------------ 
Article 21 Permits Cooperation 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) DDG Shimbo said the critical part of the Convention is 
Article 21 paragraph 3, which Japan interprets as enabling 
the United States and Japan to continue to engage in military 
cooperation and conduct operations that involve U.S.-owned 
CM.  This includes but is not limited to: 
 
-- Transportation and storage of U.S.-owned CM by Japan Self 
Defense Forces or Japanese civilian personnel. 
 
-- Movement of additional CM into U.S. military facilities 
and JSDF bases; 
 
-- Stockpiling and handling of CM at civilian ports during 
contingencies. 
 
------------------- 
Treaty Text Defined 
------------------- 
 
¶4. (S) DDG Shimbo explained how Japan is interpreting or 
otherwise working around language in the convention that 
could be problematic to U.S. operations in Japan. 
 
-- Article 1 paragraph 1(b) ""retain"": Although Japan was 
unable to get the word ""retain"" removed or changed, the 
Japanese delegation at the Dublin meeting stated during an 
intervention that Japan considers ""retain"" to include 
ownership and property rights.  Therefore, Japanese civilian 
and Self Defense Forces personnel can transport CM in Japan 
as long as they do not take legal ownership of the CM. 
Shimbo noted the intervention had been verbal and was not 
reflected in any written or official understanding that came 
out of the Dublin conference.  If challenged on this point 
during Diet deliberations, however, Shimbo said that the 
Japanese government would most likely reiterate this stance 
for the record. 
 
-- Article 2 paragraph 8 definition of ""transfer"": The 
Government of Japan defines ""transfer"" to include physical 
movement into or from Japan and/and the signing over of title 
to and shifting of control of CM, i.e. ""transfer"" only occurs 
when all criteria are met.  Hence, the United States can move 
CM into and out of Japan, and within Japan, as long Japanese 
entities or personnel are not taking title to the CM.  (Note: 
MOFA officials said NATO allies, with the possible exception 
of Norway, are interpreting Article 2 paragraph 8 in the same 
way.  NGOs assert that either/either physical transfer or 
change in title.) 
 
----------------------- 
UK Request to Remove CM 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) DDG Shimbo said he had heard that the United Kingdom 
may ask the United States to remove CM banned by the Oslo 
Convention from its territory.  If this occurs, there will be 
tremendous pressure for Japan to follow in the UK's 
footsteps, DDG Shimbo warned.  He asked to be kept apprised 
of any developments in U.S.-UK dialogue on the matter. 
 
--------------------- 
Steps to Ratification 
--------------------- 
 
¶6. (S) Barring an alternative coming out of the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), DDG Shimbo said, Japan 
will sign the Oslo Convention in December.  The government 
would then draft implementing legislation to be presented 
along with the Convention to the Diet.  The earliest this 
would occur would be during the next regular session from 
January to June 2009.  DDG Shimbo reiterated that MOFA and 
MOD are confident that they can defend Article 21 in the 
Diet, as they will point to official statements and verbal 
interventions made at the Dublin meeting to show consistency 
on positions and definitions. 
 
------------------------- 
Japan's Cluster Munitions 
------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) MOD Japan-US Defense Cooperation Division Deputy 
Director Eisuke Tanabe stated that Defense Minister Ishiba's 
top priority is to avoid a defense capability gap.  One 
option would be to not sign the Oslo Convention or postpone 
ratification, but this is unlikely given that Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Machimura has publicly stated Japan will ""take a 
step forward"" on this issue.  The Self Defense Forces are 
studying how to deal with the anticipated obligation, and the 
associated costs, to remove CM from the SDF arsenal without 
creating a capabilities gap. 
 
-------------- 
Capability Gap 
-------------- 
 
¶8. (S) Tanabe said the SDF will seek to fill any gap in 
U.S.-Japan defense capabilities created by the Oslo Accord 
and would not look to shift this burden to USFJ.  Shimbo said 
JSDF faced a key question regarding whether to purchase new, 
non-cluster-type ammunition for the multiple launch rocket 
system (MLRS).  Asked to confirm media reports indicating the 
Oslo Convention would require the JSDF to eliminate all of 
their MLRS launchers, Tanabe replied that all options are on 
the table.  Accordingly, the Defense Minister directed MOD to 
look at all options that would minimize capabilities gaps 
between U.S. forces and the JSDF.  MOD could not provide a 
recapitalization timeline or schedule. 
 
¶9. (S) USFJ representatives asked Tanabe to consider the 
affect the reduction in JSDF's capabilities might have on 
Japan's ability to play a greater role in security affairs 
worldwide.  The U.S. side noted elimination of JSDF MLRS 
launchers, in conjunction with Tokyo's decision to cancel the 
AH-1 Apache program, might reduce the Ground Self-Defense 
Force's ability to engage at long distances, and make 
interoperability with first-tier militaries more difficult. 
Such moves also contribute to the capabilities gap between 
the two forces.  Following the meeting, Tanabe observed that 
MOD would not require a bilateral working group to address 
future interoperability issues. 
 
---------------- 
Next Step - CCW 
---------------- 
 
¶10. (S) DDG Shimbo said Japan would send a delegation to the 
July CCW meeting, noting that Prime Minister Fukuda is 
committed to contributing to the CCW process.  Japan 
recognizes that all of the major CM producers, particularly 
neighbors China and Russia, are part of the CCW.  With 
Japan's use of CM limited by the Oslo Convention, it is now 
even more in Japan's interest for there to be stricter 
controls on CM possession and use in the region.  The CCW is 
the only venue to make this happen, as well as to effectively 
balance humanitarian concerns and military utility of CM. 
DDG Shimbo asked if there are any changes in U.S. positions 
in the CCW.  Embassy Political Minister Counselor drew on 
points in reftel to express appreciation for Japan's efforts 
at Dublin to maintain interoperability between our forces. 
The United States will continue to support and play an active 
role in negotiations on CM within the CCW framework, 
PolMinCouns told DDG Shimbo. 
SCHIEFFER