VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #1657/01 1690903
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 170903Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5147
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0598
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/USFJ
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1257

S E C R E T TOKYO 001657 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
NSC FOR WILDER/KATZ; OSD/APSA FOR 
SHINN/SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA; USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5; PACOM FOR 
J00/J01/J5; JOINT STAFF FOR J5 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2018 
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV IZ AF JA
SUBJECT: SHAPING JAPAN'S AFGHAN DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS 
 
REF: A. TOKYO 1464 
     ¶B. TOKYO 1593 
     ¶C. SECDEF DTG 031932Z JUN 08 
     ¶D. TOKYO 1623 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Japanese government is struggling to 
find a strategy to terminate its C-130 mission to Iraq and 
start a new deployment to Afghanistan to ""off-set"" its 
decision to opt-out of the Iraq coalition.  The U.S. 
political calendar appears to weigh heavily on Japanese 
deliberations -- the GOJ is expressing a desire to end its 
Iraq deployments by the end of the Bush Administration so 
that it can get credit for a new Afghan mission from the 
incoming U.S. administration.  Domestic political turmoil and 
disunity within the Fukuda Cabinet, however, are hampering 
efforts to formulate a coherent operational and legislative 
strategy or manage U.S. expectations.  Japan will continue 
discussions after its survey team returns from Afghanistan on 
June 18 with an eye towards making a Cabinet-level decision 
by the end of the month.  The G-8 Summit in Hokkaido likely 
increases the pressure on Japan to make a more robust Afghan 
contribution.  End Summary. 
 
Mixed Messages 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (S/NF) During June 16-17 meetings in Tokyo, ASD for Asia 
and Pacific Security Affairs Shinn received a range of views 
on Japan's thinking regarding a possible new Afghan 
Self-Defense Force (SDF) dispatch.  Deputy Vice Foreign 
Minister Chikao Kawai talked about the logic of moving up the 
termination of Japan's Iraqi operations and making a new 
contribution to Afghanistan (Refs A/B).  Kawai underscored 
the importance of the American political calendar, noting 
that Japan would prefer to close out the Iraq mission before 
the next U.S. administration takes office in January. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Kawai asserted that there have been no formal 
discussions over which of the three main operations currently 
being studied by the survey team in Afghanistan -- C-130 
logistical flights; Japanese participation in a PRT; and 
dispatch of CH-47s -- Japan might pursue.  Nevertheless, ASD 
Shinn was treated to a variety of often conflicting opinions 
on specific missions, even from within the same agency. 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) Vice Minister Kohei Masuda, for 
example, listed the CH-47 dispatch as the ""most possible"" of 
the three options.  MOD Defense Policy Bureau DG Nobushige 
Takamizawa dismissed such positive signals on the CH-47s from 
Masuda and Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba (Refs C/D), 
suggesting that the two MOD leaders ""had their heads in the 
clouds.""  Takamizawa urged the U.S. government to forget 
about the CH-47s and ""concentrate instead on realistic 
missions such as fixed wing aircraft and PRTs."" 
 
¶4. (S/NF) Joint Staff Office (JSO) Chairman Admiral Takashi 
Saito told USFJ Commander Lt. Gen. Rice on June 12 that a 
CH-47 dispatch is extremely difficult for a number of 
operational, legal, and political reasons.  Lt. Gen. Rice 
responded that Minister Ishiba's message to the Secretary of 
Defense on the CH-47 mission had raised expectations at the 
highest levels of the U.S. government.  MOFA Foreign Policy 
Bureau DDG Kazuyoshi Umemoto suggested that Japan has, in 
fact, altered its approach on the CH-47s based on Ishiba's 
meeting in Singapore.  The government had been officially 
""negative"" on the CH-47s before Ishiba's ""positive"" signal to 
Secretary Gates, Umemoto commented, but ""now the government 
is 'neutral'"" towards the option. 
 
Cabinet Disunity 
---------------- 
 
¶5. (S/NF) There appear to be more fundamental differences 
among key Cabinet Ministers over whether any type of new 
mission is viable.  Taku Yamasaki, head of the Liberal 
Democratic Party's (LDP) Project Team on Self-Defense Force 
(SDF) legislation, told ASD Shinn that Prime Minister Yasuo 
Fukuda and his Chief Cabinet Secretary, Nobutaka Machimura, 
have held different views on Afghan strategy.  It is 
Machimura, he added, who had been driving the government's 
policy to date, including the dispatch of the survey team to 
the region.  PM Fukuda, he assessed, has been much less 
enthusiastic about taking on any new operation.  Yamasaki 
said that Machimura seems to be stepping back from his 
previous stance in light of the political challenges. 
Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Kyoji Yanagisawa suggested 
the same, telling ASD Shinn that Machimura has decided that 
it is too hard politically to do anything more than extend 
the current operation.  Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura 
told the Ambassador that he, too, is deeply pessimistic about 
prospects for securing legislative authority for a major new 
operation in the current fragile political environment. 
 
Political Dynamics 
------------------ 
 
¶6. (S/NF) Other officials and politicians take a more 
optimistic view on Diet prospects.  MOFA's Umemoto said that 
if Japan were to package a new Afghan deployment with a 
decision to terminate the unpopular Iraq mission, the 
government could solicit support from the normally 
recalcitrant opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).  DPJ 
Vice President Katsuya Okada voiced a similar view, stating 
that ""the public would be much more willing to support a new 
Afghan deployment if it was coupled with a pullout from 
Iraq.""  Okada suggested that the U.S. leverage the Afghan 
government and NATO partners in both the lead-up to the G-8 
Summit in July and in the public arena to demonstrate the 
importance of Japan's participation in ground operations in 
Afghanistan.  Afghan Ambassador to Tokyo Haron Amin, echoing 
an offer to ASD Shinn in Paris from Afghan National Security 
Advisor Zalmai Rassoul in Paris, said that he is prepared to 
spearhead public efforts to secure a new Japanese deployment 
on the ground. 
 
Tight Timelines 
--------------- 
 
¶7. (S/NF) Japanese officials acknowledge that time is running 
short to bridge internal divisions over a possible new Afghan 
operation.  The survey team is scheduled to brief the Cabinet 
Office and Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense 
immediately after their return on June 18.  ACCS Yanagisawa 
told ASD Shinn that the three Ministers will meet during the 
week of June 23 to agree on a recommendation for the Prime 
Minister.  Due to tight diplomatic and political calendars, 
the government will have to decide quickly on what type of 
operation to pursue and how to go about securing Diet 
approval for it.  MOD's Takamizawa asserted that a U.S. 
decision to send experts to Tokyo to follow-up on the survey 
team visit ""should depend on whether the issue will be on the 
agenda"" for the G-8 in early July.  The LDP's Yamasaki noted 
that the Fukuda government will need to set a policy 
direction soon in order to allow time to draft legislation to 
either enable the extension of the current Indian Ocean 
refueling operation or authorize a new mission in 
Afghanistan.  The government is seeking to start an 
extraordinary Diet session in late August so that the Lower 
House can override an expected opposition veto of new 
legislation in the Upper House before the refueling operation 
expires in January.  The opposition can delay an override 
vote for up to 60 days. 
 
Substance over Form 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (S/NF) During his meetings, ASD Shinn emphasized that a 
token contribution in Afghanistan will not be helpful or 
appreciated by the international community.  Afghanistan is 
truly a coalition effort and a symbolic presence like Japan 
maintains in Iraq would be considered counterproductive. 
Sending a dozen people to a PRT or a handful of C-130s will 
fall far short of the bar for being operationally 
significant.  The Ambassador suggested to DVFM Kawai that in 
the U.S. domestic political context, public patience is 
wearing thin over the unwillingness of U.S. allies to make 
substantive contributions to achieve common objectives.  ASD 
Shinn expressed appreciation for Defense Minister Ishiba's 
commitment to consider seriously the dispatch of CH-47s.  In 
addition to this critical requirement, he urged Japan to take 
charge of a full PRT, including providing force protection, 
as well as to look at sending ""significant"" fixed-wing 
elements to assist with logistics and surveillance. 
 
Comment: Managing the Clock 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9. (S/NF) Interval disarray and political bickering are 
hampering the GOJ's ability to articulate a coherent strategy 
on a new contribution to Afghanistan.  At the same time, the 
Japanese are becoming incresaingly concerned about having a 
""successful"" summit as a result of diverging views with the 
U.S. on other issues like climate change.  The chance for 
getting Japan to make a substantial rather than symbolic 
contribution to Afghanistan will be greatest in the lead up 
to the G-8.  If the Secretary and the President could make 
such a request in their respective bilats with Japan, they 
may get results.  Otherwise, we judge it will be very hard to 
get the Japanese to move in any substantial way. 
SCHIEFFER