VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #1556 1610031
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 090031Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4863

UNCLAS TOKYO 001556 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP TRGY PREL PARM IR MNUC AORC IAEA UNSC JA
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: JAPAN'S RESPONSE TO CRITICAL 
EQUIPMENT NEEDS FOR IRAN'S NEW IR-2 CENTRIFUGE DESIGN 
 
REF: STATE 52030 
 
¶1.  (U) Please see action requests in paragraphs 3 and 4. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) ESToff delivered non-paper and photos in ref to 
METI Security Export Control Policy Division Deputy Director 
Atsushi Tanizawa and Deputy Director Yukio Yoshihiro May 29. 
Tanizawa said Japan is complying with UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1737 and 1803 regarding strict export control of 
dual-use items to Iran.  ESToff urged the officials to engage 
in further outreach with Japanese companies and ensure they 
are aware of critical commodities that front companies could 
use to expand Iran's uranium enrichment efforts.  The 
Japanese firm Toray, for example, is a major carbon fiber 
producer, which is a critical commodity Iran might seek for 
its IR-2 centrifuge. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The METI officials asked that ESToff forward a 
letter in English (contained in paragraph 4) to Washington 
agencies regarding GOJ efforts at enforcing export control 
regulations.  In addition, Tanizawa requested further 
clarification of which specific countries Japanese companies 
should be wary.  In the past, METI has been very careful when 
dealing with companies located in Dubai and the UAE because 
it had found multiple front companies posing as legitimate 
businesses, he said.  The GOJ would appreciate any additional 
information to convey to companies before conducting its 
outreach. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER. 
 
Thank you for your information regarding Iranian centrifuge, 
IR-2. 
 
In accordance with UNSCR 1737 and 1803, we have been 
enforcing strict export control toward Iran.  It is our 
practice not to grant any export licenses for NSG 
list-controlled items to Iran.  Furthermore we asked Japan 
Customs to check all exports of industrial ovens to Iran. 
 
When it comes to epoxy resins that you mentioned in your 
non-paper, it is neither practical nor appropriate to check 
all exports of epoxy resins to Iran since they are so widely 
and commonly used for variety of civil applications. 
 
Useful as your information (is) on epoxy resins, it is so 
broad that we need more clarification.  It would be truly 
appreciated if you could provide us further information as 
follows. 
 
1)  Concrete features or characteristics of epoxy resins 
which may be required to bind carbon fibers used in 
centrifuges. 
 
2)  Specific commercial names of epoxy resins, if any. 
 
3)  How does the Government of the United States control 
epoxy resins (shipped) to Iran? 
 
END OF TEXT. 
SCHIEFFER