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OO RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #9684/01 1792347
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O 272348Z JUN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 069684 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AG EFIN ETTC KTFN PREL PTER UNSC
SUBJECT: ENCOURAGING SUPPORT FOR UN 1267 SANCTIONS AND 
FOLLOW-ON RESOLUTION TO UNSCR 1735 
 
REF: A. A) STATE 066897 
     ¶B. B) USUN 000421 
 
 ¶1. (U) This is an action cable.  Please see paragraphs 6,7 
and 8. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
¶2. (U) The follow-on resolution (Septel) to UNSCR 1735 (2006) 
is intended to guide the work over the next eighteen months 
of the UN Security Council committee established pursuant to 
UNSCR 1267 concerning al-Qaida and the Taliban (1267 
Committee).  The resolution will also extend for another 
eighteen months the mandate of the 1267 Committee's 
Monitoring Team, which provides analytical support to the 
Council on implementation of the resolution.  The 1267 
sanctions regime, which requires states to impose an asset 
freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo on individuals and 
entities found by the Council or its 1267 Committee to be 
associated with al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, is 
one of the international community's most important 
multilateral counterterrorism tools. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Per ref A, we used the opportunity of the Monitoring 
Team's mandate renewal to include in the draft resolution a 
series of measures intended to address criticism that the 
Council's decisions on sanctions are opaque and that its 
procedures for placing individuals on and removing them from 
the 1267 sanctions list are neither fair nor clear.  In 
addition, we urged greater implementation of existing 
fairness and transparency procedures in the 1267 sanctions 
regime.  We want to underscore all of these elements to 
remind UN Member States that we continue to take seriously 
calls to increase fairness and transparency in listings and 
delistings.  However, we also want to underscore that the 
1267 sanctions regime was created to address the threat posed 
by al-Qaida and the Taliban, a threat which persists, and 
therefore we believe the Council's focus should be on taking 
action to address this threat. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Prior to drafting this resolution, we worked with a 
number of countries to explore options to address criticisms 
of the regime and to improve procedures for ensuring fairness 
and transparency in sanctions decisions.  We have been 
briefed on various iterations of proposals to establish an 
independent review panel to advise the 1267 Committee (which 
is a subsidiary body of the Council) on listing and delisting 
decisions. Per Ref B, several of these key interlocutors 
presented this idea to the 1267 Committee.  We (and several 
other Security Council members) have consistently opposed 
establishment of a review panel for a variety of reasons. 
For example, we believe that an advisory panel would 
undermine the authority of the Security Council.  We also 
think it would be ineffective and unworkable in practice, 
given the sensitive nature of much of the information relied 
upon to impose targeted sanctions.  An advisory panel would 
be unlikely to have access to the full record relied upon by 
Member States in proposing or reviewing sanctions.  This lack 
of access would preclude meaningful review.  Member States at 
the forefront of efforts to advance the idea for an 
independent review have acknowledged the shortcomings 
inherent in ideas for an independent review mechanism.  They 
have also told us that they advanced the idea in an effort to 
strengthen procedures in the 1267 Committee in order to help 
ensure the continued viability of the al-Qaida/Taliban 
sanctions regime. 
 
---------- 
OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
¶5. (SBU) Although we (and other Security Council members) 
cannot support proposals advanced by some Member States 
(including Liechtenstein, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Germany) for an independent review panel for 
some of the reasons outlined above, we want those Member 
States to acknowledge positively and publicly the fact that 
we have followed through on our commitment to include new 
 
STATE 00069684  002 OF 003 
 
 
measures in this draft resolution to strengthen procedures to 
ensure fairness and transparency in the 1267 Committee.  We 
believe these elements of the resolution will significantly 
increase transparency of Committee decisions and further 
signal the Committee's determination to demonstrate that the 
Council continues to take seriously the need for the 
sanctions regime to employ fair and clear procedures.  We 
further want to remind all Member States that ensuring the 
continued viability of the regime is a collective effort that 
requires their support.  We would like Member States to join 
us in publicly heralding the adoption by the Council of this 
resolution that was designed to help strengthen fair and 
clear procedures, and to ensure that the committee remains 
focused on the taking action to help deter the threat posed 
by terrorists linked to al-Qaida and the Taliban. If any 
Security Council Members inform us of plans to make an 
"Explanation of Vote" (EOV), we would like to discourage 
statements that would undercut the significant achievements 
made in this resolution. 
 
-------------- 
ACTION REQUEST 
-------------- 
¶6. (U) Action addressee posts in capitals are instructed to 
deliver the points in paragraph 7 to appropriate 
interlocutors.  USUN, at the highest appropriate level, 
should approach representatives from all 15 Security Council 
members to request that they join us in supporting adoption 
(on June 30) of this resolution, and to further join us in 
publicly welcoming new measures to improve fair and clear 
procedures as a significant, substantial progress on an issue 
the Council continues to take very seriously.  USUN should 
similarly encourage non-Security Council Members from key EU 
countries (Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Germany) to make statements in support of 
this resolution and ask that they join us in taking steps to 
support committee action to deter the al-Qaida/Taliban 
terrorist threat. 
 
¶7. (U) Action addressees may wish to draw upon the following 
points, as appropriate: 
 
-- We would like you to join us in publicly welcoming on June 
30 the follow-on resolution to UNSCR 1735. 
 
-- This resolution will guide the work of the 1267 
(al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions) Committee over the next eighteen 
months, and will extend the mandate of the 1267 Monitoring 
Team. 
 
--  This resolution is designed to achieve two objectives. 
The first is to demonstrate the Council's continued 
commitment to addressing the threat to international peace 
and security posed by al-Qaida and the Taliban.  The second 
is to demonstrate that the Council continues to take 
seriously the need for the sanctions regime to employ fair 
and clear procedures in making listing and delisting 
decisions and in considering exemptions to sanctions.  We 
want UN Member States to know that this is a collective 
effort. 
 
-- We have made great efforts to address criticisms that have 
damaged the credibility of this important sanction regime and 
hope that these efforts demonstrate the Council's continued 
commitment to employing fair and clear procedures. 
 
-- We ask that you join us in publicly lauding the 
achievements made in this resolution, and that you actively 
participate in strengthening the regime including by 
proposing, and encouraging other Member States to propose, 
names for listing and/or delisting as appropriate. 
 
-- We must work together to ensure that this effective tool 
in deterring terrorists and those who support them is fully 
exploited, and that the 1267 Committee remains dynamic and 
that the Consolidated List reflects realities on the ground. 
 
-- Keeping this sanctions regime up-to-date and effective 
requires active participation, support, and implementation of 
measures by all Member States. 
 
-- We look forward to working with you to continue to 
strengthen this regime, as well as other UN counterterrorism 
 
STATE 00069684  003 OF 003 
 
 
efforts. 
 
¶8. (SBU) If action addressees learn that their Security 
Council interlocutors plan to provide an "Explanation of 
Vote" (EOV) upon adoption of this resolution, action 
addressees may draw upon the following points, as appropriate: 
 
-- We understand and sympathize with the desire to send a 
signal to the public (and for European Security Council 
Members, to courts) that you are working to address 
adequately "due process" rights in implementing UN targeted 
sanctions. 
 
-- We have made significant concessions to accommodate these 
concerns in negotiations of the draft UNSCR to guide the work 
over the next 18 months of the 1267 (al-Qaida/Taliban 
sanctions) Committee and to extend the mandate of the 1267 
Monitoring Team. 
 
-- We had anticipated that the measures introduced in this 
resolution would be hailed by you and our other European and 
Security Council partners as significant, substantial 
progress that should restore public confidence in this 
important sanctions regime and allow the Committee to resume 
its main focus on deterring the al-Qaida/Taliban terrorist 
threat. 
 
-- We do not believe that statements emphasizing that the 
Council can and must do more will serve any other purpose 
than to cast further doubt on the Council's decisions and 
erode Member States' enthusiasm for and confidence in 
actively implementing or proposing sanctions for Taliban and 
al-Qaida-linked terrorists. 
 
-- The UNSC 1267 Sanctions regime is at a critical juncture. 
It is the UN's most effective, important CT tool.  It is the 
one sanctions regime that heretofore enjoyed widespread 
support and sets the pace for measures adopted across UN 
sanctions regimes.  Its erosion will adversely impact UN 
targeted sanctions as a tool if we do not work together to 
reverse current trends. 
 
-- We ask that you refrain from statements focusing on the 
1267 Committee's weaknesses and instead recognize the 
positive changes that will be implemented and encourage 
others to do the same. 
 
------------------ 
Reporting Deadline 
------------------ 
¶9. Posts should report any substantive comments no later than 
July 3, 2008. 
 
---------------- 
Point of Contact 
---------------- 
¶10. Questions may be directed to IO/PSC (Erin Crowe, 
202-736-7847). 
RICE