R 271524Z JUN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO PAGE 02        STATE   069301  271521Z 
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

UNCLAS STATE 069301 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM
SUBJECT: STATE LEAHY AMENDMENT VETTING IN IRAQ 
 
REF: A. 05 BAGHDAD 04271 B. 05 BAGHDAD 02829 C. 05 BAGHDAD 01681 D. 05 BAGHDAD 02760 E. 06 BAGHDAD 0462 F. 05 STATE 225765 G. 03 STATE 034981 H. LEAHY VETTING GUIDE 24 APRIL 2007 
 
¶1. This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 6. 
 
SUMMARY 
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¶2. The Leahy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) 
prohibits units of security forces from receiving assistance 
if the Department has credible evidence of gross human rights 
violations by such units.  This cable identifies specific 
activities in Iraq that are subject to the Leahy Amendment 
and seeks Post,s recommendation on the most feasible way to 
effect compliance, given the security environment. 
 
BACKGROUND 
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¶3. The "Leahy Amendment" applies to all foreign assistance 
funds appropriated to the Department of State and requires 
that "(n)o assistance shall be furnished under this Act (the 
FAA) or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of the 
security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of 
State has credible evidence that such unit has committed 
gross violations of human rights." (Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961, as amended, Section 620J). Congress has previously 
recognized the uniquely difficult security conditions in Iraq 
may necessitate modification of Leahy vetting procedures for 
an interim period until security conditions improve. 
 
¶4. INL programs in Iraq are currently vetting trainees for 
security risks by using a mixture of the following practices: 
 performing background checks and reviewing Iraqi criminal 
records; gathering biometric information that is checked 
against the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
and in some cases U.S. military and/or intelligence 
databases; and checking local records whenever practical. 
However, these vetting procedures screen for security risks, 
not human rights abuses relevant to the Leahy Amendment. 
 
¶5. Since 2006, Iraqi military personnel nominated for IMET 
have been vetted using the automated fingerprint 
identification system described in paragraph 4, and then the 
candidates, nominations are forwarded to the Department for 
standard Leahy vetting by NEA/I, INR and DRL. 
 
 
ACTION REQUEST 
¶6. The Department seeks to comply with the Leahy amendment 
consistent with current worldwide guidance promulgated by 
cable and the Leahy vetting guide (REFS G and H) and as 
further described in relation to Iraq programs below. 
Recognizing the unique security concerns present in Iraq, we 
seek post,s views on the best approach to doing so and on 
what additional resources, if any, may be required at post to 
fully implement the guidance. We request post,s views by 
July 16, 2008. 
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¶7. Proposed application of Leahy vetting to INL-supervised, 
IRRF and INCLE-funded programs: 
 
(a)   Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF):  The approximately 12 
current (and any future) Iraqi investigators assigned to MCTF 
will be vetted using standard procedures described in the 
Leahy vetting guide.  If candidates are found to have 
credible evidence of gross human rights violations against 
them, they will be removed from their posting to the MCTF 
(or, if future recruits, from consideration for assignment to 
the MCTF), the Government of Iraq will be told the reason for 
exclusion, and another candidate will be selected. Any future 
tactical component dedicated to the MCTF will be vetted as a 
unit, as will its commander, using standard procedures 
described in the Leahy vetting guide. 
 
(b)   Commission on Integrity (COI): Embassy should be aware 
the Leahy vetting Guide states &In broad terms, any division 
or entity (to include an individual) authorized by a state or 
political subdivision (city, county, etc.) to use force 
(including but not limited to the power to search, detain and 
arrest) to accomplish its mission would be considered a 
&security force8.  The Department has determined that the 
COI is a security force unit given its training-including a 
forced entry team, equipment and organization. In 
coordination with the Anti-Corruption coordinator at Embassy 
Baghdad, the COI as an organization, its commissioner, and 
the top level of officials, including the head of each COI 
geographical office, directly reporting to the commissioner, 
should be vetted.  Request specific post recommendations on 
vetting methodology. 
 
(c)   Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS) and Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) ) Prisons and Other ICS facilities (the ICS 
equivalent of units) and Senior ICS and KRG prison officials 
and prison wardens will be vetted, as will individuals in 
charge of jails operated by the Ministry of Justice or KRG. 
 
(d)   Judicial Protection Service (JPS) ) The JPS, as a 
unit, and its commander/director will be vetted. 
 
(e)   The Iraqi Police Service (IPS)  - State administered 
IRRF funded training to the Iraqi Police Service in such 
competencies as intelligence gathering and countering 
kidnapping, terrorism, and organized crime.  Approximately 
250 police are trained per-year under this program, which is 
distinct from the wider police development mission executed 
by Multi-National Force ) Iraq.  The program will expire at 
the end of FY 2009.  Standard Iraq Leahy vetting of 
candidates trained under this program will be done. 
 
 
¶8.  Proposed application of Leahy vetting to IMET programs: 
 
a.    Since 2006, Iraqi military personnel nominated for IMET 
have been vetted in accordance with standard Leahy 
procedures, using the automated fingerprint identification 
system described in paragraph 4, then the candidates, 
nominations are forwarded to the Department for vetting by 
NEA/I, INR and DRL. 
 
b.    All IMET candidates will continue to be vetted using 
standard procedures described in the Leahy vetting guide. 
Candidate information required for vetting will include at a 
minimum: full name, date of birth, place of birth, and unit. 
Proposed training location, curriculum, and dates are also 
required.  If candidates are found to have credible evidence 
of gross human rights violations against them, they will be 
removed from consideration, the GOI will be notified and 
another candidate will be nominated. 
 
¶9. General principles for application of the Leahy Amendment 
to IMET and the INCLE programs described in this cable: 
 
(a)   Future funding.  Every organization receiving 
assistance subject to section 620J of the FAA, Leahy 
amendment will be vetted on a yearly basis.  Newly funded 
units/organizations and their commanders will be vetted 
before receiving State funding.  Assistance will be denied to 
units against which there is credible evidence of gross human 
rights violations by the units or their commanders. 
 
(b)   Credible evidence of gross human rights violations. 
Consistent with the current worldwide guidance and vetting 
guide, should there be credible evidence of gross human 
rights violations related to organizations (to include 
prisons) or their commanders/wardens/directors, the 
Department will take steps to prevent assistance from going 
to the organization identified in the allegation until 
effective measures are taken to bring responsible members to 
justice.  Assistance and training will be withheld at the 
lowest possible applicable level. 
 
(c)   Acknowledging the security situation cited in paragraph 
3 above, proposed vetting procedures have been modified from 
standard procedures in that all members of large newly formed 
units (MCTF, Prisons and JPS) would not have to be vetted 
individually.  Under normal procedures, all members of newly 
formed units receiving assistance would be vetted 
individually.  As security improves in Iraq, this 
modification of standard policy will be re-evaluated. 
 
RICE