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DE RUEHC #7793/01 1761820
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 241821Z JUN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 067793 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ODIP
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE ON OFFICIAL ENGAGEMENT WITH BELARUS 
 
¶1. (U) Summary.  This cable provides guidance for 
contacts with Belarus officials, with background on the 
current state of relations between the United States and 
Belarus. 
 
------------------------- 
Representational Contacts 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) In light of the ongoing pressure by Belarus on 
our embassy personnel, it would not be appropriate to 
invite government of Belarus representatives to USG 
representational events or for USG representatives to 
attend events hosted by or hosted in honor of Belarusian 
officials, including Belarus national day on July 3 and 
U.S. Independence Day on July 4.  In past years, the 
Department has not maintained a firm policy on such 
events, asking posts to use their own discretion. 
However, it is important that U.S. missions do not send 
signals to Belarus or to other countries that our 
relations with Belarus are being conducted on a business 
as usual basis. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Official Meetings: Selective Engagement 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) Since 1997, the United States has maintained a 
policy of "selective engagement" with Belarusian 
leaders: our official contacts with Belarus are 
commensurate with our policy objectives.  Policy-level 
contacts are infrequent.  We do maintain robust contacts 
with and encourage democratic elements in Belarus, 
including independent media and non-governmental 
organizations.  Our informal agreement with the EU has 
been not to meet Belarusian officials at the Cabinet 
level.  In practice, U.S. policy contacts have been at 
or below the Deputy Assistant Secretary level. 
 
¶4. (U) In conversations with allies, particularly in 
Europe, we should reinforce that our selective 
engagement policy has been successful in marginalizing 
the Lukashenka regime and demonstrating a cost for its 
behavior.  Belarus has regularly sought senior level 
contacts with the U.S. and European countries as a way 
to gain legitimacy both in the eyes of other leaders and 
in the eyes of the Belarusian public.  We have 
maintained that senior level contacts should only come 
after Belarus takes significant steps towards easing the 
atmosphere of repression.  Our continued U.S.-EU policy 
of maintaining official contacts below the ministerial 
level has been an important public demonstration of the 
unacceptable nature of Lukashenka's actions.  We should 
also point out that the Lukashenka regime has 
historically distorted and exploited rare senior level 
contacts to claim legitimacy for his regime, without 
granting any concessions for such contacts. 
 
¶5. (U) We continue to maintain working level engagement 
on issues of mutual concern, often within the context of 
international organizations and institutions. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Background on Current Bilateral Relations 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) The United States continues to maintain 
diplomatic relations with Belarus, though these have 
been severely strained in recent months.  Beginning in 
March 2008, Belarus has expelled or otherwise forced the 
departure of our Ambassador and all but 5 American 
diplomats.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has 
set an upper limit of five American diplomats who can be 
in country at any time, including temporary duty (TDY) 
visitors working at the Embassy.  Our Locally Engaged 
Staff (LES) have encountered harassment and threats due 
to their employment with the U.S. embassy.  Recipients 
of U.S. assistance have also been harassed and 
threatened with criminal penalties for their activities 
in support of human rights and democracy, and the state- 
controlled media has conducted Soviet-style ?exposes? of 
U.S. activities. 
 
¶7. (U) Belarusian officials have made it clear that they 
are applying this pressure on our mission to compel a 
reduction in the sanctions imposed after the fraudulent 
presidential election of March 2006 and tightened in 
recent months.  In particular, the Belarusian 
authorities have reacted to sanctions imposed in 
 
STATE 00067793  002 OF 002 
 
 
November 2007 on state oil and chemical conglomerate 
Belneftekhim and to a March 2008 clarification that 
subsidiaries of Belneftekhim are also subject to the 
sanctions.  These recent measures were taken after 
Belarus failed to release all political prisoners, 
including presidential candidate Alyaksandr Kazulin. 
 
¶8. (U) Throughout the diplomatic assault on our embassy, 
we have told Belarus we are open to a dialogue aimed at 
improved relations, but have stressed that this dialogue 
would have to occur in the context of the release of all 
political prisoners and of concrete and irreversible 
steps to correct the underlying factors that led to the 
imposition of sanctions. 
 
¶9. (U) For additional information or guidance on 
contacts with Belarusian officials, you may contact 
Joseph Wang, Belarus Desk Officer, at 202-736-4443 or 
Deputy Director Colleen Hoey in the Office of Ukraine, 
Moldova and Belarus Affairs at 202-647-9049. 
RICE