P R 232038Z JUN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 067398 
 
 
BUENOS AIRES FOR EST 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2033 
TAGS: MTCRE KSCA PARM PREL MNUC ETTC TSPA AR
 
SUBJECT: MTCR:  ARGENTINE SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE (SLV) 
PROGRAM 
 
REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 691 (AND PREVIOUS) 
      ¶B. STATE 50050 (AND PREVIOUS) 
  
 Classified By: ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham. 
 Reason:  1.5 (B), (D). 
  
 ¶1.  (U)  Classified by ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham. 
 Reason:  1.5 (B), (D). 
  
 ¶2.  (U)  This is an action request.  Embassy Buenos Aires, 
 please see paragraph 7. 
  
 ¶3.  (C)  BACKGROUND:  REF A reports the government of 
 Argentina's (GOA's) initial reaction to the U.S. request for 
 additional transparency on Argentina's space launch program 
 (SLV) and requests further details concerning how Washington 
 agencies envision conducting the proposed ""annual 
 consultations"" and periodic site visits. 
  
 ¶4.  (C)  PURPOSE/OBJECTIVE:  As noted in REF B, the U.S. 
 seeks a GOA commitment to provide the United States with full 
 transparency into its SLV program, including annual 
 consultations on the status of the program and on 
 imports/exports relating to the program, and the option of 
 periodic site/s visits.  As an additional transparency 
 measure, we also seek Argentina's commitment to brief its 33 
 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Partners on its SLV 
 program - perhaps via a short information paper - 
 and to describe its SLV efforts in its annual declaration to 
 the HCOC. 
  
 ¶5.  (C)  We believe that this arrangement -- agreement to 
 hold annual consultations and the option for periodic site 
 visits -- will keep the SLV issue from being an irritant in 
 our bilateral relationship.  It also will reinforce our 
 mutual missile nonproliferation objectives by providing 
 ongoing insight into the Argentine program and opportunities 
 for the U.S. to consult with Argentina if program 
 developments - including imports/exports relating to the 
 program - raise questions and/or if questions should arise 
 regarding the migration of technology and equipment from the 
 SLV program to an MTCR Category I offensive military missile 
 system. Additionally, we believe asking Argentina to provide 
 a one-time briefing to the MTCR is an appropriate way for the 
 GOA to demonstrate transparency and accountability to the 
 MTCR for fulfilling its commitments to the MTCR in the early 
 1990s concerning SLVs and the Falda del Carmen facilities. 
  
   ¶6.  (C)  In response to the GOA's request for more 
 information (REF A), we therefore want to provide further 
 elaboration of our thinking concerning annual consultations 
 on the status of Argentina's SLV program and the option for 
 periodic site/s visits.  In particular, we want to indicate 
 that the U.S. would envision the ""annual consultations"" being 
 a half-day to one-day meeting that would be held on a 
 mutually agreed date each year in either Washington or Buenos 
 Aires (venue would alternate).  We also would expect both 
 sides to be represented by an appropriate expert-level 
 delegation, and not high-profile senior officials.  For 
 example, we would anticipate that the U.S. delegation would 
 be led by the State Department's Director for Missile Threat 
 Reduction and would include representatives and technical 
 experts from the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and State. 
  While the specific agenda for the ""annual consultations"" 
 would need to be agreed in advance by the two governments, we 
 would generally expect th 
 e meeting to include a status report by the Argentine side on 
 the SLV program.  We also would expect the U.S. side to raise 
 any questions it might have about program developments and/or 
 imports/exports relating to the SLV program.  Additionally, 
 and as relevant and appropriate, we would anticipate the U.S. 
 side sharing information with the GOA concerning 
 proliferation-related activities of third countries and/or 
 non-state actors that would be helpful to the GOA's efforts 
 to implement and maintain sufficient safeguards to ensure 
 that the SLV program is not used - even inadvertently - as a 
 source of supply by proliferators. Finally, with regard to 
 site visits, our expectation would be that this would largely 
 be managed by the GOA inviting U.S. Embassy officials to 
 witness program milestones and affording them unfettered 
 access to the SLV program, including all relevant equipment 
 and personnel.  However, we would not want to preclude the 
 possibility of Washington officials visiting the GOA's SLV 
 program faciliti 
 es at some future date. 
  
 ¶7.  (C)  ACTION REQUEST:  Drawing on the information provided 
 in paragraphs 4-6 above, request Embassy Buenos Aires convey 
 to CONAE Director Varotto and appropriate Argentine MFA 
 officials U.S. thinking on the nature of the SLV-related 
 transparency measures we are seeking, and report response. 
 Post should underscore that the U.S. intent is not/not to 
 create unwieldy or overly burdensome confidence building 
 measures, but to establish a transparency mechanism whereby 
 we can have confidence that the Argentine SLV program is 
 moving forward in a manner consistent with our shared missile 
 nonproliferation objectives.  Post also should stress that we 
 recognize and appreciate Argentina's leadership on 
 nonproliferation matters and hope we can work together to 
 address SLV transparency in a mutually satisfactory way. 
  
 ¶8.  (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham (Phone: 
 202-647-4931).  Please slug any reporting on this issue for 
 ISN and WHA. 
 RICE 
  
  
 NNNN 
  



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