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Viewing cable 08STATE63551, REAFFIRMING RUSSIA,S COMMITMENT TO THE WMD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08STATE63551 2008-06-12 18:32 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0019
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #3551 1641841
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 121832Z JUN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1856
UNCLAS STATE 063551 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMGT OTRA PREL PTER RS
SUBJECT: REAFFIRMING RUSSIA,S COMMITMENT TO THE WMD 
TERRORISM WORK PLAN 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
1. (U) This is an action request (see para 3). 
 
2. (SBU) At the recent weapons of mass destruction terrorism 
(Wmd-t) sub-group meeting of the U.S.-Russia Counterterrorism 
Working Group (CTWG) in washington in February, the united 
states and russia adopted a robust work plan that marked a 
strong U.S. and RUSSIAN INTEREST IN WMD terrorism 
cooperation.  In the plan itself, Russia pledged to RESPOND 
BY March on two specific U.S. proposals ) a nuclear 
forensics plan and a MoU on consequence management for 
incidents in the vicinity of nuclear plants.  However, 
RussiaN interlocutors HAve NOT YET respondED to our 
proposals, AND subsequently HAVe implied that THEY must 
SECURE INTERAGENCY APPROVAL before implementation. 
 
3. (SBU) IN THE INTEREST OF MAKING PROGRESS ON IMPORTANT WMD 
TERRORISM INITIATIVES, particularly in advance of the CTWG, 
department requests post deliver a message to APPROPRIATE 
OFFICIALS IN the mfa office of new challenges and threats, 
drawing on the points below. Department requests that post 
deliver these points in a tone consistent with our bilateral 
dialogue, and not pass them verbatim as a non-paper. 
 
-- At the february WMD subgroup meeting of the CTWG IN 
WASHINGTON, we were pleased to adopt a work plan laying out 
concrete plans for cooperation in the field of wmd terrorism. 
 we regard the plan as a blueprint for success, beneficial to 
both the U.S. and Russia. 
 
-- AT A TIME WHEN al-qa,ida leadership HAS publicly declared 
ITS belief that weapons of mass destruction are a legitimate 
form of attack against civilians, COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD 
IS IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST. 
 
-- IN THIS REGARD, WE ARE EAGER TO MOVE FORWARD IN 
IMPLEMENTING THE WORK PLAN and undertaking the many important 
action items.  We would welcome information about the status 
of Russian approval of the work plan, which we hope will be 
soon. 
 
-- ALSO, WE WOULD WELCOME RUSSIA,S  RESPONSE TO the 
PROPOSALS MADE AT the FEBRUARY SUB-GROUP meeting for 
Bilateral cooperation on nuclear forensics, aN MoU on 
consequence management for incidents in the vicinity of 
nuclear plants, and to recent non-papers sent on foreign 
consequence management and a bioterrorism tabletop exercise. 
 
4. (U) department appreciates post,s assistance in conveying 
these points. 
RICE