R 112051Z JUN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BERLIN 5097-
AMEMBASSY LONDON 8001-
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1830-
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1176-
AMEMBASSY PARIS 9394-
AMEMBASSY ROME 6707-
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4697-
USEU BRUSSELS
USMISSION GENEVA 2394-
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2134-
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 3310-

UNCLAS STATE 063111 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y  (ADDED SENSITIVE CAPTION) 
 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC
 
SUBJECT: G8 NPDG CONSIDERS NONPROLIFERATION STATEMENT 
 
Summary 
 
¶1. (SBU) At its June 5 meeting, the G8 Nonproliferation 
Directors Group (NPDG) agreed on most of the nonproliferation 
language for the G8 Summit statement, but left some key 
issues unresolved.  These included the G8's view of the way 
forward on nuclear disarmament, the DPRK (whether to mention 
abductions and how to describe Six-Party commitments), and 
Iran (whether to mention suspension of enrichment and the 
need to consider EU High Representative Solana's June 14 trip 
to Tehran).  Compromise U.S.-Canadian language on transfers 
of enrichment and reprocessing technology, facilities, and 
equipment was widely accepted, but the EU and others wanted 
time to consider its legal ramifications.  NPDG 
representatives will try to resolve outstanding issues by 
email.  end summary 
 
¶2. (U) Mary Alice Hayward, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations, 
ISN, led the U.S. delegation to the June 5 meeting of the G8 
Nonproliferation Directors Group (NPDG) in Kyoto, Japan.  The 
meeting, the last before the G8 Summit in July, was almost 
entirely occupied with drafting the nonproliferation section 
of the G8 Leaders' statement.  This report summarizes key 
points raised in that discussion. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Discussion of the first paragraph on general goals 
centered on the strong German interest in having a reference 
to a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.  The U.S. had 
countered on the need to stress the environment necessary to 
create such a world, and the chair proposed a compromise 
taking both perspectives into account.  France made a strong 
argument that this was a nonproliferation statement and was 
not the place to reconcile fundamental differences on 
disarmament.  After a fairly long discussion, the Chair 
produced a paragraph in which the key last sentence remained 
bracketed.  The paragraph reads: "We are determined to make 
all efforts to overcome the danger of the proliferation of 
WMD and their delivery means and to prevent acquisition of 
WMD by terrorists, by upholding, strengthening and 
universalizing all relevant multilateral non-proliferation 
and disarmament instruments.  (We are committed to working 
towards/realizing a world free of all WMDs by creating an 
environment conducive to such a goal.)" 
 
DPRK 
 
¶4. (SBU) Although all participants recognized that the 
section on the DPRK and Iran would have to be revised before 
the Summit depending on developments in the meantime, the 
Group nevertheless held extensive discussions of these two 
issues, drawing on revisions proposed by the U.S., as well as 
language the chair had circulated earlier.  Japan and Russia, 
in particular, had rather heated exchanges on the DPRK 
section, both referring to the 2005 Six-Party declaration. 
Among the issues raised were whether to refer only to 
commitments by the DPRK or whether to mention commitments of 
all six parties; whether to specifically call for the 
"complete, verifiable, and irreversible" denuclearization of 
the DPRK; and whether to mention the abduction issue.  On the 
latter, the Japanese chair (Takeshi Nakane, Director-General, 
Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Science Department, MOFA) 
said he had no flexibility, especially since the Summit was 
to be in Japan.  If the question could not be resolved by the 
NPDG, he would have to bring it to Political Directors.  The 
Chair said he would provide a re-drafted paragraph. 
 
Iran 
 
¶5. (SBU) The discussion on the Iran paragraph led off with 
Russia proposing that the G8 use the paragraph the P-5 had 
agreed to at the May NPT PrepCom.  Other representatives 
argued, however, that the context was different and that the 
G8 should instead draw on language from previous summit 
statements, which included references to Iranian suspension 
of enrichment activities (which the P-5 statement did not). 
All agreed on the need to take into account the upcoming 
visit of EU High Representative Solana to Tehran on June 14, 
but not on whether to reflect the recent report of the IAEA 
Director General.  In that connection the Russian 
representative pointed out that the U.S. and Russia (at a 
Rood/Kislyak meeting) had agreed there would be no Iran 
resolution at the June 2-6 IAEA Board of Governors.  The 
Chair said this paragraph would have to be considered by 
Political Directors, but later clarified that this would not 
happen at their meeting to take place the week of June 9. 
 
NPT Review Process 
 
¶6. (U) The result of a long discussion on the NPT was finally 
to take a Canadian suggestion and revert to straight-forward 
language from the G8 Gleneagles statement.  In the agreed 
paragraph, the G8 agree to "work collectively to achieve a 
successful outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference" and 
"pledge ... to redouble our efforts to uphold and strengthen 
the Treaty." 
 
Nuclear Testing/FMCT 
 
¶7. (U) A brief discussion on these issues led to a technical 
amendment as to what a testing moratorium applied to.  The 
paragraph was then agreed. 
 
BTWC/CWC/Hague Code of Conduct 
 
¶8. (U) There were no substantive comments on this paragraph. 
 
 
Other Nonproliferation Activities 
 
¶9. (U) Russia objected to U.S. proposals for strengthening 
references to UNSC Resolution 1540 and the Proliferation 
Security Initiative.  The chair accepted some U.S. language 
on 1540 ("stress full implementation of UNSC resolution 
1540") but not calls for assisting other states in 
implementing the Resolution. 
 
Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and 
Materials of Mass Destruction 
 
¶10. (U) With the change of one of three "risks" to 
"challenges" in the second sentence of this paragraph, the 
Group accepted the compromise language agreed to at the 
special meeting of the Global Partnership Working Group 
(GPWG) the previous day (septel).  The language reflects 
determination to "accomplish" priority projects underway and 
notes agreement that "since the risks of the spread of 
weapons and materials of mass destruction exist 
worldwide,...the Partnership will address these global 
challenges particularly in areas where the risks of terrorism 
and proliferation are greatest." 
 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
 
¶11. (U) Apart from some minor fixes and the Russian request 
to delete a reference to "3S," (referring to nonproliferation 
safeguards, safety, and security) which the Russians said 
could not be translated into Russian but which the Chair 
insisted on retaining, the only debate on this paragraph 
concerned a final sentence referring to Chernobyl.  Canada 
and the chair argued that such a reference was needed to 
carry on work on this issue, although others said it was not 
relevant to the activities of the NPDG.  The chair said the 
Japanese would raise it with the Sherpas. 
 
Transfers of Sensitive (Enrichment and Reprocessing--ENR) 
Technology 
 
¶12. (SBU) The discussion centered on a compromise paragraph 
that the U.S. and Canadian representatives had worked out on 
an ad referendum basis just before the meeting began.  Other 
representatives expressed their pleasure that the U.S. and 
Canada seemed to have reached agreement and -- except for 
agreeing to a Russian suggestion to use "criteria based 
approach" to describe what the NSG was coming to agreement on 
-- did not change the language.  The EU representative said 
that the restriction on certain kinds of transfers of 
"equipment, facilities and technology" could run up against 
EURATOM rules and needed to be reviewed by EU lawyers. 
Others expressed surprise that the EU was raising this 
concern at such a late date, when the G8 has agreed on even 
stricter restrictions in the past.  All representatives 
agreed that this paragraph would stay in brackets for review 
by their authorities.  The chair hoped the issue could be 
settled by email exchanges. 
 
¶13. (U) After some discussion, the chair agreed that the 
Political Directors would not discuss the text of the 
statement in their meeting on June 9-10, but that NPDG 
representatives would attempt to resolve outstanding issues 
by email.  At the conclusion of the meeting, he circulated a 
text, showing where the discussion had led, except on the 
DPRK and Iran, where he promised to transmit language later. 
 
G8 Initiative on Nuclear Energy Infrastructure 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Japanese introduced to the NPDG a paper on this 
subject agreed by a recent meeting of the Nuclear Safety and 
Security Group (NSSG).  It calls for states to take account 
of the 3S's (see para 11 above), when developing national 
infrastructures for nuclear power.  While France, the U.S., 
the UK, Italy, and the EU supported the general thrust of the 
paper, the German representative recalled that at the NSSG, 
Germany said it could not participate in this activity until 
it was discussed at more senior G8 levels and higher 
authorities in Germany had blessed it.  After the Russians 
recalled that their proposal to place the NSSG under the NPDG 
had been rejected in 2006 and others engaged in further 
procedural wrangling, the chair announced that Japan would 
bring the issue to the Sherpas to resolve. 
 
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 
 
¶15. (U) Tomiko Ichikawa, MOFA official responsible for this 
field, briefed the Group on her May 13 contacts with the 
chair of the 1540 Committee in New York, at which time she 
had asked how the G8 could support the Committee's 
activities.  He had replied that since the Committee's 
program of work was not finalized, he could not provide 
priorities but noted that the number of countries reporting 
(140)--some more than once--showed the success of outreach 
programs.  Nevertheless, some 35 states had not reported, 
indicating a continuing need to raise awareness, particularly 
in Africa, the Caribbean, and the South Pacific.  Ichikawa 
said she would consult with G8 partners to get ideas on what 
to do next.  There were no comments. 
 
Bilateral Demarche on FMCT (Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty) 
 
¶16. (SBU) At a bilateral discussion the day before the NPDG 
meeting, Hayward had brought to Nakane's attention a concern 
the U.S. had raised in Geneva about the prospect of Japan 
sponsoring an NGO briefing on FMCT during the UNGA First 
Committee meeting in October in New York.  While the U.S. 
could not object to a discussion of the subject in general, 
it found disturbing the notion that at the briefing the NGO 
might be planning to propose a draft FMCT in competition to 
the one the U.S. had tabled at the Conference on Disarmament 
in 2007.  The U.S. hoped Japan would not give additional 
weight to the text by associating itself with its 
presentation.  Nakane took the demarche on board but made no 
comment.  In a June 11 conversation with an officer from 
Embassy Tokyo, Ayako Hashida of the MOFA's Arms Control and 
Disarmament Department confirmed that Japan will help 
organize the meeting but will not support a new draft treaty. 
 
¶17. (U) Text of Draft Nonproliferation Section of the G8 
Leaders' Statement (Note: paras 2 and 3 are place holders) 
 
 
Begin Text 
 
¶1. We are determined to make all efforts to overcome the 
danger of the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means 
and to prevent acquisition of WMD by terrorists, by 
upholding, strengthening and universalizing all relevant 
multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament instruments. 
(We are committed to (working towards) (realizing) a world 
free of all WMDs by creating an environment conducive to such 
a goal.) 
 
(2.  We are committed to resolving regional proliferation 
challenges by diplomatic means.  We express our continuous 
support for the Six-Party process towards the complete, 
verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the DPRK and 
the evnetual normalization of relations between the relevant 
Six-Party members through the full implementation of the 
Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, including the 
resolution of the outstanding issues of concern such as the 
abduction issue.  (We strongly urge the DPRK to immediately 
fulfill its commitments including providing a complete and 
correct declaration fo all its nuclear programmes.)  We also 
urge the DPRK to comply with UNSCRs 1695 and 1718, to permit 
the international community to verify the elimination of all 
its nuclear weapons and programmes and to return to full 
compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards.) (to be further 
discussed based on the development of actual situation) 
 
(3. We express our serious concern at Iran's nuclear 
programme and continued failure to meet its international 
obligations.  We urge Iran to fuly comply with UNSCRs 1696, 
1737, 1747 and 1803 without further delay, in particular, to 
suspend all enrichment-related activities as well as to fully 
cooperate with the IAEA.  We firmly support and cooperate 
with the efforts by China, France, Germany, Russia, the 
United Kingdom and the United States to resolve the issue 
innovataively through negotiation on the basis of their 
offers (in June 2006 and in May this year,) and urge Iran to 
respond to them positively.) (to be further discussed based 
no the development of actual situation) 
 
¶4. We will work collectively to achieve a successful outcome 
of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.  In this context, we 
reaffirm our full commitment to all three pillars 
(non-proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and 
disarmament) of the NPT and pledge ourselves to redouble our 
efforts to uphold and strengthen the Treaty.  We welcome all 
nuclear disarmament efforts, notably the ongoing reductions 
of nuclear weapons that the nuclear-weapon States among G8 
members have made so far and call on all nuclear-weapon 
States to undertake such reductions in a transparent manner. 
 
¶5. We urge all states concerned to observe a moratorium on 
nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear 
explosions.  We strongly support immediate commencement and 
early conclusion of negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off 
Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament and urge all states 
concerned to declare without delay and uphold a moratorium on 
production of fissile material for weapons purposes. 
 
¶6. We welcome the current progress of the BTWC and the CWC, 
namely the successful outcome of the CWC 2nd Review 
Conference and reiterate the vital importance of their full 
and effective implementation. 
   We stress the importance of and remain committed to the 
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
and urge all states to subscribe to the Code without delay. 
 
¶7. Preventing and countering proliferation requires all 
states to implement effective measures.  We will redouble our 
efforts to work together to that end in a more hormonized and 
coordinated manner.  In this context we welcome the extension 
of the mandate of the 1540 Committee and stress the 
importance of full implementation of UNSC resolution 1540. 
   We further stress the importance of: 
(-the implementation of other relevant UNSCRs,) -- ENTRY 
MARKED THROUGH 
- effective export controls, 
- strengthening of IAEA safeguards and the universalization 
of the IAEA Additional Protocol, 
- the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of 
Radioactive Sources, and 
- supporting the activities of the Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security 
Initiative which has just celebrated its 5th anniversary. 
 
¶8. We are determined to accomplish priority projects under 
the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and 
Materials of Mass Destruction that was launched at the 
Kananaskis Summit of 2002.  Since the risks of the spread of 
weapons and materials of mass destruction exist worldwide, we 
agree that the Partnership will address these global 
challenges particularly in areas where the risks of terrorism 
and proliferation are greatest. 
 
¶9. We reaffirm the inalienable right of all parties to the 
NPT to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with 
all their Treaty obligations.  We are committed to and 
promote the highest possible standards on nuclear 
non-proliferation, safeguards, safety and security ((3S)) 
including the IAEA Additional Protocol.  In this context, we 
appreciate various initiatives in the field of multilateral 
approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and assurance of nuclear 
fuel supply and encourage all efforts to further develop 
them.  (In relation to nuclear safety, we reaffirm previous 
G7/G8 summit commitments with regard to Chernobyl and endorse 
the view of G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group in this 
regard.) 
 
(10. We welcome the significant progress made by the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) in moving toward consensus on criteria 
based approach to strengthen controls on transfers of 
enrichment and reprocessing equipment, facilities and 
technology.  We support the NSG effort to reach consensus on 
this important issue.  We agree that transfers of our 
equipment, facilities and technology to any additional states 
in the next year will be subject to conditions that, at a 
minimum, do not permit or enable replication of the 
facilities.) 
 
End Text 
RICE 
 
 
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